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SUMMARY 
 
Abstract 
 
The idea of the end of art, originating in Western modernism, forms a link between modern 
art and thought. The tendency for this idea to recur throughout the modern, together with 
the proliferation of art in the post-modern period, has rendered ‘the end of art’ somewhat 
redundant in most contemporary art analysis. By contrast, this thesis considers the value of 
applying the idea of the end of art to contemporary art discourse and practice, in particular 
for its potential to strengthen the link between discourse and practice and return a sense of 
sovereignty to contemporary artists.  
 
Contemporary art’s open, post-historical nature is frequently valued over the perceived 
metanarratives and ideology of the modern; however these characteristics also result in 
concerns that contemporary art lacks criticality. Attempts to return theoretical or 
philosophical criteria to evaluating contemporary art are frequently thwarted by 
accompanying attempts to retain its openness and plurality, while the common tendency to 
define ‘the contemporary’ as a new or improved moment tends instead to replicate modern 
or utopian thought. This thesis contends that for many art practitioners, the openness and 
all-encompassing nature of the term ‘contemporary art’ paradoxically works to ‘entrap’ 
their practice, and preclude its potential for criticality and significance. 
 
This thesis contributes to addressing this dilemma by proposing a definition of 
contemporary art as the end of art, and explores the potential for executing a contemporary 
practice within this view. It contrasts existing definitions of contemporary art with the idea 
of the end of art by examining the idea’s history and recent contextualisation within 
contemporary art by philosopher Arthur C. Danto. The thesis proposes strategies for 
practicing art at the end of art, and argues for the value of practicing art relative to the idea 
that art has ended. 
 
Description of Creative Work  
 
An exhibition of between seven to eight works will take place at Sarah Cottier Gallery, 
Sydney, from February 5 to February 27, 2016. Media will include hessian, mixed fabric, 
mixed fibre, metal and wooden fixings, bamboo, acrylic paint. Work is primarily wall-based, 
but may also hang from the ceiling or be positioned on the floor. This work extends 
experiments with new materials originating from work previously completed as a result of 
the thesis research, exploring art-making methodologies in combination with an end of art 
statement.  
 
 PREFACE  
THE STORY OF MY PRACTICE 
 
Decorative Painting Project (1988 - 2003) 
 
The outset of my undergraduate study1 was accompanied by a sense that I had no real 
reason to make art, and confusion as to what art actually was. While at this point I had no 
thought of the end of art, a retrospective view of the development of my practice displays a 
relation to the idea. 
 
In a second-year painting exercise instructed by artist John Dunkley-Smith, the exact 
dimensions of the supports we were to use – height, width, and depth – were specified, 
resulting in the construction of four box-like forms. While free to paint anything on them, 
the emphasis on the object-ness of these supports rendered the act of applying an illusory 
sense of representation superfluous. My solution was to draw an even grid on each visible 
surface, fill its squares with identical painted markings, and write each side’s measurement 
near the edge. The result was a set of boxes covered in similar, regular, and aesthetically 
compelling patterns fig 1. 
 
A sense of nihilism had accompanied my approach to this exercise – the heavy silence of the 
objects’ demand for content was overwhelming, as was the responsibility I had felt to apply 
significant artistic form to their surfaces. Happening upon my solution however, a layer of 
mystique was removed from my perception of the art object due to the emphasis the 
exercise gave the reality of painting as a box-like form, endowing the support with greater 
significance over the sense of its subject matter or illusion, which came to seem superficial. 
Where I had previously felt a keen lack of individual style or a subject to paint within the 
open terrain of our newly imposed studio practice, the idea of gridded, patterned paintings 
provided me with a method with which to approach future works, which I continued over 
the next few months fig 2. 
                                                          
1
 Sydney College of the Arts, 1987-1989. 
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Fig 1 Elizabeth Pulie 
1988 
example from early painting exercise 
acrylic on canvas on cardboard, 20.4 x 20.4 x 12cm 
3 
 
  
Fig 2 Elizabeth Pulie  
1988 
early patterned painting examples 
acrylic on board, 4 panels, each 20 x 10cm 
4 
 
In discussions these works were frequently contextualised as ‘process art’ by my tutors: to 
me however, the objectives and concerns of this 1960s movement did not provide an 
adequately personal rationale for making art. While I enjoyed the meditative process of 
making these works, and the considerable time and effort involved resulted in a satisfying 
sense of working, the process of ‘making art’ felt an insufficient reason for me to choose to 
make art in the first place – thus my founding questions regarding what art was, and why 
one would make it, remained. 
 
Happening upon a small book concerned with European modernism2, I gained sudden 
awareness of a view of modern western art as the progressive historical movement of 
styles, where each new style challenged the parameters of the art that had preceded it and 
questioned the canon of the art of the day. This idea gave me an insight into the diversity of 
modern art forms, their frequently radical nature, and the historical import of modern art as 
a whole: it seemed that the artists of each movement had striven to make forms of art that 
were more real to them than the official forms of their time. I gained the idea that art’s 
validity lay in its questioning its own nature, and that artists should engage in a radical 
practice true to their own view of art and the world.  
 
After making gridded, patterned paintings for almost a year, I was eventually advised by a 
tutor that I shouldn’t let my work become ‘too decorative’: here, the fact my work shouldn’t 
be decorative seemed to form a parameter of contemporary art. In critical tutorials where 
we had discussed the meaning or theory informing our colleagues’ work, a contrast seemed 
to exist between the import of a work’s theory or meaning and a frequently accompanying 
emphasis on the work as aesthetic, which raised questions for me around the relation 
between aesthetics or appearances and a works’ meaning or significance. These parameters 
and contrasts seemed to form signposts around which I could anchor a critical practice.  
 
At this time, a sensationalised television report3 made me aware of the business-art practice 
of New York-based artist, Mark Kostabi. Kostabi – a cheeky, oddball character with a 
clownish persona – manufactured paintings in a factory, a team of artists designing, 
                                                          
2
 I have unfortunately lost any references to this book. 
3
 An exposé by the Australian current affairs program 60 Minutes, 1988. 
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executing and even signing his work for him. The report’s journalist portrayed Kostabi’s 
project and its acceptance by contemporary art institutions as scandalous; to me, Kostabi’s 
work challenged the fact that art should be non-commercial and hold meaningful content, 
raising questions of authorship and authenticity and highlighting the institution’s role in 
forming the concept ‘art’. His maintaining a clown-like persona meant Kostabi thumbed his 
nose at the institution while it (albeit fleetingly) accepted him, and my awareness of his 
enterprise transformed my understanding and practice of art4. A view of art as commodity 
eradicated the heavy demand I had felt that art should embody meaning, showing me 
something real about what art was. The conflict that I had sensed existed between a work’s 
aesthetic and its meaning was, to a degree, solved within a view of art as business, and the 
fact the institution embraced a practice that openly ridiculed it by denying the art object’s 
authenticity or significance signalled an exciting vision of art as radical and self-critical.  
 
Art as decoration and art as commodity formed parameters for contemporary art, indicating 
a possibility for a critical art practice. Where Kostabi took something art wasn’t meant to be 
and made art as business, I decided to take something else art wasn’t meant to be and make 
art as decoration5. The institutional validation of Kostabi’s paintings eradicated the necessity 
I felt that my art should hold meaning or significance, and it seemed that the only true role 
art objects could hold in such an instance was as decoration. Given this was the reality for 
art in my day, my aim to be true to reality meant I could only make art as decoration. 
 
I decided that making decorative paintings was to be my life project. I titled these paintings 
numerically and consecutively – beginning with One (1988) fig 3. 
  
                                                          
4
 I later became aware of Warhol’s earlier pioneering of the idea of Business Art. 
5
 While the modern Austrian architect Adolf Loos wrote his lecture condemning ornament in 1908, the fact I 
was warned against making decorative paintings in 1988 reveals that ‘art’ and ‘ornament’ remain conceptually 
opposed: see Adolf Loos, Ornament and Crime: Selected Essays, ed. Adolf Opel, trans. Michael Mitchell 
(California: Ariadne Press, 1998). 
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Fig 3 Elizabeth Pulie  
One 
1988 
acrylic on canvas, 140 x 110cm 
7 
 
In order to exclude any indicators of depth, meaning, theme or content from these works, I 
initially rendered the shapes and motifs using stencils and flat surfaces, minimising 
brushstrokes or a sense of the artist’s hand. I aimed for a future wherein my paintings could 
be ordered and remade in different colours and sizes to suit particular interiors, and to this 
end kept numbered cardboard templates of the designs. My decorative paintings were well 
received by students and faculty, and I was invited to participate in group exhibitions and 
hold solo exhibitions in established public and commercial galleries and artist run initiatives. 
 
While I continued this project for fifteen years it didn’t have the impact I wanted: I had 
anticipated some opposition in reaction to my work, and had hoped that the resulting 
controversy would raise questions regarding the nature of art and its objects within the 
contemporary moment. The ready acceptance of my decorative paintings by institutions of 
contemporary art led paradoxically to my project’s failure (at least in part), since any 
oppositional status they may have held as decoration, and thus as non-art, was nullified and 
subsumed. 
 
Situating objects within a gallery context tends automatically to imbue them with 
significance, meaning or concerns: where the first monochrome or readymade may have 
looked like non-art in its time, it may be impossible today to make such a gesture. My 
paintings were not read as ‘merely decoration’, and critics and theorists tended to link my 
work with issues such as feminism, aesthetics, and art versus craft6. In 1997, Jacqueline 
Millner wrote: ‘as Pulie is well aware, no amount of clarification from the artist…could 
prevent the behemoth of interpretation from unleashing its manifold postulations.’7 The 
claim that my work was ‘only decoration’ had necessarily to be made in words, since the 
openness of contemporary art institutions to art in any form meant it was no longer possible 
to critique art through the object itself. While I continued to number my paintings for some 
time, my definition of ‘decoration’ became looser: I began to draw my own designs, allowed 
visible brushstrokes, and experimented with new mediums and surfaces fig 4. Losing track of 
my numbering system around 2003, my decorative painting project – within the strict sense 
of its original parameters – dissolved.  
                                                          
6 For example, Bronwyn Clark-Coolee, ‘Elizabeth Pulie,’ Agenda 15 (1990): 14-15. 
7
 Jacqueline Millner, ‘Looking Good, the Work of Elizabeth Pulie,’ Eyeline 33 (1997): 12-14. 
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    Fig 4 Elizabeth Pulie  
    204 (Freehand Over Landscape) 
    2002 
    acrylic on canvas, 84 x 62cm 
    photo courtesy Sarah Cottier gallery 
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Relational Practice (2000-2006) 
 
Throughout the 1990s I exhibited increasingly at artist run initiatives8, where creating and 
sharing events and spaces with other artists felt more authentic than an involvement with 
the professional world of commercial galleries and museums. The dwindling impact of my 
object-based practice had rendered it less interesting to me, while making and facilitating 
art outside the institution seemed more radical. In addition, the exclusive sense of an 
involvement with an alternative art world felt like something unique to being an artist and 
potentially represented a characteristic that was essential to art9. In the year 2000 I made 
the decision to run a gallery in the front room of my house10 in an attempt to participate in 
an activity that felt more real than that of my decorative painting project. 
 
I had noticed that I tended to scan the name(s) of the artist(s) involved in exhibitions before 
making a judgement as to whether or not I would attend the opening, a fact which pointed 
to the idea that an artist’s name (or ‘fame’) was of some value and somehow intrinsic to a 
definition of art. With this in mind, I began to publish and distribute my own art magazine, 
Lives of the Artists11 (2002-2005). I wanted to create an interest in (and exploit) the lives of 
my friends and colleagues for those outside the art world and highlight the community that 
surrounded the alternative scene, outside official art contexts. Similarly to my introducing 
decoration to the realm of art, I focussed on something (i.e. the artist as name or 
personality) not normally considered intrinsic to art’s meaning, and I hoped to lend a sense 
of do-it-yourself, street-style glamour and thus exclusivity to the activities in which I was 
engaged with my artist friends. 
 
Lives of the Artists was a black and white photocopied publication that I edited and 
published myself. While my aim was that it would eventually achieve greater distribution, 
                                                          
8
 Including regular exhibitions and attendance at CBD Gallery, Pendulum, South and Elastic Projects in Sydney. 
9
 The term ‘Relational Art’ was first raised within the exhibition catalogue for Traffic, curated by Nicholas 
Bourriaud at the CAPC Musee d’Art Contemporain de Bordeaux in 1996; I was however unaware of the term 
when I undertook my own relational activities. 
10
 Front Room, 2002-2003, with co-director and artist Jay Balbi. 
11
 Named after Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, first published in 
1550. 
10 
 
glossier production standards and increased advertising revenue, within its eventual run of 
ten issues, Lives of the Artists retained an underground, handmade quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
   Fig 5 Elizabeth Pulie  
   Lives of the Artists #5, Spring 2003 
   photocopy on paper, A4, 32 pages 
   (cover image: Kathy Temin) 
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Contributions to the magazine were made by artists and friends and varied greatly in nature, 
ranging from exhibition reviews and articles to artist pages, advertisements and light-
hearted, pop-cultural references. My own contributions (occasionally published under a 
pseudonym) consisted mainly of interviews with artists and reviews of non-art subjects, for 
example local retailers or Danish pastries. I aimed for the publication to contain writing of a 
light-hearted, approachable nature interspersed with more serious art content.  
 
My final relational activity was an artist’s group called Sydney Ladies’ Artist’s Club (SLAC) 
(2005-2007). Initially comprising a core number of Sydney-based female artists, the group 
was based around events rather than a physical space or exhibitions, and communication 
occurred via email and a blog12. I believed strongly that the group should operate 
democratically: to this end, any member could organise any event they liked under the 
auspices of the group. Events could be open to all (including men) or to members only, and 
organisers were responsible for obtaining a venue, sending invitations, and setting out the 
event’s parameters. Some of the events included a craft afternoon, slide nights, netball 
tournament, and a reading group.13  
 
While enjoyable, my relational art practice felt ineffective as an art strategy: facilitating 
others’ ideas was frustrating when they did not resonate with my own questions regarding 
the nature of art or my desire to challenge what art was. The most rewarding aspect of this 
practice may have been the sense of respect it lent, rendering me gatekeeper of my own 
institution. While I viewed these projects as my art practice, it gradually became clear that 
some assumed this more facilitative role meant I had stopped making art: despite growing 
international awareness of such practices as in themselves art, it became apparent that an 
expectation that the role of artist necessitated the making and exhibiting of objects 
frequently remained. While I had maintained an ongoing studio and exhibiting practice 
during these years, my relational involvement tended to read as my giving up art. 
                                                          
12
 The blog is still active: http://sydneyladiesartistsclub.blogspot.com.au/.  
13 An offer to the group in 2006 to hold an exhibition at Artspace, Sydney, challenged my aim that the 
organisation operate democratically: three or four members had negotiated the offer and felt a need to 
control the event, curating other members into their own installations rather than allowing all members equal 
access to gallery space and funding. Since a hierarchical approach was not in the spirit of my original aims for 
the group, I withdrew SLAC from Artspace’s offer. The occasion proved difficult to negotiate and caused 
unforeseen friction and discord, with the group petering out not long afterwards. 
12 
 
End of art project (2010 - ) 
 
In 2006, impending motherhood seemed to necessitate a withdrawal from relational 
activities, and I returned to a solitary, studio-based practice.  In this phase, lacking a project 
or framework in which to operate, I experimented with new materials such as oil stick and 
ink and juxtaposed them with my more usual hard-edged acrylic forms fig 6. I hinged my 
paintings around personal themes and made intentionally ‘ugly’ art, mimicking mass-
produced paintings that sell as furniture for interiors rather than high art.  
 
While this period of work was open and experimental, the sense of nihilism that 
accompanied my confrontation with the blank support remained. Once again afloat in a sea 
of conceptual uncertainty, I nonetheless produced and exhibited some paintings which were 
interesting enough.  
 
In 2010 I was invited by Melbourne-based artist Elvis Richardson to contribute to her gallery 
project Death be Kind, wherein all work was obliged to deal with the theme ‘death’. This 
presented me with a very real challenge: having spent twenty years avoiding an association 
with meaning in relation to my art objects, I didn’t know how to approach this particularly 
significant theme without resorting to clichéd images and death motifs. Spending a great 
deal of time considering this dilemma, I repeated the words ‘death’ and ‘art’ in my head, 
which led naturally to the phrase, ‘the death of art’. Given the context of my ongoing 
questioning of art as a concept, the failure of my decorative painting project and the sense 
of nihilism I encountered when approaching art as a practice, this phrase felt real to me. I 
liked the idea that I could potentially say ‘the death of art’ yet continue to make it, and that 
this contradiction would reflect the reality I sensed wherein art – in the continuous, 
progressive modernist sense of the self-questioning art object – seemed to be over, yet ‘art’ 
continued to exist.  
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
       Fig 6 Elizabeth Pulie  
       Foyer 
       2010 
       acrylic and oil stick on canvas, 102 x 84cm 
       photo courtesy Sarah Cottier gallery 
14 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
My practice is informed by a sense of art in its relation to theory or philosophy, linked to the 
historical and linear development of the art object’s ontology through modernism. This view 
considers ‘art’ a historically determined, contingent concept over an essential one, its 
discussion restricted to the realm of western visual art. While borders between eras are 
notoriously porous, for the purpose of this study I consider the inauguration of mechanical 
reproduction in the 19th century to have initiated the period of modern art due to the 
challenge it posed to the traditionally mimetic forms of painting and sculpture, instigating 
the development of modern art’s project of self-critique and beginning (arguably) with the 
movement of Realism. As theorised by Arthur Danto, a sense that the history of the self-
critical development of art as a visual medium is over is the meaning of the end of art, due 
to the connection between this history and art’s ontology as a concept. My thesis research 
aims to argue for the concept’s application to a theory or definition of contemporary art, as 
well as examine its agency in facilitating a more philosophical contemporary practice than 
the current moment in art tends to allow, returning a sense of sovereignty to contemporary 
artists. 
 
A view of modern art as developmental links it to western philosophy; here, rather than 
represent competing disciplines, they instead share a common concern with the critique or 
definition of their subject. The changing attitudes toward the validity of art objects’ forms 
historically may be seen to parallel philosophical treatment of the human subject and its 
essence, and in both instances, this development may be viewed as the liberation of form as 
theorised by Jean Baudrillard14. Where modernist thought increasingly liberated attitudes 
regarding the forms the concept ‘art’ could inhabit, the process accompanied the increasing 
liberation of the human subject, the real, and thought itself. A sense that this progression is 
over informs both modern art and thought via ‘the end of art’ and ‘the end of history’:  
where art ends in the final liberation of its form within the everyday, history is viewed as 
having ended with the final liberation of our concept of the human and the real. These 
histories’ explanations of our self-conception form our metanarratives, and the end of 
                                                          
14
 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Towards the Vanishing Point of Art (1987),’ in The Conspiracy of Art: Manifestos, 
Interviews, Essays, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, trans. Ames Hodges (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), 104. 
15 
 
history or the end of art may be characterised as either the end of the metanarrative in 
total, or the end of a certain ideological metanarrative. Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics in the 
early 19th century predate this developmental view of art15.  
 
Contemporary art is frequently defined in its difference to the modern due in large part to 
its post-historical, global nature, as emphasised in Terry Smith’s16 and Peter Osborne’s17 
attempts to provide a definition or philosophy of contemporary art. These readings are 
accurate as the field does display historical stasis and is increasingly global; however this 
view of contemporary art is only effective as the result of modernism and in line with 
modernist aims, and must therefore be viewed as inextricably linked to the modernist 
project rather than possessing a distinct ideological drive. Contemporary art’s ontology 
must equally acknowledge that the infinity of forms at its disposal are the outcome of the 
modernist liberation of art’s essence rather than something inherent to the concept ‘art’ 
itself. Where a definition of contemporary art as the end of art refers most explicitly to the 
end of the modernist project of self-critique leading to art’s liberation, this is complicated by 
the fact of the contemporary’s intrinsic link to this project as its logical outcome. Where an 
end of art motif may be seen to have informed the modernist project and its development, 
contemporary art may more accurately be described as ‘the end of the end of art’. It is in 
this sense that the contemporary moment contrasts most starkly with the modern, despite 
the interrelationship of the two moments. 
 
The label ‘contemporary art’ tends to lack criticality when it does not denote a particular 
style, form, or period in art, simply referring to art which is ‘happening now’ – Hal Foster in 
particular raises this concern in his commentary on the field18. Where the openness of the 
term ‘contemporary art’ may also be viewed as positive due to its allowing for multiple 
voices and forms and its escape from the perceived imperial project of modernism, this 
same openness is equally considered to preclude critique due to its relativity and 
meaninglessness, detracting from attempts to theorise it, and the fact that definition and 
                                                          
15
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1975). 
16
 Terry Smith, What is Contemporary Art? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
17
 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All – Philosophy of Contemporary Art (London: Verso, 2013). 
18
 Hal Foster, ‘Questionnaire on “The Contemporary”,’ October 130 (2009): 3 – 124. 
16 
 
critique are perceived as features of the modern further complicates the project of defining 
contemporary art in its difference. Equally, while the availability of all form to contemporary 
practice may viewed positively, this same feature represents a trap for such practice, with 
absolute openness and an infinity of means resulting in a lack of significance or meaning in 
relation to any particular form. 
 
As arguably the last modern movement, conceptual art is viewed as having established 
contemporary conditions and – among other themes – within his philosophy Peter Osborne 
raises the idea that contemporary art is a ‘post-conceptual’ art19. Where the progression of 
modern movements may be conceived as the systematic removal of that which was 
inessential to art’s definition, conceptual art represents an attempt to separate the concept 
from its material form, defying previous expectations that art remain visual or object-
bound. Thus conceptual art’s project of dematerialisation maintained the modern project of 
definition, illustrated by conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth’s characterisation of artworks as 
propositions, wherein by exhibiting a work the artist is declaring that something is art and 
thus engaging with the question, ‘what is art?’20 The attempted eradication of aesthetics or 
materiality by conceptual art allowed for a return of radicality to art practice, holding 
potential for art’s release from commodification and the collusion with socio-economic 
structures such commodification engendered, and potentially re-enfranchising individuals 
previously excluded by institutional expectations that artists be white or male. Here, a 
radical art practice was possible: the sense that art could inhabit any object or action 
seemed to render it accessible to all and make possible its escape from institutional 
sanctification. 
 
However Kosuth, theorist Lucy Lippard and others identify conceptual art’s pure project of 
dematerialisation as having failed, since much conceptual and contemporary art remains 
bound by the object, its ontology determined in terms of aesthetics or the material and its 
                                                          
19
 Peter Osborne, ‘Contemporary Art is Post-Conceptual Art,’ lecture, Fondazione Antonio Ratti, Como, 9 July 
2010, accessed March 18, 2015, 
http://www.fondazioneratti.org/mat/mostre/Contemporary%20art%20is%20post-
conceptual%20art%20/Leggi%20il%20testo%20della%20conferenza%20di%20Peter%20Osborne%20in%20PDF
.pdf. 
20
 Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art After Philosophy,’ in Art After Philosophy and After, Collected Writings, 1966-1990, ed. 
Gabriele Guercio (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 14. 
17 
 
reality as a commodity giving rise to a collusion with neo-liberal values21. Paradoxically, this 
outcome may have its roots within the conceptual project’s very aims: for the concept ‘art’ 
to exist, it requires demarcation from the realm ‘ordinary life’, thus the sense that art must 
be seen, and therefore visual, remains. When art exists within the ephemeral and the 
everyday, our ability to see it as art rather than as a normal everyday occurrence 
necessitates its institutional contextualisation, lending greater agency to the institution. 
Where Kosuth and Lippard view conceptual art’s re-materialisation as the movement’s 
failure, Osborne views it as proof of the necessity of aesthetics to a philosophy of 
contemporary art as a post-conceptual art22.  
 
The concept ‘creativity’, may – unlike ‘art’ – be essential to human activity, and may be 
applied to disciplines as varied as mathematics, cooking, agriculture or pedagogy. Despite 
conceptual art’s failure to eradicate a sense of art as aesthetic, a number of conceptual 
artists retain the hope that art may yet be seen to exist within everyday life rather than in 
collusion with institutions. Here, ‘art’ would be recognised within those actions and 
inventions that critiqued, challenged or provided alternatives for mainstream or neo-liberal 
values, improved our everyday existence and hopes for the future, or allowed a voice to 
those disadvantaged by, or ‘outside’ of, mainstream culture. In the instance that ‘creativity’ 
is more exclusively associated with the institutionalised realm of art, the innovation that 
frequently occurs within the multitude of processes outside the field are rendered of less 
value: some of the most radical (ex)- conceptual artists, such as Ian Milliss, continue to 
maintain a view that art (as creativity) be recognised within all activity23. In order that this 
be realised the automatic association of art with the institution and the visual must be 
challenged, and it is here that an end of art statement has a crucial role to play: this 
viewpoint goes some way toward maintaining a view of art’s potential for radicality and 
questioning, values that continue to be applied to or expected of contemporary art but are 
frequently perceived as lacking. 
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The availability of all form to contemporary art means nothing of significance remains to 
contribute to art as a visual concern: when any object or situation can be art, a view of art as 
a proposition (as outlined by Kosuth) is over. In the contemporary moment, artworks’ 
significance tends instead to be located within their status as allegory, in their supplying 
meaning or raising awareness around matters normally unrelated to art discourse, 
frequently political issues. In this context it is increasingly impossible to make work about 
nothing, since any form or situation framed as ‘art’ is automatically attributed with 
meaning. Where this framing occurs increasingly within the work of curators, 
commentators, and collectors, artists tend to be rendered mute producers of material – as 
allegory – to be shaped. The disenfranchisement of the artist within contemporary art may 
be seen as a symptom of the end of art, where the cessation of the development in art’s 
form means all art is equally valid in a view of art as individual expression. When the art 
object no longer embodies the conditions of its existence it inhabits the roles of decoration, 
commodity, or allegory, or simply symbolises art’s previously significant history. The 
disparaging term ‘zombie formalism’ – coined by artist and critic Walter Robinson in 201424 - 
refers most commonly to a certain type of commercially successful painterly abstraction 
typical of the current moment, however the zombie analogy is interesting in relation to a 
view of contemporary art as the end of art. 
 
Conceptual art’s concern with art as concept aligned it with philosophical discourse and 
practice, while the return to materiality and aesthetics within the contemporary tends to 
align art practice with a sense of self-expression and art as necessarily object- or experience-
based. The contemporary phenomenon of the artist’s statement arose within the 
conceptual era as a work of art in itself, replacing the art object and justifying its absence: 
within the contemporary moment, the artist’s statement tends instead to take the form of a 
marketing tool, the provision of a few lines of text identifying the themes or concerns linked 
to the separate, material work. An end of art statement as practice returns a sense of 
philosophy or theory to artists’ practices, enabling their engagement with art as discourse.  
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The idea of the end of art may appear fallacious in the face of art’s continued and magnified 
production within the contemporary moment, and the fact the idea tended to recur within 
modern art’s theorisation results in disparaging references to the ‘multiple ends of art’ 
within current discourse, for example by Hal Foster25. The fact that claims regarding the end 
of art have arisen most frequently within the realm of philosophy means it is rarely viewed 
as impacting contemporary practice, and many contemporary artists are unaware of the 
claim’s existence. This thesis examines the potential for an end of art practice – that is, a 
practice wherein an end of art statement accompanies the continued production of art – to 
enable engagement with art as a proposition as outlined by Kosuth: where such a practice in 
its entirety constitutes the statement ‘this is not art’, it results in philosophical re-
engagement with the question, ‘what is art?’ A statement that art has ended may both 
facilitate a break with the developmental history or progression inherent to the modernist 
project and resolve the sense of nostalgia displayed in characterisations of contemporary art 
as a new, improved moment. Stating ‘the end of art’ may complete the circle of art rather 
than move it forward: were the conceptual ideal of the disappearance of the art object 
within life to occur, art would move closer to its beginning than its end, to a time wherein 
‘art’ as a concept did not perhaps exist.  
 
In chapter one of the thesis, the impulse to either ask or attempt an answer to the question, 
‘what is contemporary art?’ is examined. Instances of the raising of this question post the 
inception of the new millennium are cited and analysed, particularly in relation to 
contemporary art’s evasion of definition and the variety of attitudes displayed towards this 
evasion. Existing attempts to theorise contemporary art as a new or alternative moment to 
that of the modern are examined and critiqued, specifically Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of 
the altermodern and Terry Smith’s and Peter Osborne’s provision of a definition or 
discourse for contemporary art. 
 
Chapter two examines contemporary art’s ontology in relation to conceptual art, linked to 
Peter Osborne’s characterisation of contemporary art as a ‘post-conceptual’ art. The lack of 
critique identified within current art is discussed in relation to the legacy of conceptual art’s 
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having opened art as a concept to the infinite possibilities of form and non-form, and 
related to moments within the modern wherein a lack of critique or sense of openness was 
similarly perceived to have existed. The history of conceptual art’s pure project of 
dematerialisation is examined, specifically within the ideas of Joseph Kosuth and Lucy 
Lippard, and the failure of this project is analysed both in relation to Peter Osborne’s notion 
of the necessity of aesthetics to contemporary art and ideas from the field of object 
oriented ontology. The chapter concludes with an argument related to Jean Baudrillard’s 
characterisation of the current moment as ‘trans-aesthetic’, wherein a sense of the absolute 
liberation of form (as achieved by conceptual art) informs the contemporary moment as an 
impossibility of form.  
 
Chapter three continues the thread of the impossibility of form in relation to the idea of the 
end of art. The end of art is discussed in its relation to the idea of the end of history, and 
attitudes toward the end of art within the German philosophical tradition as outlined by Eva 
Geulen are canvassed. The work by the most recent theorist on the end of art, Arthur C. 
Danto, is examined in relation to Hegel’s original end of art statement, and the extensive 
critique that exists regarding Danto’s thesis is outlined, along with Danto’s responses. The 
idea of freedom within the conceptual and contemporary moments is related to Hegel’s 
original postulation, and perceptions of the end of art as a specifically philosophical concern 
discussed in relation to contemporary practice. 
 
In chapter four, the strategy of giving up art in the face of the end is assessed, alongside 
other potential practice-based strategies in relation to the idea of the hegemony of 
contemporary art as the end of art. Finally, my own end of art strategy is outlined in terms 
of the conceptual tendency to work via projects and within established parameters, the 
nature of my thesis research in relation to an end of art statement is described, and 
justification is made for a theoretical consideration of contemporary art as the end of art. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS CONTEMPORARY ART?  
 
PART 1 - On the need to ask the question 
 
What is contemporary art? First, and most obviously: why is this 
question not asked?1 
 
At the end of 2009, the editors of the journal e-flux – Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, and 
Anton Vidokle – devoted two issues to the question, ‘what is contemporary art?’ 
commissioning articles from an assortment of commentators and artists around this 
theme2. Only a few months prior, Terry Smith published his book, What is Contemporary 
Art? At the same time, Hal Foster presented the results of his Questionnaire on “The 
Contemporary” in October magazine. Where Aranda, Kuan Wood and Vidokle suggest the 
question isn’t asked, attempts to define, theorise or historicise current or contemporary art 
were being made at the end of the last decade. 
 
In his book, Smith suggests why the question may not be asked: 
 
Generalization about contemporary art has evaded articulation for more 
than two decades: first because of fears of essentialism; followed by the 
sheer relief of having shaken off exclusivist theories, imposed historicisms, 
and grand narratives.3  
 
Here Smith alludes to what is perhaps the most problematic aspect of attempting to answer 
the question: one of contemporary art’s most defining characteristics is its evasion of 
definition. 
 
Perhaps there is no need to raise questions around the nature of contemporary art? As the 
e-flux editors suggest (echoing Smith), contemporary art is a field that: 
 
…stretches across boundaries, a multi-local field drawing from local practices 
and embedded local knowledge, the vitality and immanence of many 
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histories in constant simultaneous translation. This is perhaps the 
contemporary’s most redeeming trait, and we certainly do not miss the old 
power centers and master narratives.4 
 
In addition they state: ‘the contemporary as a cacophonic mess gives us enormous hope.’5  
 
Despite the positive sense of art’s escape of grand narratives resulting in contemporary art’s 
overthrowing or questioning of the imperialism seen as inherent to previous art, doubts do 
exist around contemporary art both as a term and a field of practice. Such doubts include 
the validity of contemporary art’s claim to political or social engagement, its 
characterisation as democratic, and its identification with a postcolonial, de-bordered 
world. For some, the term ‘contemporary art’ itself is inadequate in describing the art of our 
time, lacking philosophical stringency and unable to historicise current art. In Jean 
Baudrillard’s unforgiving critique of contemporary art throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
he characterised it as ‘a conspiracy’6: the fact his discourse tends to most successfully 
theorise the field in its relation to modernity and modern thought makes it fundamental to 
this particular investigation. 
 
The critical nature of the e-flux journal7 renders it a reliable, recent source of questions 
concerning the nature of contemporary art. e-flux has been committed since its inception to 
considering such questions, and a survey of articles commissioned throughout its history 
provides good coverage of the issues involved in defining or theorising the field. In the 
journal’s twelfth issue in January 2010, its editors describe contemporary art as a glass 
ceiling or invisible barrier, as something that we know exists but are unable to put our finger 
on. While contemporary art is easily and readily acknowledged, the authors claim, ‘nothing 
attains critical mass under any umbrella beyond “the contemporary”’8. They compare this 
tendency to the machinations of capitalism, wherein individuals and relationships exist in a 
state seemingly unrelated to a larger whole, masking ‘the hidden ultimatum of an innocuous 
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protocol’9. They describe contemporary art as carrying out ‘evasive manoeuvres’, the first of 
which is to claim fluidity while demanding institutionalisation: where the word 
‘contemporary’ is associated with a sense of currency, flexibility and responsiveness, the 
editors suggest that contemporary art in fact continues to require housing within less fluid 
and less responsive institutions, and that it remains contextualised by the monolithic, bricks-
and-mortar structures of modern art.  
 
The second ‘evasive manoeuvre’ the e-flux editors identify concerns contemporary art’s 
seemingly more redeeming traits – its multiculturalism, focus on the local, crossing of 
boundaries and acknowledgement of all histories. Here, they cast doubt as to whether the 
local is represented on its own terms or whether a larger, more international discourse is 
imposed onto these localisms, ‘…asserting its own language distinct from centre and 
periphery alike’10 – for example via the phenomenon of the international contemporary art 
biennale. Critic, curator and historian Cuauhtémoc Medina also views the claim to the local 
and post-colonialism with suspicion, stating that, ‘we now face a regime of international 
generalization transmitting the pandemic of the contemporary to the last recesses of the 
earth.’11 He connects the globalism of contemporary art to the buoyancy of the 
international art market: 
 
…the main reason for the craze surrounding the contemporary art market 
in recent years (and for its not having immediately collapsed after the 
plunge of global capitalism) has been the market’s lateral extension: 
bourgeoisies who would previously buy work within their local art circuits 
became part of a new private jet set of global elites consuming the same 
brand of artistic products, ensuring spiralling sales and the celebration of 
an age in which endless ‘editions’ allow artworks to be disseminated 
throughout an extended geography.12 
 
Artist, film maker and author Hito Steyerl provides perhaps the most scathing view of 
contemporary art, claiming that it, ‘pollutes, gentrifies, and ravishes. It seduces and 
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consumes, then suddenly walks off, breaking your heart.’13 For Steyerl, contemporary art 
both mirrors the hyper capitalism typical of post-Cold war political paradigms and actively 
participates in the facilitation of this order: ‘The Global Guggenheim is a cultural refinery for 
a set of post-democratic oligarchies, as are the countless international biennials tasked with 
upgrading and re-educating the surplus population.’14 Contemporary art is characterised by 
Steyerl as, ‘unpredictable, unaccountable, brilliant, mercurial, moody, guided by inspiration 
and genius. Just as any oligarch aspiring to dictatorship might want to see himself’15, and 
contemporary art’s claim to the local is negatively conveyed:  
 
From the deserts of Mongolia to the high plains of Peru, contemporary 
art is everywhere. And when it is finally dragged into Gagosian dripping 
from head to toe with blood and dirt, it triggers off rounds and rounds of 
rapturous applause.16 
 
In 2014, Keti Chukhrov described contemporary art’s aspiration to democracy as false.  
She identifies two strands of resistance as having occurred within art historically: the first – 
the modernist stance of estranging the work of art from its audience by ‘blocking 
perception, pleasure, or the judgement of taste’17 – meant the artwork existed in ‘extra-
social conditions’ outside the capitalist economy and culture industry, as theorised by 
Adorno. The second strand, that of the avant garde, questioned bourgeois culture by 
dissolving art into life, wherein it became concerned with matters of a political or social 
nature. Chukhrov identifies both strands as having ‘reached their peak in the 1960s and 
70s’, after which they were ‘absorbed and compromised’ within contemporary art. Here, 
Chukhrov claims the ‘reduction and rigidity’ of modernism transformed into the production 
of ‘successful abstract art’, while the avant-garde’s openness to the world outside the art 
institution became absorbed by the institution itself, in its increasing self-criticality and 
flexibility18.  
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For Chukhrov, a belief in art’s capacity for emancipatory or democratic social impact is 
continually reproduced by contemporary art, wherein the legacies of modernism and the 
avant-garde are, ‘re-enacted, reinstituted, and revisited’ even while losing ‘their social and 
aesthetic viability.’19 Referring to the thought of Adorno and Peter Burger, she claims: ‘if 
art’s strategies of dissolution into life do not coincide with radical social transformation, 
then art’s claim about its political engagement is not valid’20:  
 
…while claiming extreme social openness and political commitment in the 
vein of the avant-garde’s impact on society, contemporary art—de 
facto—in its economic disposition happens to be part and parcel of post-
Fordist alienated production. In other words, in narratives it claims 
democratic and resisting values, but in reality it happens to be a 
nonsocialized, nondemocratic, i.e., quasi-modernist, realm in its means of 
production and sense.21 
 
Chukhrov believes art’s potential as socially transformative is eradicated when it operates in 
compliance with the institution – in this sense, the space we may hold open for art in 
relation to its value as a radical or questioning field is compromised by the contemporary’s 
reliance on and reproduction of modernist tropes in the absence of real social change. 
 
An inability to define contemporary art is also viewed as problematic to its practice. Artist 
Liam Gillick writes that while it was not uncommon for modern artists to have denied the 
name lent their style or movement by others, ‘the term “contemporary art” activates denial 
in a specifically new way, in that it describes not a practice but a general “being in the 
context.”’22 Gillick claims that ‘the most progressive artists and curators’ are dissatisfied 
with the term ‘contemporary art’ and so he calls for a new term, the construction of which 
he believes artists must be involved in. Citing the tendency for contemporary art to refer to, 
‘that which is being made now—wherever’23, Gillick claims such flexibility cannot 
encompass, ‘all dynamic current art, if only because an increasing number of artists seek to 
                                                          
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Liam Gillick, ‘Contemporary art does not account for that which is taking place,’ e-flux journal 21 (December 
2010) accessed February 25, 2015, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/contemporary-art-does-not-account-for-
that-which-is-taking-place/. 
23
 Ibid. 
26 
 
radically differentiate their work from other art’24, claiming the term is only useful for the 
purpose of ‘auction houses, galleries and art history departments’25. Where Gillick had 
previously suggested the term ‘current art’ as a replacement26, he later admits this 
alternative is equally unable to ‘include all the work that is being made with the intention of 
resisting the flexibility of contemporary work’27 – thus it would seem the problem lies within 
the flexibility of that which is allowed as art today over the particularity of the term used to 
describe it.  
 
Gillick identifies the difficulty of producing art within such a state: ‘the contemporary 
necessarily restricts the sense in which you are looking for a breakthrough’28 – Gillick claims 
that here, individual works lack significance outside of the greater whole. He describes 
works produced within this context as lacking political or social affect, where, ‘moving 
against the stream is a problem, for it goes in every direction.’ 29 Gillick cites the value of 
attempts by artists to instigate political action within life, alongside their art practice but 
existing separately from it. Referencing the work of artist Paul Chan, he claims a description 
of Chan as an ‘artist and activist’ provides the necessary distinction between the efficacy of 
his activism and what one assumes is the less effective mode he assumes as an artist: ‘it is 
currently impossible to escape the hold of the contemporary, but it might be possible to 
separate life and action from contemporary art.’30 While a desire for political critique or 
activism may be facilitated by such cognitive separation, the activity of the artist as an artist 
and the complicated status of the art object within the inclusive situation of the 
contemporary are no further resolved by such distinctions. As Gillick concludes, ‘not 
working at all is very hard to do. So the answer is to keep working within a limited form of 
conceptual difficulty.’31 He likens contemporary art practice to the act of joining a highway 
at full speed, where, ‘slowing down and getting on or off again is difficult and undesirable.’32 
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In 2012 Vidokle and Kuan Wood echoed Gillick’s sentiments concerning the difficulty of 
practicing in opposition to or critique of the contemporary. Claiming that ‘for many years’ it 
was possible to make politically or socially engaged work in order to break with accepted 
forms of art, they write that now:  
 
…the enclosure of contemporary art has accounted for this work in its 
calculations, for we have come to see the insertion of political art in 
museum spaces as a zombie-like caricature of social commitment, a 
walking dead of social life and artistic currency that masks a total 
confusion with regard to the question of how to render artistic form 
relevant and challenging.33 
 
A sense of entrapment by the contemporary is evident in Vidokle and Kuan Wood’s critique, 
who claim that artists who do possess a ‘genuine social commitment’ tend to lead a secret 
double life due to their awareness that the ‘social relevance of their work is trapped in their 
own subjectivity’34. They write that while a political consciousness is still relevant to art, this 
sense is today overshadowed by ‘the much more pressing politics of what constitutes 
contemporary art in the first place – the question of why this or that work is even being 
shown in a given space’35, suggesting that recent biennale- or Documenta-style exhibitions 
avoid themes in favour of a, ‘vague and relativistic, open-ended idea of heterogeneous 
plurality.’36  
 
For Vidokle and Kuan Wood the invention of Duchamp’s readymade is pivotal here, credited 
as having freed artists from both the ‘laws of traditional taste’ and ‘manual labour’ and 
rendering the artist free to ‘do and exhibit anything’37, the institution obliged to accept any 
object the artist presents. The price for this condition of ‘total sovereignty’ is high: 
 
Duchamp’s liberated artist could only appear when sanctioned by an art 
institution. In other words, the basic condition allowing the artist to 
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produce whatever he or she pleased was that the liberated artistic 
gesture must only appear in sanctioned spaces of art.38 
 
This situation lends greater authority to institutions, which become ‘in turn just as 
responsible for producing art as artists themselves’39 – an outcome of the institution’s 
validating role is the disempowerment of artists. This situation is a complex one: while we 
value contemporary artists’ freedom to exhibit any object, when any object can be art the 
context of its presentation is crucial to its identification as art, compromising artists’ ability 
to situate their practice against the institution.  
 
The question of defining contemporary art first occurred to the editors of e-flux when, in 
attempting to make a wiki archive, they found they couldn’t create meaningful categories 
for a user-navigable menu: 
 
…there have been no significant movements in the past twenty years, and 
artists have not been interested in organizing themselves around any… 
we found that no objective structure or criterion exists with which to 
organize artistic activity from the past twenty years or so, and the 
question of how to structure such an archive, to make it intelligible, 
proved to be so difficult to address that it completely derailed the project 
for the time being.40 
 
In the instance that we may look to a sense of history or a structure in an attempt to create 
a narrative for today’s art, the lack of such features may contribute to a sense of 
contemporary art as the ‘end of art’.  
 
Hal Foster: Questionnaire on “The Contemporary”  
 
Difficulty in defining the field of contemporary art is linked to its post-historical status, a 
concern raised by Hal Foster in his Questionnaire on “The Contemporary” in 2009. Having 
sent the questionnaire to seventy curators and critics, Foster received and published replies 
from thirty two, noting that ‘very few curators responded’. Foster’s questionnaire posits 
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that contemporary art’s heterogeneity results in its lack of critical definition, rendering the 
field ‘free-floating’ and unattached from history. Stating that former categories of art (such 
as postmodernism and the avant garde) no longer apply, Foster suggests contemporary art 
has become an ‘institutional object in its own right’, approached by institutions as 
disconnected ‘not only from prewar practice but from most postwar practice as well’. He 
asks respondents whether this ‘free floating’ is something real or imagined, whether it is the 
result of the end of grand narratives or an outcome of an increasingly neoliberal society, and 
if there are any benefits to what he describes as the ‘apparent lightness of being’ of the 
field. 
 
Foster’s questionnaire indicates a genuine interest on his behalf in acquiring consensus 
around these ideas. When asked his motivation for conducting it, Foster states: 
 
Perhaps it was fueled by discontent, but bewilderment also played a part. 
For my generation contemporary art seemed to have a special purchase on 
the present; the sense that art is an index of the moment appears lost in 
today’s profusion of practices. That is a source of discontent for me.41 
 
A survey or questionnaire purports to be a formal, impartial and scientific study of a subject, 
potentially resulting in a fairly accurate overview. While a general reading of the 124 pages 
of answers to Foster’s question gives a sense of the range of attitudes that exist towards the 
subject, to attain more concrete data a scientific breakdown of the results is required. To 
this end, I coded and counted the responses to Foster’s survey.  
 
The predominant response (44% of respondents) was to comment on contemporary art’s 
global and postcolonial nature and speculate on this fact’s potentially occluding a single, 
centralised paradigm or set of criteria for contemporary art. The two next most common 
responses stated that contemporary art should be defined and practiced in relation to 
contemporary issues (37%), and that contemporary art either reflects, or is the result of, 
neoliberal or capitalist structures (37%). A large number of respondents felt it was 
important to interrogate the nature of contemporary art, to attempt to define it or at least 
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have the discussion (34%), and an equal number commented on the ‘untimeliness’ of 
contemporary art, on it’s being both in and out of time, or a time of a non-linear nature 
(34%). It was felt that contemporary art must be defined via specific artist’s works, histories 
and locations rather than one broad definition (34%); that there is value in contemporary 
art’s lacking a definition (34%), and that contemporary art by its very nature resists 
paradigms and grand narratives (31%)42.  
 
A sense of contradiction exists within the survey results: for example, while 34% of 
respondents found it important to examine or interrogate contemporary art or question its 
lack of definition, an equal number viewed its lack of definition as valuable, as something 
we should maintain rather than challenge. Not only did the survey results as a whole 
contain contradictions, but opposing opinions often existed within individual responses 
themselves. This represents another frequently held belief about contemporary art: a 
quarter of respondents characterise contemporary art as a contradictory field, or a field 
defined by antinomies. 
 
PART 2 - Theorising contemporary art 
Nicolas Bourriaud: The Altermodern 
 
Two respondents to Foster’s questionnaire, Okwui Enwezor and James Meyer, refer to 
curator and writer Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of the ‘altermodern’ in their response. Having 
coined the terms ‘relational aesthetics’ (199843) and ‘postproduction’ (200244) as means by 
which to categorise contemporary art in relation to new methods of artistic practice, 
Bourriaud developed his concept of the ‘altermodern’ in 2009 alongside his curation of the 
Tate Triennale. Rather than identify new practices, the altermodern attempts to 
theoretically accommodate contemporary art in contrast to art of the past and in its relation 
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to an increasingly globalised world. To Bourriaud, the current moment in art is both a break 
with post modernism and a new view or version of modernism altogether: ‘Travel, cultural 
exchanges and examination of history are not merely fashionable themes, but markers of a 
profound evolution in our vision of the world and our way of inhabiting it.’45 
 
Okwui Enwezor views the altermodern as, ‘directed at teasing out what may be called the 
logics of contemporary art and the kind of historical arguments on which they are 
founded’46, a viewpoint he claims echoes the concerns raised by Foster. However in contrast 
to what he sees as the more dubious tone of Foster’s question, Enwezor identifies the 
concept of ‘the altermodern’ as asserting certainty in its tracing the way questions of 
modernity have generated new forms of contemporary art ‘worldwide’. He sees 
contemporary art as not a ‘borrowed language’ like modernism, but ‘a meta-language 
developed at the intersection of multiple historical collisions’47 which locates it beyond the 
modernist centres of Europe and North America. As a meta-language, Enwezor identifies 
contemporary art as having developed due to ‘different historical reasons’48, but mostly in 
relation to, ‘the powerful influence of imperial expansion across the world’49. 
 
For Bourriaud, the concept of postmodernism cannot account for the global nature of 
contemporary art and society. Identifying postmodernism as having been concerned with 
‘multiculturalism and the discourse of identity’50, he believes the altermodern more 
effectively defines our period as ‘a planetary movement of creolisation’51. Other 
characteristics with which Bourriaud endows postmodern discourse are that of ‘cultural 
relativism and deconstruction’, which he dismisses as simply substitutes for ‘modernist 
universalism’, providing, ‘no weapons against the twofold threat of uniformity and mass 
culture and traditionalist, far-right, withdrawal.’52 Here, postmodernism’s apparent 
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alignment with universalisms has political implications, which the altermodern avoids in its 
dispersal of culture via the increased movement of individuals around the globe.  
Where discontent exists concerning postmodern discourse’s ability to account for the 
contemporary moment, in her response to Foster’s question professor Pamela M. Lee 
wonders if we may have passed too quickly through its arguments to reach the conclusion 
of ‘the contemporary’. She posits that postmodern discourse may have laid the groundwork 
for the fragmented, ahistorical nature of the contemporary via its focus on the end of 
history and the narrative, thus drawing a closer relationship between the two discourses 
than that depicted by Bourriaud:  
 
…in so quickly giving up the ghost of postmodernism for a set of ever-
proliferating contemporary art rubrics—globalization, the relational, the 
politics of aesthetics, you name it—I wonder if we have inadvertently 
contracted with a set of terms to which we have neither intellectual nor 
ideological affinity.53 
 
A tendency to define the contemporary moment via a reading of contemporary artists’ 
increasingly nomadic existence, wherein they constantly and seemingly necessarily move 
around the globe to exhibit in large-scale, international exhibitions, is perhaps more 
accurately a reflection of the increased mobility of the global population more generally than 
an adequately ontological factor to account for differences between the contemporary and 
modern moments. In addition, where the notion of the altermodern tends to characterise 
contemporary art practice as taking place solely within exhibitions of a global scale, it surely 
excludes those practitioners who lack the mobility or finances such participation demands: for 
artists with families, artists with jobs, or artists who prefer to remain within their locale, the 
necessarily nomadic categorisation of the altermodern renders it a highly exclusive one.  
 
The global nature of contemporary art also informs two other recent attempts to theorise, 
philosophise or define the field: Terry Smith’s What is Contemporary Art? (2009) and Peter 
Osborne’s Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art (2013).  
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Terry Smith: What is Contemporary Art? 
 
Just as Smith characterises the asking of this question as going against the grain of a larger 
cultural trend, the editors of e-flux state, ‘if we begin to discern its (the contemporary’s) 
shape, either it shifts, or we become obsolete: uncontemporary.’54 Nonetheless Smith 
believes it is important to ask the question, stating, ‘whatever one’s engagement with art, it 
will always be, at root, an entanglement within art’s questioning’55. 
 
In his text, Smith frequently situates contemporary art in contrast to that of the modern, his 
argument reflecting the sense of a theoretical battle between these periods and their 
ideologies. While acknowledging that the roots of contemporary art lie within modernity56 
Smith mostly refers to modernist art (and ‘modernism’) in a negative sense and 
contemporary art (and ‘contemporaneity’) in the positive: this results in ‘the contemporary’ 
reading as a good force within his text, contrasting with the bad force of the modern – 
‘during the past two centuries, the elements of contemporaneity have been subsidiary to 
the powerful forces constituting modernity’57. According to Smith, while ‘the contemporary’ 
was actually in existence alongside ‘the modern’ it was simultaneously suppressed by it, a 
situation that has changed with, ‘the recent ascendancy of the contemporary’58. The theme 
of ‘modern versus contemporary’ seems at times the main point of Smith’s argument, which 
reads as a story wherein the irrepressible power of the modern is gradually yet inevitably 
overcome by the combined forces of the contemporary’s simultaneously open, questioning 
nature and global, all-encompassing presence. 
 
Identifying the narratives of modernism as having included, ‘art as mirror, leisure, or 
licensed dissent’, Smith states that these narratives ‘have had their day’59. Postmodernism’s 
counter-arguments to modernity have ‘become consumed in self-fulfilling prophecy’60 and 
other theories of contemporary art, described as the, ‘most recent universalisms, such as 
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globalization or the fundamentalisms’61 either fall short of the task, or ‘are overreaching, 
disastrously’62, with the consequence that, ‘contemporary art has become…thoroughly 
questioning in nature, extremely wide-ranging in its modes of asking and in the scope of its 
inquiries’63. Here it seems the open, questioning nature of contemporary art is the result of 
its lack of adequate theorisation. 
 
Smith attempts to structure his argument within a series of categories and subcategories, 
statements and hypotheses. He offers ‘three core meanings’ of the term “contemporary” 
(with the addition in brackets of a fourth), two ‘contentions’ to describe the conditions of 
contemporaneity and four ‘main themes’ of contemporary art. It is difficult to track the 
categories and subsections around which Smith structures his discourse, its multiple 
declarations lending the argument a confusing emptiness and often occluding meaning.  
 
Smith identifies three different yet overlapping ‘major currents’ of contemporary art: the 
first current, associated with ‘neoliberal economics, globalizing capital, and neoconservative 
politics’, is broken down further into two ‘trends’, the first of which repeats ‘avant-garde 
shock tactics’ and includes artists such as Damien Hirst, Julian Schnabel, Jeff Koons and 
Takashi Murakami. The second trend, the result of, ‘the constant efforts of the institutions 
of modern art…to rein in the impacts of contemporaneity on art’64 revisits and revives ‘old 
modernist impulses and imperatives’65 and includes artists Richard Serra, Jeff Wall, and 
Gerhard Richter. Calling this trend ‘Remodernism’, Smith maintains that, ‘together, these 
trends amount to the aesthetic of globalization, serving it through both a relentless 
remodernizing and a sporadic contemporizing of art’66. Here, contemporary art that may 
seem modern is ‘served’ through both ‘relentless modernizing’ and ‘sporadic 
contemporizing’ – sporadic, but apparently just ‘contemporized’ enough to be allowed as 
contemporary art. Further, Smith claims that, ‘in the work of certain artists, such as 
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Matthew Barney, both currents come together, generating an art tsunami’67, offering the 
labels ‘Spectacle Art’ or ‘Spectacularism’ as appropriate to this current. 
 
The second current, ‘distinct in origins, nature and outcome’, is defined in opposition to the 
modernist idea of movements (‘no art movements here’) and is ‘something akin to a world-
wide cultural change – indeed, a postcolonial turn.’68 Identifying this current as following 
decolonization, Smith describes the art it includes as a ‘plethora’, shaped by, ‘local, national, 
anticolonial, independent, antiglobalization values’69. Sounding something like the type of 
art Bourriaud describes in his altermodern manifesto, Smith claims the art of this current 
‘circulates internationally through the activities of travellers, expatriates, the creation of 
new markets’ and that it, ‘predominates in biennales.’70 It includes practices that entail 
research over time, public involvement and ‘didactic presentations’, and which look at 
sustainable environmental relationships and often involve ‘electronic communicative 
media’71. Unlike the first, Smith does not here identify any artist’s names or suggest any 
labels for this current. 
 
Smith’s third and final current is the result of ‘a generational change occurring as the first 
two (currents) have unfolded’72; he associates it with younger artists and describes it as 
recent, worldwide, and ‘everyday’. Unlike the first current, this art rejects ‘gratuitous 
provocation and grand symbolic statement’, and results in ‘specific, small-scale, and modest 
offerings’73. While containing elements of the first two currents, the third is less concerned 
with notions of power structures or struggle and more with, ‘material media, virtual 
communicative networks, and open-ended modes of tangible connectivity’74. These artists 
look at ‘the nature of temporality’, the ‘possibilities of placemaking’ and at media 
immersion, sharing concerns with the second current around ‘sustainable flows of survival, 
cooperation, and growth.’75 Again, no names or labels are supplied at this point. 
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Having identified these currents, Smith discusses in subsequent chapters the nature of 
contemporary art in its relation to them: here, the structure and architecture of art 
museums and the art market are related to the first current, the ‘Postcolonial Turn’ and 
‘Otherness’ to the second, and ‘Contemporaneity: Times/Places’ the third. At the outset of 
Smith’s final chapter he states that until this point he had been putting forth his ideas about 
contemporary art, ‘by way of show and tell’76 – acknowledging perhaps the essentially 
descriptive nature of his argument, that he had yet to reveal his answer to the question, 
‘What is contemporary art?’ Declaring that it is, ‘Time to come clean, to relate my approach 
to others that are in contention, to show my disciplinary hand’77, Smith wonders what the 
results would be for art practice, criticism and theory if he raised the idea that, ‘it is time 
that contemporary art was subject to a certain kind of art historical analysis’78.  
 
Paragraphs later, having further elaborated upon the contemporary’s sense of multeity in its 
distinction from the modern, Smith explains, ‘Just because this scene can be so dazzling, so 
entrancing, so distracting, the question “What is contemporary art?” calls for further 
answers, drawn from wider perspectives’79. Here, Smith repeats his intention to investigate 
the question in relation to art history – however the investigation is once again suspended 
while he critiques the, ‘range of answers to the question of contemporary art that have been 
offered in recent years’80. These include characterisations of contemporary art as post-
historical, criticism of contemporary art’s collusion with the market and fashion, the 
challenge of interpreting contemporary art as it occurs, the work of the October critics, 
Okwui Enwezor’s ideas around postcolonialism and contemporary art, Bourriaud’s 
altermodern, and contemporary art’s definition as pluralistic – all of which Smith finds 
lacking as singular theories or responses. 
 
At the outset of the final section, Smith states that a contemporary art history should both, 
‘draw on efforts to date’ and be, ‘built on a framework that is distinct from that which 
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underlay Modern Art’81 and that it must address the qualities of ‘earlier art’ (including the 
pre-modern), ‘world art’, and ‘current and recent art’ in order to be, ‘worthy of its object: 
contemporary art’82. He declares: ‘I have been attempting to lay the groundwork for such a 
history throughout this book’83 (alluding to the fact that an actual definition, or history of 
contemporary art, may not after all be forthcoming) then further subjects the reader to an 
expanded description (‘for the sake of recollection’84) of his original hypothesis of 
contemporaneity as manifested within the three currents from the introduction, wondering 
how these individual currents themselves would answer the question, ‘What is 
contemporary art?’  
 
‘Spectacularism’ (as ‘a late modern art’, ‘too easily in tune with the times’, and ‘the latest 
phase in the universal history of art’) is counting on the fact that ‘art emergent within the 
other currents I have identified will fade into oblivion’ while it itself persists as, ‘the art 
remembered by the future’85. The second current would, ‘forge an independent culture’ by 
reviving ‘local traditional imagery’ within the formats of Western modern art, and ‘remake 
Western culture’86. The third current has ‘no single answer’ to the question, ‘what is 
contemporary art?’ Instead, it is ‘more networked’ than the global perspectives of 
postcolonial artists, and ‘indifferent to the generalizations about art’ of the ‘remodernists’. 
Artists of the third current, ‘abhor the superficialities of the spectacle’ and ‘live in the 
present’, therefore their question is not ‘what is contemporary art’, but more about ‘what 
kinds of art might be made now, and how might they be made with others close to hand’.87  
Classifying these currents once again in relation to their modes of display (the museum, the 
biennale, alternative spaces), Smith posits that his method of defining contemporary art via 
three currents could be viewed as based on the ‘classic logic of the dialectic’, where a thesis 
of ‘institutionalizing remodernism and retrosensationalism’ against an antithesis of 
‘postcolonial multiplicity’ would result in the synthesis: ‘remix, relational survivalism’88. 
While admitting that a potential outcome of this form could mean that the third (synthesis) 
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may ‘turn into a thesis’ attract an ‘as yet unimaginable antithesis’ and therefore maintain 
the structure of art history (which would then go forward ‘in essentially the same way’), 
Smith contests that the general shifts engendered by contemporaneity are so powerful that 
the situation wherein this dialectic is even possible has disappeared, and ‘the synthesis will 
not occur.’89 Instead he characterises this potential synthesis as a ‘supplement’, which exists 
within a potentially infinite number of supplements. Smith insists his three narratives of 
contemporary art are not ‘merely symptoms’ of ‘what it is to make art in the conditions of 
contemporaneity’ – rather they are (puzzlingly yet somehow crucially), the ‘actual kinds of 
art that these conditions have generated.’90 The three currents are antinomies, ‘like all other 
relationships characteristic of these times’91, and the friction between them is a part of their 
essence.  
 
The directness of his original question ‘What is Contemporary Art?’ contrasts markedly with 
the vague nature of Smith’s resulting argument: it may be that his desire to remain true to 
the overriding sense of contemporary art’s openness and resistance of metanarratives fatally 
inhibits his ability to arrive at a conclusive answer. Smith’s book doesn’t define 
contemporary art, but the inconclusive nature of his effort perfectly reflects the issues 
involved in attempting a definition. 
 
Peter Osborne: Anywhere or Not at All – Philosophy of Contemporary Art 
 
Peter Osborne aims to provide a philosophy or discourse for contemporary art, something 
he describes as being ‘badly known.’92 While admitting this quest seems ‘at times, almost 
impossible’, he identifies three tendencies - ‘straw conceptualism’ (the idea that 
contemporary art requires only conceptual interpretation, or is reducible to ‘direct 
propositional expression’93), the reduction of art to aesthetics, and the exemption of 
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contemporary art from history – as means commonly used in ‘sustaining ignorance about 
contemporary art’94.  
 
Osborne identifies three periodizations of contemporary art, each of which is, ‘constructed 
from the standpoint of the rupture of a particular historical event’95, and privileges 
particular geopolitical terrains. The first of these is chronological and refers to art made in 
the period after modern art; it is primarily US-based and occurs after WWII, or post-1945. 
The second periodization begins in the 60s with art’s break with object-based or medium 
specific art forms, and the third classification is that of art post-1989, at the end of the Cold 
War, the end of Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the third periodization 
Osborne claims art is no longer associated with the notion of the avant garde and is 
integrated into the ‘culture industry’; this period sees the growth of the institution of the 
biennale. Similarly to Smith’s perception of his three identified currents, Osborne claims 
these periodizations do not compete but instead work with each other in contextualising 
contemporary art.  
 
Osborne aims to produce a discourse which will ‘render the idea of contemporary art 
critically intelligible’96, but which is not empirical or ‘temporally inclusive’, stating that not 
all art produced now, or all art regarded by others as contemporary, is worthy of the name: 
‘”Contemporary” is, at base, a critical and therefore selective concept: it promotes and it 
excludes’97. Osborne cites Harold Rosenberg’s 1975 statement that, ‘art criticism today is art 
history’98 as the basis for his argument around the need for a critical philosophy of 
contemporary art. He views recent art criticism as having been dominated by the ‘second-
generation October art historians’ who, disillusioned with Greenberg’s medium-specific 
approach, gave definitions of contemporary art a ‘largely documentary and reconstructive’99 
character, discouraging its critical judgement. For Osborne, the outcome of the revival of a 
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philosophical art criticism is condensed within the proposition that, ‘contemporary art is 
postconceptual art’100, a statement on which he expands further via the dialectic of his text.  
 
Osborne characterises ‘the contemporary’ as fictional and hypothetical due to its 
assumption of a ‘total conjunction of present times’ and a ‘unity to the temporal mode of 
the present’101; here, contemporary art functions as though there is a shared subject-
position from which any sense of a relational totality could be ‘lived as a whole’102. Similarly 
to Smith’s emphasis on the multeity of the contemporary as differentiating it from the 
modern, Osborne sees the idea of multiple contemporaries making a similar distinction: 
here, the sense of ‘our’ contemporaneity refers to the ‘temporal conjunction of differential 
subject positions’ that results not in a ‘we’ that is an ‘I’, but a ‘plurality of temporally co-
present ‘I’s’103, lending the contemporary its ‘distributive unity’. To Osborne, a view of ‘the 
contemporary’ as fictional means it is something that we must construct rather than 
discover. 
 
For Osborne, as for Bourriaud and Smith, the concept of postmodernism is inadequate in 
accounting for contemporary art. Osborne views postmodernism as the result of the 
‘conceptually and chronologically restrictive manner’104 with which Greenberg defined 
modern art, and claims this definition opened the field for postmodernism’s ‘abstract 
negation’. Osborne believes that, ‘the critical priority of conceptual art’ and the ‘significance 
of its postconceptual legacy’ is not adequately theorised by the modern-to-postmodern 
transition, suggesting instead the periodization: formalist modernism to conceptual art, 
followed by postconceptual art. The ‘conceptual-postconceptual trajectory’ then forms a 
‘standpoint from which to totalize the wide array of other anti-formalist movements.’105 
 
Osborne references numerous philosophical positions throughout his argument and claims 
he structured his text on the fragment format of Romantic philosophy; the fact each chapter 
is both complete within itself while forming a fragment of a larger whole reflects his view of 
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contemporary art as ‘distributive’ while demanding of ‘systematic intent’. He classifies his 
statement that ‘contemporary art is postconceptual art’ as a ‘speculative proposition’, a 
Hegelian concept wherein the subject of a statement (in this case ‘contemporary art’) 
disappears within or is destroyed by its predicate. The predicate then becomes the subject 
(‘postconceptual art is contemporary art’) and is consequently destroyed in turn: here, 
Osborne claims the ‘infinite movement of thinking’ these terms engender lends them a 
certain harmony or unification. Osborne believes this proposition ‘approaches the 
experience of art’, but only, ‘at the end of a very long process through which the meaning of 
the elements at issue…are developed.’106 Thus it would seem that Osborne aims to reflect or 
even embody the nature of contemporary art within his text as a way of constructing rather 
than describing his subject, in line with his stated aim. Where Osborne’s philosophy of 
contemporary art is something one must experience through the entirety of his text, 
Osborne hints at a claim to the role of artist, and his belief that contemporary art is 
something its philosophy must construct renders his text itself something akin to a work of 
contemporary art.  
 
PART 3 - Critiquing ‘the contemporary’ 
 
To ask what something is suggests that its identity is unclear, that it is something we don’t 
recognise or can’t categorise: to ask what contemporary art is may be considered an act of 
criticism, potentially casting doubt on the legitimacy of its claim to the category ‘art’. Where 
a confident and satisfactory answer to the question, ‘what is contemporary art?’ might 
suggest that the field and its discourse is valid, an attempt to answer the question could also 
be viewed in the light of defence and paradoxically reinforce the sense of crisis surrounding 
its identity. If contemporary art’s identity was sound, we could assume that the question 
would not be raised, nor an answer provided.  
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In ‘The Necessity of the New: Between the Modern and the Contemporary’107, Ian McLean 
compares and critiques Osborne and Smith’s discourses. While outlining the differences 
between their analyses of the character of the modern and the contemporary, he identifies 
these discourses as sharing the underlying point that, ‘the concept of the contemporary has 
acquired the historical-ontological significance that “the modern” formerly had, thus 
usurping its former paradigmatic function.’108 If it is true that a significant new paradigm has 
replaced that of the modern, the question may be raised as to how contemporary the 
contemporary really is, in its characterisation as having escaped the more paradigmatic 
structure of the modern? In addition, if a new paradigm does exist, questions as to its 
nature would perhaps be less urgent: rather, the apparent need to define or defend this 
paradigm tends to lend it instead a sense of crisis over one of certainty. While McLean views 
Smith and Osborne’s approaches to modernity as marking the difference between their 
arguments, the structure of both these discourses may in fact be revealed to be more firmly 
entrenched within the modern than as providing any sort of alternative to it.  
 
In a conversation at Sydney’s Artspace in 2009, Rex Butler identified Smith’s attempt to 
define contemporary art as resulting in fact in three definitions, which he describes as 
‘somewhat tautological’109. Butler’s summary of these definitions is that:  
 
1. Contemporary art asks what it is to exist in the conditions of 
contemporaneity.  
2. Contemporary art is contemporaneous.  
3. Contemporary art is the most evident attribute of the contemporary 
world picture.110 
 
Smith’s reply to this is that tautology, as a concept, is commensurate with: 
 
…the contemporary tropes of recursion and realignment, such that 
each element turns back on itself – not in the reflexive then resolving 
                                                          
107
 Ian McLean, ‘The Necessity of the New: Between the Modern and the Contemporary,’ in Three Reflections 
on Contemporary Art History, eds. Nicholas Croggon & Helen Hughes (Discipline in association with emaj, 
2014), 17-55. 
108
 Ibid., 38. 
109
 Rex Butler, ‘What is Contemporary Art? Terry Smith in Conversation with Rex Butler,’ Column 5 (2009): 134-
44. 
110
 Ibid., 134. 
43 
 
manner that was typical of modernist thought, but with a 
temporal/spatial logic that seems to me to be peculiarly 
contemporary.111  
 
Beyond the common sense of the word ‘tautology’ as a deficit of style, in rhetoric it refers to 
‘statements that are in-themselves redundant’112 due to their use of words or concepts that 
don’t add meaning, where in the realm of logic a tautological statement is, ‘a statement that 
is always true’113. Redundant, self-reinforcing statements, universal truths and logical 
expressions overlap more with Greenberg’s 1961 description of the essence of modernism 
than Smith may recognise: 
 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic 
methods of a discipline to criticise the discipline itself, not in order to 
subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of 
competence. Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he 
withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left all the more 
secure in what there remained to it.114 
 
In reference to Terry Smith’s emphasis on the postcolonial and multicultural nature of 
contemporary art, art theorist and historian Andrew McNamara has commented: 
 
His promotion of the postcolonial and multicultural coexistence implies 
the liberal value of tolerance (liberal but commonly held on the Left), a 
notion of the equality and universality of civic rights and liberties 
(Enlightenment), critique and legitimate dissent (Enlightenment), 
‘hopeful anticipations’ (modernist), and also cultural relativity 
(modernist). For this reason, it is difficult to concur that a commitment 
to decolonisation and postcolonialism necessarily requires a disavowal 
of universals, even though this is said to mark its key point of 
difference.115 
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McLean describes it as odd that Osborne situates his discourse in reference to the German 
philosophical tradition, due to this tradition’s justification of, ‘Western modernism within a 
post-Enlightenment frame’116. Referring to Osborne’s claim that ‘the more successful an 
artist, the less likely they are to live and work in their country of origin, or indeed in any 
single place’ and that the movement of such artists is, ‘overwhelmingly “inwards”, from the 
periphery to Europe and…New York’117 McLean believes that while Osborne recognises the 
importance of non-Western art to contemporary art’s ontology, it is only alongside the 
significance of its ‘Westernisation’ that this recognition is made, meaning that, ‘the old 
provincialism model of Western hegemony prevails, even if in a more (neo-) liberal guise.’118 
While he describes Osborne’s argument as ‘powerful’ in its accuracy, McLean also finds it an 
‘apologia for the status quo – the West’s institutional embrace of the contemporary’119, and 
identifies within his argument a, ‘reluctance to let go of modernism, which to date at least is 
a history of Western art’120. McLean speculates such a tendency provides justification for, 
‘keeping the discourse of contemporary art within a Western frame in which the major 
museums have a huge investment.’121 
 
Where Bourriaud identifies the ‘heterochrony’ or ‘multeity’ of times of the altermodern as, 
‘a view of human history as constituted of multiple temporalities, disdaining a nostalgia for 
the avant-garde and indeed for any era’122, curator James Meyer has written that: 
 
This multeity, this purported breakdown of linear time that is declared 
to be definitive of the contemporary, is an artifact of the 1960s, of 
postmodernity, the very period the contemporary has allegedly left 
behind.123 
 
Meyer identifies equally a commitment to modernist sensibilities within Bourriaud’s notion 
of time in the altermodern: 
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Another modernity indeed: the contemporary is the fantasy that one 
can be modern again, that one can once again “float free from historical 
determination,” as the avant-garde supposedly did. “Altermodernity” is 
another repetition of this modernist dream. Bourriaud disdains the 
nostalgia he feels.124 
 
The prevalence of modernist sensibilities within attempts to create a discourse of 
contemporary art renders the purported break between these periods, or differences 
between their ideologies, less distinct, casting further doubt over the validity of the 
category of ‘the contemporary’. According to Andrew McNamara: 
 
…efforts to claim any advance on modernist culture since the 1960s have     
floundered because in one way or another they have relied on modernist 
precedents in order to claim they surpass the modern.125 
 
An attempt to characterise contemporaneity in opposition to the modern is seen by 
McNamara as hindering the development of a discourse around the current moment: 
 
The zeitgeist frenzies that have regularly broken out since the late 1960s 
around terms that promise a sheer break from modernity in order to 
announce a new and unique cultural situation actually inhibit 
understanding of how our contemporary situation remains embroiled 
within its wayward, far from resolved legacy.126 
 
Despite Smith’s (and others’) view of contemporary art as a multeity or as defined by 
contradictions, Butler claims Smith won’t settle for a paradoxical definition of contemporary 
art, wherein ‘what defines the contemporary is that we cannot say what defines it’127 – 
according to Butler, ‘the contemporary is what cannot be defined, a definition and its 
opposite’128. He states that where Smith’s definition may ‘sound incoherent or unhelpfully 
all-inclusive’, that it is in fact ‘necessarily so’129, characterising Smith’s view of the 
contemporary as a ‘division’. Both Smith and Butler agree that Smith’s discourse bears some 
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relation to Slavoj Zizek’s notion of ‘the parallax’, a gap between two separate points 
(existing in relation to perception) between which no synthesis is possible130. However 
Zizek’s point regarding the parallax is in reference to the synthesis of any identity, relating 
more to matters of perception than the characteristics that constitute any particular thing: if 
the inability to define contemporary art is an example of the notion of the parallax, it is only 
because contemporary art exists as a subject to be perceived like any other. 
 
Much criticism of the field of contemporary art tends to personify it, lending it the character 
of an autonomous force with which we must reckon: where the e-flux editors describe it as 
carrying out ‘evasive manoeuvres’, McLean sees it as, ‘a contested space with powerful 
vested interests’, speculating further as to how the idea itself may serve the interests of the 
institutions of contemporary art. The sudden consensus around the existence of the field is 
viewed with suspicion by James Meyer, who wonders why, ‘the museum, the academy, and 
high critical discourse came to such a consensus (regarding the contemporary) so swiftly 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century’131. On the other hand, those who 
attempt to endow the field of the contemporary with a definition or discourse tend to 
characterise it as positive, especially in its perceived contrast to that of the modern, for 
example in Smith and Bourriaud’s depiction of the contemporary as post-colonial and 
resistant to modernist ideology. Whether characterised as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, there is a sense 
within both viewpoints that the contemporary moment arose automatically, as a mysterious 
occurrence over which we somehow lack control.  
 
Whether one views ‘the contemporary’ with suspicion due to its inescapability and 
perceived resemblance to the capitalist hegemony, or views it as a positive force open to 
multiple voices and resisting modernist ideology, the apparent requirement for a definition 
of contemporary art reflects the sense that the tradition of the modern may be more 
essential to the structure of the field than we either realise or desire to be the case. In this 
instance, a more effective characterisation of current art may be found by contextualising it 
in respect of rather than in opposition to the modern, and by locating within the modern 
that which has led to the seemingly inescapable, undefined field of the contemporary. 
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In investigating the nature and limits of contemporary practice, this research situates a 
definition of contemporary art within the context of its historical relation to the modern. 
Where the contemporary moment is characterised by the impossibility of a self-critical, 
modernist practice alongside nostalgia for such practice, this research also posits a 
definition of contemporary art as the end of art.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONTEMPORARY ART AS POSTCONCEPTUAL ART 
 
To imagine the future, we should perhaps start from the more or less 
recent past.1 
 
PART 1 – Were we ever contemporary? 
 
As the most recent, and (arguably) last, modernist movement, and in a historical view of art 
as linear and developmental, conceptual art’s significant ontological impact can be seen to 
justify describing the art which followed it – that to which we refer as ‘contemporary art’ – 
‘postconceptual’. As indicated in the previous chapter, Peter Osborne endows conceptual 
art with ‘critical priority’ to the extent that he argues against the periodization of modern to 
postmodern or contemporary art, in favour of a transition from ‘formalist modernism to 
conceptual art, followed by postconceptual art’. Where Osborne describes his statement 
‘contemporary art is postconceptual art’ as a speculative proposition in a Hegelian sense, he 
also aligns the structure of the proposition with Adorno’s idea that ‘art’ – as a concept – only 
achieves unity retrospectively: thus for Osborne, the ‘ongoing retrospective and reflective 
totalisation is necessarily open, fractured, incomplete and therefore inherently speculative’.2  
 
However a description of contemporary art as ‘post’ conceptual (or indeed, ‘post’ anything) 
tends to recall the sense of linear movement viewed as typical to the modern: Osborne’s 
need to contextualise this statement as a speculative proposition, characterised by a sense 
of infinite movement between terms, may result from his desire to avoid such allusion to 
linearity. Osborne himself declares that his statement results in, ‘a certain productive 
opaqueness’3 – productive, because it works in conjunction with the sense of the 
interpretation of, ‘the individual works that constitute its referent: contemporary / 
postconceptual art.’4 For Osborne, this ties his philosophy to his sense concerning the 
importance of art criticism to contemporary art’s ontology, as stated at the outset of his 
argument. While it is difficult to grasp his reasoning here, Osborne appears to connect one 
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of the founding statements in his perusal of a philosophy of contemporary art, ‘the art 
history that art criticism (ideally) is’ with a modernist sense of art history, ‘the qualitative 
historical novelty of the present, from the multiple standpoints of which the past is to be 
reconstructed and made legible’5. However his use of Hegel’s speculative proposition means 
the ‘openness of the present onto an indeterminate future’ is foreclosed, therefore his 
philosophy, ‘cannot involve totalization as a continuous or developmental process of 
systematic presentation, imagined as approaching a point of completeness, but rather, 
more Romantically, the placing of emblematic fragments into systematic perspective’6. Here 
it would seem Osborne believes the fact his proposition is speculative, alongside his use of 
the Romantic format of the fragment, negates the sense of modernist linearity and 
totalisation his proposition tends to recall. In reality, the declared opacity of this proposition 
may more simply reflect the contemporary’s evasion of definition; I believe a more useful 
consideration of contemporary art as postconceptual exists instead within a literal 
understanding of this idea in its linearity. 
 
A key point in Osborne’s determination of contemporary art as post conceptual lies within 
the sense of conceptual art’s ‘failure’ to realise its pure project of dematerialisation or de-
aestheticisation. While a view that conceptual art failed is shared by participants from the 
movement itself, the conclusions Osborne draws from this failure, and upon which he 
establishes his conditions for a philosophy of contemporary art, are at odds with the stated 
aims and objectives that the multitude of conceptual artists expressed for their practice at 
the time. Where the definitions of contemporary art so far discussed tend to describe 
particular instances of the multitude of forms available to the contemporary, a greater focus 
on and respect for the stated aims of the conceptual artists around art’s dematerialisation 
may allow for a more convincing definition of contemporary art, with respect to a desire for 
art’s liberation and the explosion of form in which such liberation tends to result.  
 
In contrast to the movement of conceptual art, a notable exception to the chorus of voices 
providing commentary on the contemporary is that of artists themselves. Foster sent his 
2009 questionnaire to critics and curators only, stating later that, ‘I did not ask artists 
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because I felt it was not their problem really—that it bore more heavily on critics, historians, 
and curators’7. An exception is the inclusion of a response by artist Anton Vidokle, whose 
status as editor of e-flux appears to have lent him adequate qualification: it is within 
debates on contemporary art facilitated by e-flux that one can find occasional participation 
by artists, although even here the conversation is dominated by critics, philosophers and 
historians.  
 
The lack of the artist’s voice in debates concerning contemporary art may be due to what 
curator Mark Godfrey describes as artists feeling ‘extremely ambivalent about the very idea 
of the contemporary’:  
 
This ambivalence has several causes. For one, artists no longer see their 
practice as a development from, or argument with, art of the past 
twenty years, or as a brand-new moment in a neat line of “movements” 
or “paradigms,” in the way that (for instance) Conceptual artists in the 
early 1970s positioned themselves against Minimalism and Abstract 
Expressionism.8  
 
From this it would seem that today’s artists, having no particular sense of belonging to the 
moment of ‘the contemporary’, do not view it as a label that distinguishes their art from 
that of other eras in any crucial sense, nor possess the drive to make such distinctions. Liam 
Gillick’s call for a term with which to replace ‘contemporary art’ doesn’t stem from a desire 
to distinguish it from the art of the modern, but a desire to differentiate between the 
multitude of styles and approaches the term ‘the contemporary’ straddles, since, ‘this very 
inclusiveness has helped suppress a critique of what art is’9. Equally Hito Steyerl’s complaint 
is about the ethics or politics of the field of contemporary art rather than a critique of 
previous generations or particular contemporary art forms. Unlike theorists such as Smith, 
Osborne or Foster, contemporary artists don’t appear driven to conceptualise their work as 
opposing or escaping the modern.  
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As stated in the previous chapter, respondents to Foster’s ‘Questionnaire on “the 
Contemporary”’ expressed equally positive and negative attitudes towards contemporary 
art’s perceived openness or lack of definition: where openness may be seen to occlude 
contemporary art’s criticality and sense of paradigm, it allows for multiple voices and can be 
interpreted as an escape from modernist metanarratives. Uncertainty regarding the lack of 
a central discourse for contemporary art is also evident when definitions, discourses or 
paradigms are offered for the field, in the sense that they tend to occur in the multiple: as 
series' of categories grouping the contemporary’s various tendencies and styles. For 
example where Smith developed three currents of contemporary art in 2009, Foster 
identified four characteristics of the contemporary in 2003: the ‘traumatic’, involving a lack 
of grieving for the avant garde and a refusal of memory, ‘shadowing’, or the spectral nature 
of contemporary art, ‘nonsynchronous forms’, the use of outmoded genres and mediums, 
and ‘incongruence’, the juxtaposition of spaces, hybrid objects and sites10. Alexander 
Alberro, in response to Foster’s 2009 questionnaire, developed his own four tendencies of 
the contemporary: globalisation (the end of the three worlds), technology (new media, the 
black box, internet art and visual studies), the reinvestigation of the avant garde (relational 
aesthetics, art transforming life) and the re-emergence of philosophical aesthetics (art as 
affect and experience, participatory art)11.  
 
Alongside the tendency to define contemporary art via categorisation, commentators 
frequently stress the fact of these categories’ overlapping and complementary natures: 
where contradictory or antagonistic forms may occur, they are said to co-exist harmoniously 
within the contemporary rather than cancel each other out. An example of this is Osborne’s 
three periodizations of contemporary art, which in his view are not, ‘self-sufficient and 
competing alternative definitions’, but ‘different intensities of contemporaneity’, wherein 
‘each may become closest to the surface on particular occasions, but always as mediated by 
its relations to the other two.’12 Thus where a definition or paradigm of contemporary art is 
perceived to be required, single definitions are avoided, retaining the equally necessary 
sense of contemporary art’s multeity. 
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Just as Gillick claims that today, ‘an increasing number of artists seek to radically 
differentiate their work from other art’13, conceptual artists also sought to distinguish 
between theirs and other, concurrent styles of art: the difference however lies within their 
readiness to explicitly identify the forms of work theirs differs from. For example in 1970 
Kosuth divided the ‘American art activity’ of the time into three categories: the first, 
‘aesthetic’ or formalist art (‘the general notion of art as held by most of the lay public’14) he 
associated with Greenberg’s notion of aesthetic judgement: formalist artists didn’t, ‘take 
part in the conceptual engagement…of the “construction” of the art proposition.’15 The 
second category, ‘reactive art’, Kosuth describes as, ‘the scrap-heap of 20th century art 
ideas’16, claiming it referred only to the ‘how’ of an art proposition (its formal elements) 
rather than the ‘why’. To Kosuth such art was a, ‘superficial and necessarily gestural 
reaction’17 which related art to craft, and which was described (‘by journalists’) in terms 
such as ‘anti-form’, ‘earthworks’, and ‘process art’ – types of art Kosuth denigrated as 
embodying, ‘a traditional notion of art while still being “avant-garde”.’18 In contrast to these 
two forms of art, Kosuth believed that, ‘at its most strict and radical extreme the art I call 
conceptual is such because it is based on an inquiry into the nature of art.’19  
 
The tendency to situate one’s art in opposition to the art of the time is also evident within 
an anecdote relating to Andy Warhol’s motivations in making Pop art, a decade earlier: 
 
Leonard Kessler ran into Andy coming out of an art-supply store 
carrying paint and canvas. ‘Andy! What are you doing?’ he greeted 
him. ‘He said, “I’m starting Pop art,”’ Kessler recalled. ‘I said, “Why?” 
He said, “Because I hate abstract expressionism, I hate it!”20  
 
In contrast to these examples of late modern artists situating their work in direct and even 
hostile opposition to that of others, Gillick’s essay ‘Contemporary Art Does Not Account for 
That Which is Taking Place’ doesn’t explicitly describe the forms of work some 
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contemporary artists wish to ‘radically differentiate’ their work from; instead, he attempts 
to identify models alternative to ‘contemporary art’, which, ‘appear to operate in a semi-
autonomous way’ alongside it. Gillick identifies these alternatives as, ‘recent focus upon the 
documentary, educational models, and engaged social collaborations’21, offering the ‘United 
Nations Plaza’ project of 2006 as an example of such a model22. Terry Smith’s attempt to 
define contemporary art is equally devoid of examples of current work that do not conform 
to his definition, and despite his criticism of sensational, ‘remodernist’ art, he nonetheless 
(somewhat begrudgingly) allows it within ‘the contemporary’ as one of its currents. Peter 
Osborne, while insisting upon contemporary art’s sense of criticality and exclusivity, refrains 
from naming examples of current art that his paradigm might exclude. Neither the artists 
nor the theorists of contemporary art cited here display antagonism towards forms of art 
that their model of contemporary art excludes, or that they claim to operate in opposition 
to. An inability to critique or oppose one’s practice or theory to any particular form of 
contemporary art or exclude any form from this realm reflects the sense of the openness of 
the contemporary moment to all form and the end of the modernist sense of formal 
discourse. 
 
Where Gillick identifies documentary, educational models and engaged social collaboration 
as providing alternatives to ‘contemporary art’, he is nonetheless aware of these forms’ 
limits as alternatives. While recognising that the ‘mediation of one’s own practice creates 
moments of escape from the contemporary’, Gillick claims this also creates, ‘a dilemma 
when it becomes the primary production of the contemporary artist’, because, ‘even the 
“educational turn”…quickly produces its own coding as part of the contemporary.’23 
Identifying that, ‘collective and documentary forms have attempted to escape’ 
contemporary art, Gillick wonders further: ‘how can we avoid the post-contemporary 
becoming an historic nostalgia for the group or mere political identification?’24 Where an 
artist such as Warhol displays a strong belief in the potential for new forms of art powerful 
enough to overthrow existing conventions, Gillick is unable to imagine a form with which to 
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make a similar impact on ‘the contemporary’. While the enemy for modern artists may have 
been other types of art, the enemy for contemporary artists such as Gillick lies within the 
hegemony of ‘the contemporary’ itself.   
 
Although a characterisation of contemporary art as ‘open’ – as either a positive or negative 
trait – has some consensus within the discourses discussed so far, a view of art as overly 
open is not specific to the current moment. In 1982, over twenty five years before his 2009 
questionnaire, Hal Foster raised very similar questions in his essay ‘Against Pluralism’25. 
Here, they were framed in relation to the new ‘pluralistic’ art he saw manifesting at the 
time: ‘My motive here is simple: to insist that pluralism is a problem, to specify that it is a 
conditioned one subject to change, and to point to the need for cogent criticism.’26 He 
identified the increasing influence of the art market and the proliferation of art schools as 
characteristic of the new pluralistic art, reflecting comments made in answers to his 2009 
Questionnaire. Describing the new pluralistic art as an ‘institution’ to which its practitioners 
willingly conformed, Foster declared further that, ‘posed as a freedom to choose, the 
pluralist position plays right into the ideology of the “free market”’27, predating here later 
critique of contemporary art’s alignment with a neo-liberal attitude. He declared that, ‘few 
artists or even critics seem to feel the lack of cogent discourse’ within this pluralistic art, 
speculating further that this was, ‘perhaps the signal of the concession to pluralism’28 – 
foreshadowing current tendencies to embrace contemporary art’s lack of discourse.  
 
Foster contrasted the new pluralistic art, in its lack of a dominant mode and a critical 
position, to late modern art: ‘in the '50s abstract expressionism seemed monolithic, and in 
the '60s the visual arts had an order that American culture otherwise lacked.’29  He declared 
further that: 
 
Late modernism was literally corrupted — broken up. Its self-critical 
impulse was retained, but its ethical tone was rejected. This rejection 
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led to an aestheticism of the non- or antiartistic. Such a reaction 
(much conceptual art is representative) allowed for many new modes 
of art: hybrid, ephemeral, site-specific, textual.30 
 
While not elaborating upon his sense of the ‘ethical tone’ of late modern art, Foster 
connects the rejection of this tone with the rise of a ‘non-artistic’ aesthetic. Commenting 
upon the fact that  ‘much conceptual art’ is ‘representative’ of the rise of the non-artistic, he 
refrains from laying specific blame with conceptual art – or with any particular artist or 
movement – for late modernism’s supposed corruption. Thus within this statement, a sense 
of mystery exists around the cause of this – apparently new – anti-aesthetic attitude of 
undefined origin. 
 
Foster identifies abstract expressionism and minimalism as movements associated with 
what he perceives as having been the more centred art of late modernism. While describing 
1950s abstract expressionism as ‘monolithic’, Foster claims further that: 
 
In the '60s self-criticism centered these arts radically. In (schematic) 
retrospect the major art and criticism of the period constitute a 
highly ethical, rigorously logical enterprise that set out to expunge 
impurity and contradiction . . . only to incite them as countertactics. 
For if minimalism was the apogee of modernism, it was also its 
negation.31 
 
In 1961 however, Ad Reinhardt – an artist associated with the movement of abstract 
expressionism – displayed a more critical attitude towards the art of his contemporaries: 
 
I was trying to speculate about what corruption means everywhere. 
Now what would corruption be in art? And my answer would be in 
the work that’s too available, too loose, too open, too poetic. I would 
say it permits too many people to project their own ideas in it, and I 
don’t like to see art that open, so that at some point almost anything 
goes, almost anyone could do it. I think that whole idea is corrupt. I 
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think the idea of the artist making believe he doesn’t know what he is 
doing is a corrupt one.32 
 
Reinhardt goes on to speculate on artists’ responsibility for this corruption, citing the 
behaviour of abstract expressionists to illustrate his point:  
 
For example, the latest Life article about avant-garde art that I saw 
was involved with Still, De Kooning, and Rothko, and they permitted 
their work to be treated as flames, girders, grasses and sunsets. Now 
does the art permit this? If the art permits Life magazine making 
anything they want of it, this may make for a corrupt situation, too. A 
kind of art, perhaps, that seems to excite or entertain, perhaps. That 
way it seems to be accessible and maybe it’s involved in quickly 
exhausted values, in a kind of built-in obsolescence.33 
 
Reinhardt also critiques what he perceives to have been a lack of engagement on behalf of 
the artists of this time with discourse around their work: ‘Last week one of the artists said to 
me, “Let someone else raise these issues, they have nothing to lose”…there is a passivity in 
artists today’34. Reinhardt’s critique of late modern artists’ perceived passivity contrasts 
with Foster’s view of these same movements as ‘rigorous’ and ‘logical’ in approach, and has 
much in common with Foster’s later critique of pluralist artists’ indifference to discourse. 
Reinhardt makes the further declaration that within late modern art, ‘commercialism or 
careerism or professional painting has become a racket like every other racket, a business 
like every other business’35, echoing the alignment of art with the market found within both 
Foster’s 1982 criticism of pluralism and current critique of the contemporary. Where Foster 
retrospectively characterises abstract expressionism as centred and self-critical, Reinhardt 
described it at the time as ‘too open’ and in itself ‘corrupt’. Whether we view the perceived 
openness of contemporary art in a positive or negative light, it would seem an accusation of 
art as too open, as lacking criticality, or as willing to conform to the demands of the market 
or popular culture is not specific to the current moment, but one that has recurred within 
art over at least the last half century.  
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PART 2 - The brief history of conceptual art 
 
The first pronouncement by an artist on the nature of conceptual art was made (arguably) in 
1961 by Henry Flynt:  
 
‘"Concept art" is first of all an art of which the material is "concepts", 
as the material of for example music is sound. Since "concepts" are 
closely bound up with language, concept art is a kind of art of which 
the material is language. That is, unlike for example a work of music, 
in which the music proper (as opposed to notation, analysis, and so 
forth) is just sound, concept art proper will involve language.’ 36 
 
Despite this early idea of conceptual, or ‘concept’, art, the idea as a movement did not take 
force until 1967 with the publication of Sol le Witt’s ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ in 
Artforum37. In the same year, the then-unknown artist Joseph Kosuth declared that his art 
objects were made of ‘conceptual rather than found materials’, in a statement published 
alongside his inclusion in a group exhibition in New York38.  
 
An examination of Kosuth’s writing throughout the evolution of his practice – from his initial 
1967 statement above to those made in the 1990s – reveals some of the issues inherent to 
the development of conceptual art when viewed retrospectively. In his first major essay ‘Art 
After Philosophy’ (1969) Kosuth expounds upon his idea of conceptual art in relation to his 
thesis that philosophy as a discipline is over, since: ‘one begins to get the impression that 
there “is nothing more to be said.”’39 He identifies the twentieth century as a time of 
philosophy ending and art beginning – ‘not strictly speaking, but rather as the “tendency” of 
the situation.’40 He claims that while art existed before Duchamp, such art’s concern with 
‘other functions’ rendered it ‘only minimally art’41 – these other functions included, 
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‘depiction of religious themes, portraiture of aristocrats, detailing of architecture, etc.’ 
which Kosuth views as having, ‘used art to cover up art.’42 
 
Kosuth separates aesthetics from art, characterising art as something akin to an ‘analytic 
proposition’, which he describes as a, ‘tautology which enables art to remain “aloof” from 
philosophical presumptions.’43 In this sense art, in its concern with the conditions of its 
existence over matters of aesthetics or representation, is seen to more successfully fulfil 
philosophy’s role of self-reflection and analysis. Kosuth likens the form of this art to a 
language, leading to a view of works of art as analytic propositions:  
 
…if viewed within their context – as art – they provide no information 
what-so-ever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in 
that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is saying 
that a particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of 
art.44 
 
For Kosuth, art’s tautological nature likens it to logic and mathematics, since the ‘art idea’ 
and ‘art’ are one and the same: they can be ‘appreciated as art without going outside the 
context of art for verification.’45 When art exists for its own sake (as a tautology) it escapes 
the assumptions philosophy is subject to in its reliance on something ‘outside’ itself – 
language – to make its assertions. There is a sense within Kosuth’s early thesis of wanting to 
rescue art as a pure idea from the influences or assumptions that weaken it, or rob it of its 
significance. The notion of ‘art as art’ as a replacement for philosophy removes art from the 
mundane, practical realms of architecture, decoration, craft or representation, returning it 
to a higher purpose associated with human thought. The perceived concern of more 
formalist movements of the time with matters regarding aesthetics (as propounded by 
Greenberg) was viewed by Kosuth as a degradation of art, trapping it within redundant 
traditional formats. For artists such as Kosuth, it was only by questioning these formats and 
considering them boundaries to be broken through that art could achieve its noble, 
philosophical pursuit. 
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This sentiment is echoed by artists viewed as having been influential to Kosuth, and whom 
he quotes at the beginning of part two of ‘Art After Philosophy’: ‘In France there is an old 
saying, “stupid like a painter”… All my work in the period before the Nude was visual 
painting. Then I came to the idea.’ (Marcel Duchamp); ‘The disinterest in painting and 
sculpture is a disinterest in doing it again’ (Donald Judd); ‘For each work of art that becomes 
physical there are many variations that do not’ (Sol LeWitt)46. While declaring his reluctance 
to reinforce the notion of conceptual art as a ‘movement’, Kosuth identifies artists 
associated with conceptual art who he in fact regarded as doing something outside this art 
in its more pure form.  Kosuth was concerned that the use of the term ‘conceptual art’ to 
describe the multitude of work that was becoming increasingly associated with it would lead 
to a sense of conceptualism as an artistic ‘tendency’, which he feared would then become 
viewed as a style associated with a particular form of art’s materialisation. While Kosuth 
admitted that a certain presence of the object necessarily remained alongside attempts to 
deliver art to its more pure conceptual form, he felt the notion of conceptual art as a style 
would lend undue emphasis to its existence as an object, to its related form and aesthetic, 
detracting from his assertion around the irrelevance of aesthetics to art.  
 
The emphasis on the material or object-ness of art is viewed by Kosuth as determining the 
similarity (or otherwise) to his project by the multitude of artists identified at the time as 
‘conceptual’. He describes the work of Robert Barry and Lawrence Weiner as having become 
associated with conceptual art, ‘almost by accident’47, as an association made solely on the 
basis of their choice of materials and processes over a concern with art as concept. To 
illustrate his point, Kosuth describes a work by Barry where small paintings were 
progressively reduced, first to a series of single lines, which then became radio-wave beams, 
then inert gases and finally existed only in the form of ‘brain energy’. To Kosuth, this work 
by Barry is only conceptual, ‘because the material is invisible. But his art does have a 
physical state, which is different than work which only exists conceptually.’48 Kosuth claims 
that more ‘purely conceptual art’ existed in the work of Terry Atkinson and Michael Baldwin 
in the UK, On Kawara in Japan, and Christine Kozlov and Ian Baxter in Canada. He identifies a 
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new, ‘purer’ form of conceptual art as made by younger artists of the time (Adrian Piper, 
Saul Ostrow and Perpetua Butler) and further conceptual work (‘in this purer sense’) by Ian 
Burn, Mel Ramsden, and Roger Cutforth.  ‘Pure’ conceptualism is thus lent a sense of 
historical continuity via the identification of older artists who influenced Kosuth through to 
younger artists he viewed as carrying the idea into the future. However Kosuth’s attempt to 
justify his reasoning around claims of works’ purity or otherwise tends to render the notion 
less precise: while he describes some artists as making work which is ‘conceptually 
presented’ or ‘along conceptual lines’, others are described as treating art objects in a 
‘much different way than they are usually treated in an art context’, while others are said to 
use a ‘conceptual format’ or make ‘“conceptual” sort of work’. In spite of Kosuth’s desire to 
retain the pure thread of conceptual art, where the art as idea (or as ‘art’) is more apparent 
than its existence within an object, it seems he is unable – even within this own early 
reasoning – to avoid its muddying. 
 
Conceptual art as a defined movement or period is known for its brevity. Only six years post 
his attempt to restrict the parameters of this art – as discussed above – Kosuth addressed 
the sense of its having ‘failed’ in issue two of the equally short-lived conceptual art journal, 
The Fox (1975-76). Kosuth writes that, ‘the last Fox poster advertised “…the failure of 
Conceptual Art” as part of the content of Number 1’. While identifying this sense of failure 
as having only been, ‘…alluded to in various articles’ within the issue, Kosuth took the theme 
up in issue 2, in an essay he called ‘1975’49. While suggesting that conceptual art’s history 
was more complex than may be implied by the notion of failure, Kosuth nonetheless admits 
that, ‘the activities of the mass of practitioners within what is now an (art) institution is a 
betrayal of the impetus of its original aims.’50 This betrayal takes the form of what he 
identifies as the development of ‘stylistic conceptual art’ (SCA):   
 
…a formalistic hypostatization of cultural sleepwalking; as dependent on 
and as expressive of the institutions of the prevailing dominating socio-
political-economic ideology as is the current practice of the more 
traditional modes of art-making (painting and sculpture).51 
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While declaring he may have been responsible for, ‘some of the current malaise in art-
practice’52, Kosuth saw conceptual art’s death as the result of its acceptance or annexation 
by the establishment. The idea of conceptual art as action, where, ‘the activity was art, not 
the residue’53, is written about by Kosuth in ‘1975’ as having been co-opted by the 
institution: 
 
…what can this society do with activity? Activity must mean labor. And 
labor must give you a service or a product. Only as a product could what 
I spent my time doing be meaningful in this society. But what it meant 
to me, and to anyone really interested in art had nothing at all to do 
with its existence as a product. The more recent work needed galleries 
and museums to provide the necessary context – and this is where the 
problems, artistic and political, begin.54 
 
Kosuth’s early fears concerning the opening up of conceptual art to a multitude of less pure 
conceptual practices and of art’s subsequent re-entrenchment within the material object 
and thus aesthetics were seemingly fulfilled. Kosuth illustrates this co-optation as the sense 
of the conservative forces of the establishment reining this practice in by embracing it: there 
is a sense here that what might today be referred to as the force of neo-liberalism was 
ultimately stronger than artists’ ability (or desire) to escape it.  
 
Lucy Lippard’s anthology of texts documenting the conceptual movement, ‘Six Years: The 
Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972’ was originally published in 1973. It 
was reissued in 1997 and introduced with a new essay by Lippard called ‘Escape Attempts’, 
wherein she reflects on the nature of the art of that time 25 years earlier. While not an 
artist, Lippard was closely associated with the conceptual art movement, participating within 
it as a curator, writer and critic, however her experimental style of curating and writing was 
in itself art-like. Lippard, herself situated in New York, emphasises conceptual art’s 
internationalism and its having occurred seemingly spontaneously and concurrently over a 
broad sweep of cities globally. Lippard’s essay is detailed in its reference to the many and 
varied forms taken by conceptual art, such as mail art, earthworks, performance art, 
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happenings, actions and even minimalism. While she references conceptual art’s contested 
history regarding its origins, outcomes, and the purity of its programme, Lippard’s essay is 
less concerned with the intricacies of these claims and more with recalling the ‘spirit’ of the 
movement in all its instances. 
 
Lippard describes conceptual art’s dematerialisation as an attempt to escape what she calls 
the ‘frame-and-pedestal’ syndrome, as being anti- art-as-commodity. Similarly to Kosuth, 
she viewed ‘ultra- conceptual art’ as evolving from art as idea and art as action. Lippard 
identifies conceptual art as having made art more accessible to women than previous art 
movements, since its dematerialized form made it inexpensive, unintimidating and 
accessible. While acknowledging that conceptual art may today appear timid and 
disconnected in comparison to the political activism of the time, she describes the 
conceptual artists themselves as having looked and sounded like radicals. Even if the art was 
apolitical, in its presentation the form (or lack of a form) this art took was radical: it was 
often the form of conceptual art that was political over its content. Lippard describes 
conceptual artists as wanting to attack notions of originality, individual style and genius, 
which were associated with ‘patriarchal, ruling-class art’.  
 
However as early as 1973, Lippard wrote in the ‘Postface’ of the original publication of Six 
Years that, ‘hopes that “conceptual art” would be able to avoid the general 
commercialization, the destructively “progressive” approach of modernism were for the 
most part unfounded.’55 Where in 1969 artists believed nobody would want to pay money 
for objects such as ‘a Xerox sheet referring to an event past or never directly perceived, a 
group of photographs documenting an ephemeral situation or condition, a project for work 
never to be completed, words spoken but not recorded’, only three years later, ‘major 
conceptualists are selling work for substantial sums here and in Europe; they are 
represented by…the world’s most prestigious galleries’.56 In 1997, Lippard was realistic 
about the outcomes of the period:  
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However rebellious the escape attempts, most of the work remained 
art-referential, and neither economic nor esthetic ties to the art 
world were fully severed (though at times we liked to think they were 
hanging by a thread).57 
 
Nonetheless, Lippard retains a hope that ‘the most exciting “art” might still be buried in 
social energies not yet recognized as art.’58 Reflecting on the time of conceptual art twenty 
five years prior, Lippard declares that while art’s escape had been temporary, the spirit of 
the art remained, waiting to be tapped into by artists of the future: ‘Art was recaptured and 
sent back to its white cell, but parole is always a possibility.’59  
 
Where Lippard emphasises conceptual art in its diversity, in the openness and ephemerality 
of its forms and its political nature, Kosuth attempts to restrict conceptual art’s definition in 
order to prevent its being seen as a movement at all. However while Lippard and Kosuth 
may diverge in their emphases on its nature, their retrospective views of conceptual art 
maintain an equal sense of its having failed. In both accounts the source of this failure is art’s 
return to a material form, its subsequent re-institutionalisation and re-emphasis on 
aesthetics, and its commodification. This sense of the inescapability of art from materiality 
or the aesthetic represents a particular end of the ideological drive toward art’s liberation 
within the modern, an end that contributes toward the conditions of contemporary art as 
post-conceptual. 
 
PART 3 - Contemporary art as post conceptual art 
 
In chapter two of Anywhere or not at All (‘art beyond aesthetics’) Osborne claims that within 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, ‘art judgements’ are excluded from the notion of pure aesthetic 
judgements of taste. Since art judgements were identified by Kant as belonging to the realm 
of ‘logically conditioned’ aesthetic judgements, they operated under ‘conditions of a 
determinate concept, such as “art” or “painting”’, which are ‘not aesthetically “pure”’60. For 
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Osborne, the result of Kant’s exclusion of art judgements from the aesthetic realm results in 
a gap:  
 
In so far as ‘aesthetics’ is taken as the name for the philosophical 
treatment of art, we are confronted with a new and equally ironic 
‘ignorance of the thing and of the language’: aesthetic’s principled 
ignorance of art qua art.61 
 
The fact that Kant’s notion of aesthetics centred on the effect of an object on a subject 
means, according to Osborne, that the notion of ‘aesthetics’ relates more to the 
‘metaphysics of the subject’ than to a ‘metaphysics of the artwork as a self-sufficient or 
“autonomous” entity’, and that the notion of ‘aesthetic art’ is, ‘the contradictory result of 
the negotiation of the impasse.’62 Osborne characterises the nineteenth and twentieth 
century tradition of ‘aesthetic art’ as having been based on the ‘self-contradictory 
absolutization’ of Kant’s aesthetic art: 
 
This ignorance of language – the idea that ‘aesthetics’ is an 
appropriate term to designate the philosophical treatment of art – 
sums up the ignorance of the thing: ‘art’. This ignorance persists 
today in the widespread belief that it is the logical autonomy of pure 
aesthetic judgements of taste from other types of judgement (as 
theorized by Kant) that is the philosophical basis of the autonomy of 
art.63 
 
It would seem here that Osborne is aligned with a view of art in its autonomy as necessarily 
disconnected with the notion of aesthetics, similar to beliefs held by artists such as Kosuth 
in forming the foundations of conceptual art. However, Osborne’s view of conceptual art’s 
failure to ultimately disconnect art from aesthetics is that it constitutes, conversely, its 
success:  
 
It was the ironic historical achievement of the strong programme of 
‘analytical’ or ‘pure’ conceptual art to have demonstrated the 
ineliminability of the aesthetic as a necessary, though radically 
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insufficient, component of the artwork through the failure of its 
attempt at its elimination: the failure of an absolute anti-aesthetic.64 
 
For Osborne, conceptual art’s attempt to exceed a convention – that of art as concerned 
with aesthetics – ultimately rendered the convention more visible and reinstated it ‘on new 
grounds’, in a function he describes as Hegelian65. Therefore conceptual art for Osborne 
was, ‘an idea that marked the experimental investigation of a particular anti-aesthetic 
desire’66: this leads him to conclude that, ‘the meaning of “conceptual art” must be 
retrospectively critically refigured to incorporate this insight.’67 The implication for 
contemporary art – as a ‘post’- conceptual art according to Osborne’s reading of the 
movement – is that, ‘it is only in relation to the category of conceptual art, in its inherent 
problematicity, that a critical historical experience of contemporary art is possible.’68 Thus a 
foundation for Osborne’s theorisation of the art of the current moment, in its 
contextualisation as ‘postconceptual’, is firmly based on an idea of aesthetics as: ‘a 
necessary, though radically insufficient, component of the artwork’.69 
 
The retrospective return of art here to a sense of the aesthetic or the object – to a sense of 
aesthetics as ‘necessary’, even while ‘radically insufficient’ – jars when contrasted with the 
stated aims of the multitude of artists involved with conceptual art, further examples of 
which include: ‘I’m not really interested any longer to make an object’ (Jan Dibbets), 
‘materialist implies a primary involvement in materials, but I am primarily concerned with 
art’, (Lawrence Weiner), ‘I present oral communication as an object…I’m diametrically 
opposed to the precious object’ (Ian Wilson) and ‘Whatever happened to the art object?’ 
(Carl Andre)70. Despite evidence provided by statements such as these, Osborne maintains a 
view that the dematerialization of art was, ‘always a misunderstanding of art’s conceptual 
character’71. 
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Osborne tends elsewhere in his argument to contradict or doubt the stated views or ideals 
of certain conceptual artists. For example he quotes Dick Higgins from 1965 (in relation to 
the breakdown of the traditional categories of medium in art):  
 
Much of the best work being produced today seems to fall between 
media. This is no accident…We are approaching the dawn of a 
classless society, to which separation into rigid categories is 
absolutely irrelevant. 
 
And Robert Smithson from 1967:  
 
Painting, sculpture and architecture are finished, but the art habit 
continues. Art settles into a stupendous inertia. 
 
…only to contradict them:  
 
As it turned out, we were not approaching the dawn of a classless 
society; nor did art settle into a stupendous inertia.72  
 
Elsewhere, although Osborne describes it as ‘conservative, indeed reactionary’ when 
Smithson’s self-declared ‘transcategorial’ work is retrospectively analysed within the 
category of ‘sculpture’73, he doesn’t recognise the conservatism of his own tendency to 
retrospectively re-materialise work originally created in the spirit of dematerialisation. Even 
Henry Flynt’s statement (as quoted above) - ‘"Concept art" is first of all an art of which the 
material is "concepts"’ - is interpreted by Osborne as proof of the existence of a, ‘medium-
based conception of conceptual art’.74 While Osborne claims Greenberg’s formalist reading 
of modernism does not allow for conceptual art’s critical nature and thus precludes an 
effective theorisation for contemporary art, I believe Osborne’s own tendency to overrule or 
deny the priority of the anti-aesthetic ideals as stated by conceptual artists similarly curtails 
an effective theorisation of contemporary art, post such ideals. While artists of the 
conceptual movement may have failed in their project to – as stated by Lippard – free art 
from the ‘white cell’ of its material form, Osborne’s tendency to retrospectively cast 
aspersion on the aims of this universal movement feels like defeat and a return to order.  
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Currently, object oriented ontology and new materialist theories, frequently related to the 
philosophical thread known as ‘speculative realism’, are popularly employed in the 
contextualisation and theorisation of contemporary art. Notions of art as necessarily 
‘material’, or object-based, centre on a sense of the vitalism or metaphysics of objects, as 
found in the work of Jane Bennett or Graham Harman75. In his book Realist Magic, Objects, 
Ontology, Causality76, Timothy Morton attempts an analysis of art in relation to these ideas. 
For Morton, art as aesthetic relates to causality as it is rethought in speculative realism, 
which, rather than adhering to a view of human knowledge as limited in its ability to 
understand events and their causes, views a sense of causality existing instead within the 
world of objects, which can be known. In this sense, events that impact us are not caused by 
an unknown force outside our world of experience (for example by a God-like figure) but by 
forces we can know and experience via an exploration of objects and their impacts – that is, 
via their materiality or objecthood – located within our world. For Morton, ‘entities interact 
in a sensual ether that is (at least to some extent) nonlocal and nontemporal’77: this idea of 
a ‘sensual ether’ is important to the notion of causality within human thought, in that it 
destroys the relativism of subjective views of reality. Therefore Morton believes that ‘art’ – 
in the sense of aesthetics as related to feelings and the senses – plays an important role 
within such a scheme: 
 
Causality floats in front of objects, figuratively speaking. It doesn’t lie 
underneath them like some grey machinery. Another way of saying this 
is that causality must belong to the aesthetic dimension. To study the 
aesthetic dimension, then, is to study causality.78 
 
This sense of aesthetics destroys notions of reality as subjectively constructed: to Morton, it 
means reality becomes ‘real’ because it is, ‘…encrypted against access by any object, 
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including a probing human mind.’79 An effort to view the world as operating aesthetically – 
where ‘aesthetics’ is understood as connected to the senses – escapes the problem of reality 
existing as mere illusion due to the subjectivity of our individual views. The way things 
appear is seen to act on and change the world: for Morton, this gives great agency to 
aesthetics as appearance, from which he concludes that art (as aesthetics) has a major role 
to play in an object-oriented view.  
 
However Morton’s idea of art in relation to such theories is selective, as demonstrated by his 
description of ‘performance art, or at least the manifestoes of conceptual art’: 
 
By undoing the difference between art and nonart, by self-consciously 
getting rid of self-consciousness and professional artists, conceptual art 
ignores the rift between essence and appearance, reducing the 
ontological to the merely ontic. An overall atmosphere of jaded cynicism 
hangs over it.80 
 
Here it seems that conceptual art’s move toward de-materialisation, or performance art’s 
existence within the non-material parameters of an event or happening, excludes them from 
Morton’s view of art as causal:  
 
…when you only have the meshwork, the mask, without the possibility 
that there’s something real underneath it, then you have no play, no 
pretense, no illusion, no display, no magic. You know it’s an illusion—so 
it isn’t an illusion. You know there is no essence—this becomes the 
essence, a shadowy, inverted form of the very essentialism you are 
trying to escape.81 
 
Like Osborne, Morton disqualifies conceptual art’s project of disconnecting from aesthetics. 
When art questions its essence (for example the fact that art is necessarily material) and 
finds this essence to be an illusion, Morton believes the illusion becomes the essence, and 
the result of this is that nothing is real. Movements viewed as ‘anti-art’, or ‘anti-aesthetic’ 
are in this sense ‘anti-reality’, and anti- the object oriented ontology Morton is pursuing.  
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Morton’s view of art as aesthetic is at odds with Osborne’s interpretation of Kant, and his 
description of conceptual art as having been clouded by ‘an overall atmosphere of jaded 
cynicism’ contrasts with Lippard’s account of conceptual artists’ radicality, the spontaneous 
universality of the movement, and the words of the conceptual artists themselves. Where 
Morton views art in its object-ness as intrinsic to a more radical view of the world, Lippard 
and other conceptualists viewed it as a cell from which art needed to escape. Morton’s 
discussion of the impact of art in its materiality is illustrated using examples of paintings by 
Turner: 
 
The aesthetic experience that we humans now call “beauty” is a 
naked experience of relations between entities: between the Turner 
painting and me; among the brushstrokes in the painting; between 
me and you, both having the experience; and so on.82 
 
…and Bridget Riley: 
 
You are working directly with people’s optic nerve and field of vision, 
as in a Bridget Riley painting. You cause the optical system to vibrate, 
creating interference patterns. Your painting is a device, a machine, 
an object that has causal effects.83 
 
Where Osborne views conceptual art’s impact on art’s ontology as significant enough to 
define contemporary art as ‘postconceptual’, Morton denies conceptual art’s validity 
altogether and situates new materialist theories within the traditional medium of painting, 
thus denying the forms, or frequently lack of form, on which much contemporary art is 
based. Where it is not only impossible to delete the fact of conceptual art’s widespread and 
influential occurrence, it is equally impossible to ignore this movement’s (somewhat ironic) 
facilitation of the multitude of forms available to the art of today. Equally, where the 
openness and radicality of conceptual art gave art a new political emphasis, Morton’s return 
of art to the boundaries of the traditional form of painting represents a conservative turn. 
 
In reviewing the exhibition ‘Materializing Six Years: Lucy Lippard and the Emergence of 
Conceptual Art’ at the Brooklyn Museum in 2013, Chloe Wyma asks, ‘Is Conceptual Art Still 
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Relevant?’84 Referring to Lippard’s critique of conceptual art’s failure to evade the clutches 
of the institution and art market, Wyma describes as a ‘stalemate’ the fact that,  
 
Almost 40 years after Lippard argued for art’s dematerialization, we 
don’t seem to have moved past our anxiety over the art object. We 
are dubious of art for art’s sake, equally dubious of academic 
austerity and visual impoverishment.85 
 
Describing object oriented ontology as a ‘particularly sketchy answer’ to this stalemate, 
Wyma suggests the theories’ tendency to ‘put objects on level footing with humans’86 is 
magical thinking, related to Marx’s ideas around commodity fetishism and the paranormal. 
She suggests Lippard herself may have been too harsh in her own judgement of the limits of 
conceptual art’s dematerialisation: 
 
We can accept that it’s impossible, even undesirable, to transcend the 
art object, without succumbing to commodity fetishism wrapped in the 
bacon of seductive metaphysics. The positive legacy of “Six Years,” 
then, might be a healthy dose of skepticism.87 
 
In addition to Osborne and Morton’s somewhat retroactive views of art as necessarily 
aesthetic – either despite, or because of, the movement of conceptual art – it must be 
noted that anti-aesthetic or anti-art ideals are not specific to the moment of conceptual art. 
Jean Baudrillard cites an early example of art’s de-aestheticisation as having occurred within 
the work of Picasso: ‘In the 1970s, Roger Caillois wrote an article in which he called Picasso 
the great liquidator of all aesthetic values.’88 The work and aspirations of the artists of the 
international movement of Dada are also strong examples of an anti-art tendency89. 
However every modern art movement, when examined within the context of its historical 
particularity, may be seen to have sprung from a sense of anti-art or the anti-aesthetic, to 
the point where this sentiment may be seen to constitute a tradition of the modern. 
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Baudrillard quotes Caillois further: ‘He (Caillois) claimed that after Picasso, no one could 
conceive of anything more than a circulation of objects, of fetishes, independent of the 
circulation of functional objects.’90 For Baudrillard, the anti-aesthetic drive of modern art is 
connected to the increasing fact of contemporary art’s commodification:  
 
One could say, in fact, that the aesthetic world is the world of 
fetishizing. In the economic realm, money must circulate in any 
manner it can, otherwise there is no value. The same law governs 
aesthetic objects: there have to be more and more in order for an 
aesthetic universe to exist.91 
 
Despite conceptual art’s explosion of traditional forms and attempt to situate art outside 
the object and aesthetics, it is not uncommon within the contemporary art world to hear 
difficult, restrained, highly conceptual or even invisible artworks appreciated in aesthetic 
terms. Gavin Brown’s enterprise in New York recently restaged a 1969 work by Jannis 
Kounellis, Untitled (12 Horses), wherein twelve horses were housed within the gallery for 
one week, standing on a specially cushioned floor surface and eating hay92. Kounellis’ work 
was originally created in the spirit of the Art Povera movement, which – similarly to and at 
the same time as conceptual art – challenged the institutions of art in applying art as a 
concept to everyday, banal or anti-art situations, in a spirit of radicality and liberation.  
 
A review of this work on the popular art blog Hyperallergic represents a common tendency 
within contemporary art reception by referring less to this work’s challenging or radical 
history and more to its aesthetic affect in its present materiality: 
 
The space is cool and still, and the horse’s sleek bodies of rippled muscle and 
smooth manes are illuminated by the skylights. Similar to the original 1969 
staging of the Kounellis piece at Rome’s Galleria L’Attico, there’s a 
consideration of the art in the beauty of an animal like a horse, which artists 
have been drawn to since the Lascaux caves were painted.93  
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A comment from a viewer follows: 
 
‘It’s so quiet’, Melanie Kress, a curatorial fellow at Friends of the High Line, 
remarked after seeing the horses. ‘Having fallen in love with that piece in 
art history class, it’s still stunning.94 
 
Within the contemporary art world, work that may have originally been created in a spirit of 
the anti-aesthetic, of ugliness or anti-art is frequently appreciated in aesthetic terms: while 
there is nothing wrong with aesthetic appreciation per se, that which may have been 
significant or profound about a particular works’ contribution to art as discourse tends to 
disappear in the emphasis on its immediate aesthetic affect. Anything we come across in 
our everyday existence may be appreciated aesthetically – for example a pile of rocks, a 
sunset, a road in a certain light, a clean floor: while this fact may be a point that conceptual 
art as discourse makes, the point is lost when conceptual objects are appreciated exclusively 
in regard to their aesthetic qualities over their historic or conceptual import. 
 
Later in the review, Gavin Brown, the gallery’s director, attempts to return Untitled (12 
Horses) to its original historical significance in deflecting the sense that it is ‘about’ 
something, or that it is allegorical. The Hyperallergic reviewer writes, ‘When I asked gallery 
owner Gavin Brown what he thought it meant to bring these live animals into the space as 
art, he said: “I don’t think it’s about anything.”’95 Here, Brown impedes an attempt to read 
this work allegorically by insisting that it is not about anything, thus maintaining the sense of 
the work’s significance as a concern with art’s ontology. While the aesthetic emphasis of this 
review may have been a result of Brown’s deflecting the notion that the work is ‘about’ 
something, this instance of the re-aestheticisation of the anti-aesthetic tendencies of 
conceptual art here illustrates the more general tendency to aestheticise contemporary art 
discourse in general, and not only within more popular media such as Hyperallergic. The 
theorisation and appreciation of contemporary art in aesthetic terms means its discourse 
loses a connection with both its recent and more distant modernist past in the pursuit of the 
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anti-aesthetic, precluding the attainment of a significant, philosophical or historical 
discourse for the field. 
 
In 1987, Baudrillard described modern art as, ‘an explosive practice, then an implosive one, 
following which the cycle was over.’96 The explosive practice of modernity is likened by 
Baudrillard to an orgy, a process leading to ‘liberation in every domain’, including that of art, 
where it manifested as: ‘the assumption of all models of representation, all models of anti-
representation.’97 While Baudrillard doesn’t specify the particular moments or periods 
within art to which these ideas refer, it could be interpreted that modern art’s explosive 
practice of the liberation of art from form was realised within conceptual art’s ultimate 
idealisation of this aim, at which point an implosion occurs via art’s dispersal within any and 
every conceivable form in contemporary art. This implosion results in a sense of 
contemporary art’s inescapability, described either in terms of the ‘stalemate’ of 
contemporary art’s troubled relationship to the object by Wyma, the sense of no escape 
from  art’s institutionalisation by Lippard, Kosuth’s attempt to escape the aesthetic, or 
Gillick’s aim to escape ‘contemporary art’ altogether as a signifier. By characterising 
modernism’s sense of increasing liberation as an orgy, Baudrillard reframes an anxious, 
‘what is contemporary art?’ with a more emphatic, ‘WHAT DO WE DO AFTER THE ORGY?’98  
 
Rather than attempt to define art in the contemporary moment by either reining in its sense 
of multeity to align with complicated, imposed categories, returning it to a concern with 
aesthetics or reading it allegorically, it may be more instructive to view the contemporary 
moment in its openness to all forms alongside the accompanying sense of entrapment this 
openness induces. Baudrillard characterises this moment as: 
 
…an end without finality, the opposite of the finality without end that, 
according to Kant, characterizes classical aesthetics. In other words, we 
are in a transaesthetics, a completely different turn of events, a turn 
that is difficult to describe and delineate, since, by definition, aesthetic 
judgments are impossible in it.99 
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This end without finality, along with its accompanying sense of the transaesthetic, is an end 
from which there seems no escape. This state is represented in the shift from modern 
artists’ sense of hostility towards the official form of the art of the day (for example 
conceptual or pop art’s critique of abstract expressionism), to the hostility contemporary 
artists feel towards ‘contemporary art’ itself, its entrapment of art via the embrace and 
subsequent institutionalisation of all forms. As Baudrillard states, ‘there is no worse enemy 
to form than the availability of all forms.’100  
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTEMPORARY ART AS THE END OF ART 
 
Art is dead, don’t consume its corpse. 
Art is dead, let’s liberate our everyday life.1 
 
PART 1 - The end 
 
Where Osborne determines aesthetics or materiality as ultimately essential to a definition 
of contemporary art based on conceptual art’s inability to eradicate them, I believe a true 
definition of contemporary art as post-conceptual must accommodate the anti-aesthetic 
ideals of such art, as stated by conceptual artists. While contemporary art discourse is 
certainly complicated by conceptual art’s failure to escape the object, it may equally be 
enhanced by the consideration of these ideals as part of its ontology. If contemporary art is 
to be determined according to its relationship with the modern, I believe the anti-aesthetic 
trend inherent to the modern must be accommodated more adequately than Osborne’s 
statement – that aesthetics form a ‘necessary, though radically insufficient, component of 
the artwork’ – allows. Equally, the fact that the outcome of conceptual art’s anti-materialist 
ideal paradoxically made manifest an infinite availability of all forms to current practice 
renders this ideal more useful to its theorisation than displayed by the somewhat 
compromised, indeterminate solution of aesthetics as ‘necessary’ while ‘insufficient’. 
 
It is in respect to contemporary art’s openness to form that the notion of the end of art 
finds application. Here, the end of art refers to the end of the modernist project of the 
liberation of form, as referenced earlier within Baudrillard’s thought. Where modern art 
may be viewed as the increasing liberation of the concept ‘art’ in its drive to define art and 
locate that which is essential to the concept, the culmination of this project as the location 
of ‘art’ within all forms in its ultimate liberation may be seen to mark this project’s end. It is 
in this respect that contemporary art may be theorised as the end of art, where the avant 
garde tendencies of modern art movements formed that which we understand as ‘art’ 
today. While Baudrillard characterises the state of current art as an ‘end without finality’, in 
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1994 he wrote of the ‘impossibility’ of the end: ‘it would be too much to hope that we had 
finished with history. For it is possible not only that history has disappeared…but also that 
we still have to fuel its end.’2 It is in respect to fuelling the end of the historical progression 
of the modern that an end of art statement may be crucial to the full realisation of ‘the 
contemporary’. 
 
Notions of ‘the end’ accompany modern and post-modern thought, and their roots are 
frequently located within Hegel’s reading of history as progressive and dialectical.  Within 
this linear sense of history, the events that accompany humankind’s progress through time 
are said to lead towards a rational state via a dialectical process, the inherent contradictions 
of which result in a clash of thesis and antithesis, leading to a state of synthesis. Marx 
predicted his idea of a future communist utopia as occurring along these lines3, while in the 
1930s Kojève interpreted this process as resulting in the end of history via the ultimate 
achievement of a ‘universal homogenous state’4. In such a state, the struggles that occurred 
within the historical process preceding it would cease to exist due to the sublating of its 
conflicts. This state for Kojève was that of a classless democracy, of equality and freedom 
for every individual, an outcome of the increasing liberalism seen as characteristic of the 
history of Western democracy. 
 
Where Marx believed history would end via the fall of capitalism and the inevitable rise of 
the proletariat5, Kojève believed the capitalist system had demonstrated increasing capacity 
for the effective distribution of resources to all members of society, and viewed the end of 
history as aligned with a state of democracy6. In 1989 historian Francis Fukuyama, following 
Kojève, claimed the end of history had been reached due to the shifts that had occurred 
within that decade’s history, such as the end of the Cold War and an increase in the number 
of peaceful nations globally. Fukuyama believed this shift could be meaningfully 
contextualised via the idea of the end of history: not as the literal end of actual, or political, 
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events occurring within the world, but a sense that a momentous enough shift had occurred 
within global ideologies that this moment could be viewed as the end of history’s process of 
liberation. While Fukuyama’s reading of the end of history has been viewed as an alignment 
with the US political system, in 2007 he claimed this had been a misreading of his theory:  
 
The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of 
social or political organisation. Following Alexandre Kojève, the Russian-
French philosopher who inspired my original argument, I believe that 
the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look 
like at the end of history than the contemporary United States.7 
 
Fukuyama states further that his end of history was an argument about modernisation: ‘I 
argued that, if a society wanted to be modern, there was no alternative to a market 
economy and a democratic political system’8. He claims that the desire to be free of tyranny 
is a universal one, while the desire to live in a liberal society – ‘a political order characterised 
by a sphere of individual rights and the rule of law’9 – is not necessarily universal. Fukuyama 
identifies the desire for liberalism as being more frequently the outcome of a process of 
modernisation – a process he believes can only be instigated within a political democracy 
with a market economy. This view connects a particular political and economic system – 
democracy and capitalism – with a desire for increasing liberalism due to the modernisation 
such systems engender.  
 
Marx’s view of the end of history was more optimistic than that of Kojève, in that he 
believed the final communist utopia would free workers from time-consuming labour and 
enable them to enjoy activities that made them happy – perhaps more ‘human’ – for 
example via participation in cultural activities or increased leisure.10 Kojève however 
portrayed the image of the ‘last man’ as something resembling the undead, wherein the 
cessation of the contradictions or clashes of history would lend a sense of insignificance to 
human activity, or a purposeless existence. Similarly, Fukuyama concludes his 1989 essay 
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with the speculation that history’s ending may potentially result in a bland world, one 
lacking passionate, ideological debate or battles. He posits also that this state could involve 
an end of the disciplines of art and philosophy, since the only focus left for human activity 
would be as perpetual caretakers of the ‘museum of human history’. Fukuyama speculates 
further that such a state may lead to ‘centuries of boredom’, the prospect of which could 
result in the beginning of a new history.11 
 
In 2014, the editors of e-flux devoted two issues of the journal to the theme of the end of 
history, reflecting on the idea within the context of contemporary world affairs. They 
describe Fukuyama’s essay as prophetic, due to the fact that it, ‘now reads as a crystal-clear 
blueprint for a peculiarly murky apolitical nonideological condition that has proven to be 
incredibly difficult to work from—particularly for artists.’12 While affirming the accuracy of 
Fukuyama’s prediction, Aranda, Vidokle and Kuan Wood claim that the state of liberal 
democracy that underpins his idea of the end of history is buckling:  
 
…we are increasingly bumping up against the utter failure of liberal 
democracy to account for the bankers and corrupt regimes who commit 
their worst crimes from within the logic of economic freedom and 
electoral democracy.13 
 
Suggesting the free-market democracy may have been a ‘Ponzi scheme all along’, the 
editors claim that, ‘history is not beginning again, because it never really ended.’14 They 
suggest rather that history is returning, under conditions different to those of the idealist 
tradition in which it was previously understood: 
 
…the idea of a homogenous system built on idealism has become 
unsustainable and has given way to the many identitarian battles that it 
has had to suppress in order to keep itself going. Only the end of history 
is ending.15 
                                                          
11
 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest, Summer 1989, accessed May 13, 2015, 
https://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf.  
12 Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, Anton Vidokle, ‘Editorial – “The End of the End of History?” Issue One’, e-
flux journal 56, 06/2014, accessed May 17, 2015, 
http://www.e-flux.com/journal/editorial-the-end-of-the-end-of-history/.  
13
 ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
79 
 
The editors claim that art ‘probably did’ disappear alongside history’s drive toward a 
universal homogenous state, citing increasingly withdrawn arts funding, artists’ ‘strategic 
withdrawals’ from the art world, and the fact that, ‘everyone is bored sick of the waves of 
inflationary and depressive episodes of large-scale, bombastic zombie exhibitions.’16  They 
also refer to the increasing tendency for contemporary artists to boycott such exhibitions 
due to ideological clashes with their source of funding: ‘it seems art does not end only 
because it has flowed into life, but also because its conditions have become too 
contradictory to be contained any longer.’17 The editors believe this end of history’s idealist 
progression has resulted in the proliferation of origin myths, and the compression of our 
sense of time and space by rapid technological advances has allowed for an increase in 
‘identitarian and sectarian movements’. In this view of the end of history, Aranda, Kuan 
Wood and Vidokle claim that, ‘history and notions of progress seem to be twisting back on 
themselves’18 . 
 
The idea of the end of art exists alongside notions of the end of history, and was similarly 
initiated in the thought of Hegel. In his Lectures on Aesthetics from the early nineteenth 
century, Hegel makes the claim that:  
 
Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of 
the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather 
been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier 
necessity in reality and occupying its higher place.19 
 
Just as Fukuyama’s end of history does not entail the end of significant events occurring in 
the future, Hegel’s end of art does not involve the complete cessation of artistic activity and 
production. For Hegel it is art’s role within society that shifts significantly at its end: Hegel’s 
end of art is the end of art in its ‘highest vocation’: ‘The universal need for art…is man’s 
rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in 
which he recognizes again his own self.’20 When art can no longer occupy such a role within, 
or relationship to, society, Hegel characterises it as concerned instead with humanity’s 
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‘objective spirit’, described by Arthur Danto as, ‘the system of meanings and practices that 
constitute the form of life its members live.’21 
 
In The End of Art - Readings in a Rumour After Hegel22, Eva Geulen traces the history of the 
idea as it occurred within the work of German philosophers – Nietzsche, Benjamin, Adorno, 
and Heidegger – subsequent to Hegel. Geulen’s aim in treating the end of art as a rumour is 
less an attempt to, ‘unmask its pretensions or to denounce its truth content’23 than to 
account for what she views as the paradox inherent to the idea: its tendency to recur 
historically, beyond Hegel. Geulen neither wants to ‘settle the paradox of the end, nor to 
stage or to deny the end of art’: for this reason she claims she is left with the ‘provisional 
goal of providing a formal doctrine for this rumour’24. Characterising ‘the end of art’ as an 
object of thought that lacks unity, within her analysis Geulen interprets the various claims 
made about this end along the lines of, ‘a phenomenology of the end of art as a rumour’25. 
Geulen arranges her discussion of post-Hegelian thinking around the end of art 
chronologically, identifying the development of its contextualisation from Nietzsche through 
Benjamin and Adorno to Heidegger, following Hegel.  
 
‘Until now there has been no way to think the end of art, to develop its forms or write its 
history, that is not already anticipated in Hegel’26 – Geulen claims contradictions exist within 
Hegel’s notion of the end which prevent conclusive readings of it, but that he has equally 
thought the idea through to a point of exhaustion: she believes it is specifically Hegel’s 
aesthetics that have led to the end of art, and that he, ‘repealed modernity before it had 
even begun, thus simultaneously ensuring that the end of art would have to be repeatedly 
invoked.’27 She states that Hegel does not claim a totalitarian end to artistic production but, 
‘the end of a possibility of a reflection on art or aesthetics that does not involve the end of 
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art’28. In this sense the end of art is framed as a discourse initiated by Hegel, a discourse 
which Geulen claims invokes the name of Hegel in every instance of its recurrence. 
 
When the end of art exists as a discourse, it necessarily involves the interdisciplinary 
association of art with philosophy: Geulen writes that, ‘art cannot end itself, for it would 
then no longer be art’29, and her tracing of the discourse within a specifically German 
philosophical tradition is appropriate to this. A study of this discourse lends a sense that the 
idea that art has ended exists solely within its bounds, rather than having informed or 
impacted art as a practice, which continues on regardless. As Geulen points out, the end of 
art is, ‘the hinge between aesthetics and anti-aesthetics’30. The anti-aesthetic strain within 
modern art movements may be viewed in relation to an anti-art drive, or a drive toward the 
end of art. However this strain in itself formulates modernist aesthetics and drove art on its 
continuous path through modernism, despite its end having been proclaimed at its outset. 
Where modern art builds its end into its own ontology – into the fact that art exists – the 
idea of this end cannot be spoken of within the ontology of its practice. There is a sense that 
the end of art has no place in the practice of art, and the prevalence of the idea within 
aesthetic theory creates discord between these seemingly interrelated realms. According to 
Geulen, ‘the virulent competition, at least since Plato, between philosophy and art is 
sharpened under the conditions of the end of art as discourse to an antagonistic principle 
that binds the competitors firmly to one another.’31 
 
PART 2 - Arthur C. Danto’s end of art 
 
Geulen’s study of the end of art is bordered by modernity and she does not consider its 
relevance to a specifically contemporary art discourse, in either its difference or 
resemblance to the modern. This may be because, as she claims, ‘at the end of the end of 
art one does not find an end, but a beginning: the discovery of the end of art as a discourse 
of modernity.’32 If the period of modernity is complete and its discourse irrelevant to the 
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contemporary moment, one may sense that the inclusion of the idea of the end of art within 
contemporary discourse is itself over. In characterising the various revolutions of modern 
art as cyclical and repetitive rather than linear in nature, Geulen identifies the discourse of 
the end of art as having come to ‘a peculiar sort of end in sheer exhaustion’33, where it is 
viewed as banal and trivial, and where, ‘the end of art has become such a cliché that even to 
raise the question seems superficial’34. She writes: ‘nowadays it is de rigeur to debunk the 
end of art as a white elephant of modernity’35. 
 
Nonetheless the discourse did continue at a point between the modern and contemporary 
moment, most notably in the work of the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto36. In the 
1950s and early 60s, Danto was (appropriately) engaged equally with practices as both artist 
and philosopher. While living and working in France in 1961, Danto saw for the first time a 
reproduction of Roy Lichtenstein’s The Kiss in the American magazine Art News, which he 
describes as having, ‘looked like it came straight out of a comic book’37. The experience had 
a profound effect on Danto: 
 
I thought of The Kiss the rest of my time in France. I thought that if it was 
possible as art anything was possible in art. I remember drawing a church in 
Rome after that, and thinking: it’s okay to be doing this. I can do anything I 
want! It was then that I think I really lost interest in making art. That was a 
very philosophical response.38 
 
Upon returning to New York, Danto continued a relatively successful career as an artist, 
maintaining his studio practice (primarily involved with printmaking) and selling and 
exhibiting his work: however he began to feel that he was, ‘not part of what was going on, 
there were things happening in art that were fresh and exciting, but in which I would have 
to change radically as an artist if I was to be part of it all.’39 In the field of philosophy 
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however Danto felt he had contributed original work, specifically on the philosophy of 
history, and felt he may contribute something more original to art via that practice: 
 
In some deep way, something was stirring in the early sixties that I wanted 
to be part of, and I thought that philosophy, as I was beginning to practice it, 
was more likely to take me there than art would.40 
 
Danto does not explicitly refer to the cessation of his art practice in the context of the end 
of art, but more in relation to his realisation that art as a form had opened to almost infinite 
possibilities. While his interpretation of the fact that comic books could be art meant 
anything could be art, lending the sense that as an artist, ‘I can do anything I want!’ the 
freedom lent by this realisation led to the cessation of his practice and a philosophical 
response. His work as a philosopher held potential for Danto to engage with and respond to 
this new situation in art, so while his response was philosophical, it was as an artist that the 
idea of the end of art – as the cessation of art production in favour of its theorisation – 
arose for him. This fact may be seen to set Danto apart from the theorists analysed by 
Geulen, who as practitioners of theory may have approached art discourse from the outset 
within a philosophical context.  
 
Danto describes the fact that, until that point, it had been easy to keep his practice as an 
artist separate from that as a philosopher, since he didn’t feel the two fields had much in 
common:  
 
The field of aesthetics held no interest for me in any case…I was puzzled 
by how little the canon of aesthetics appeared to bear on what was 
happening in art, where the concept of taste, so central in the 
philosophical texts addressed to art, had nothing to do with the painting 
that shook the world, Abstract Expressionism.41 
 
While Danto continued to publish books and essays about philosophy, in 1964 his essay ‘The 
Artworld’ – presented at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association – had, as its 
subject, art. Taking a scientific approach, Danto highlighted the fact that much of the 
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emerging Pop art did not merely represent objects within the usual artistic formats (such as 
paint on canvas), but instead inserted the object itself into an art context42, echoing the 
insertion of Lichtenstein’s comic strip painting within the format of an art magazine. Upon 
experiencing such work, the question was raised for Danto around what it was that allowed 
these objects to be art when they either were, or were indiscernible from, ordinary objects 
not normally considered ‘art’. Danto was attempting to grasp something invisible, a process 
or a set of conditions to which he felt a philosophical approach was necessary.  
 
Within this essay Danto identifies both Socrates and Hamlet as having shared a view of art 
as a mirror, in its tendency to reflect our world back to us. Where the invention of 
photography invalidated the thesis that art was necessarily mimetic, Danto believed a new 
theory was required for a time wherein art objects were frequently indistinguishable from 
ordinary objects – or even were ordinary objects. Danto likens moments in the evolution of 
science, when, ‘a well-established, or at least widely credited theory is being threatened in 
such a way that all coherence goes’43 to the progression of art movements in Western 
modernism, claiming new theories are required at these moments in order to accommodate 
newly emergent, and potentially incoherent, conditions. He gives as an example post-
impressionism, wherein the mimetic theory of art – that artworks necessarily resemble or 
mirror the world – is proven inadequate to explain the post-impressionist tendency to 
intentionally distort the world, via exaggerated or unnatural forms or colours. Danto quotes 
Roger Fry’s analysis of the post-impressionists as having aimed, ‘not at illusion but reality’44, 
in that the work aimed to capture the real, actual view these artists had of the world rather 
than attempt a more clinical reflection. Fry’s invention of this new definition, or theory, of 
art – Danto refers to this a the ‘realism theory’ of art – would alter the way art audiences 
would approach works from that point on, in that it was in the creativity of an artwork that 
its sense of reality existed over its success at imitation. Danto identifies this as the theory 
that allowed for the existence of post-impressionist artworks within the realm of ‘art’ – a 
realm from which the imitation theory would have had them ejected. 
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Danto claimed another such theory was required to explain why real, actual beds were now 
accepted as art, and were no longer just beds:  
 
To mistake an artwork for a real object is no great feat when an artwork 
is the real object one mistakes it for. The problem is how to avoid such 
errors, or to remove them once they are made.45 
 
He develops the concept of ‘the “is” of artistic identification’, which ‘is the sense of “is” in 
accordance with which a child, shown a circle and a triangle and asked which is him and 
which his sister, will point to the triangle saying “That is me”’46. This same ‘is’ is employed 
when looking at art, as Danto describes, ‘in the gallery I point, for my companion’s benefit, 
to a spot in the painting before us and say, “That white dab is Icarus”’47. It is the ‘is’ of 
artistic identification that allows an everyday object, such as a bed, to undergo its 
transformation into art, in which it inhabits an entirely new function. Danto concludes from 
this that the ‘is’ of artistic identification in fact constitutes a work of art, ‘to see something 
as art requires something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a 
knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.’48  
 
It is within his artworld essay that Danto’s most famous example of ‘indistinguishables’ – art 
objects that are visually indistinguishable from ‘mere real things’ – is raised with Andy 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. Danto describes Warhol as being endowed with something like the 
Midas touch: when ordinary grocery boxes can become art, the world and all its objects may 
be viewed as a set of latent artworks, waiting to be, ‘transfigured, through some dark 
mystery’49. He identifies the fact that such objects may not have been recognised as art fifty 
years prior: ‘but then there could not have been, everything being equal, flight insurance in 
the Middle Ages, or Etruscan typewriter erasers.’50 In this sense, ‘the world has to be ready 
for certain things, the artworld no less than the real one.’51 Here, the development of 
artistic movements and their shifts in that which constitutes the concept ‘art’ is again 
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likened to the realm of science: Danto claims that the members of a society must be ready 
to accept views of the world that challenge or upturn those that previously informed their 
knowledge of it, therefore it is within the readiness of such members to conceptualise their 
world differently that makes change or experimentation possible. In this sense, changes in 
the thinking of the art ‘world’ – that which either accepts or refuses an object’s definition as 
‘art’ – in itself makes new art possible. This lends a sense of collaboration to the existence 
and development of art as a concept: while individual artists may provide an initial challenge 
in presenting a work to the artworld (in the manner of a scientific experiment), it is the 
readiness of that world to accept it as such that it gains entry, subsequently altering the 
ontology of the concept ‘art’ itself. Danto claims, ‘it is the role of artistic theories, these days 
as always, to make the artworld, and art, possible’52 – thus his interest in providing a theory 
to explain this new phase in art’s form, which he perceived as radically different to those 
preceding it.  
 
While this early essay does not refer to the end of art, it establishes Danto’s analytical 
approach toward art as a subject, his emphasis on art’s ontology as historical and 
developmental, and his interest in establishing philosophical definitions or theories for art. 
Fifteen years after publishing ‘The Artworld’, Danto claimed the essay had been 
misunderstood: ‘I had the morbid satisfaction of not having it understood at all.’53 In 1969 
philosopher George Dickie based his Institutional Theory of Art, in his essay ‘Defining Art’54, 
on ideas from Danto’s essay, however he reached conclusions that Danto viewed as 
unaligned with his own. Having quoted Danto’s statement that: ‘to see something as art 
requires something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge 
of the history of art: an artworld', the final paragraph of Dickie’s essay concludes, ‘a work of 
art is an object of which someone has said, “I christen this object a work of art”’55, where 
Danto’s essay was more aligned with the idea that it is art theory or philosophy that makes 
art possible.  
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It seems Danto did not publish further on art for fifteen years, until in 1981 he wrote The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Here Danto aims to further develop a convincing 
definition of art, again applying an analytic, scientific methodology to an analysis of art’s 
characteristics, including the aforementioned comparisons between works of art and ‘mere 
real things’; the content of a work of art (the idea that if something has content, it is art); 
the relationship between art and philosophy; aesthetics (whether something needs to be 
beautiful in order to be art); the interpretation of art (if it can be interpreted, does that 
make it art?); the difference between works of art and ordinary representations; and the 
ideas of metaphor, expression and style in art. The lengths Danto goes to in locating the 
relevance of each area in isolation to a definition of art makes for laboured reading, the 
ultimate finding being that works of art cannot be defined in relation to any one of these 
characteristics – that is, it is not simply metaphor, or aesthetic, or something to be 
interpreted, but something along the lines of a combination of them all. As a way of locating 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes as art, when their identical counterparts in a supermarket aisle are 
not, Danto claims they appear to make a ‘revolutionary and ludicrous demand, not to 
overturn the society of artworks so much as to be enfranchised in it, claiming equality of 
place with sublime objects.’56 Danto claims Brillo Boxes, as a transfiguration of a 
commonplace object, ‘transforms nothing in the artworld’ but that, ‘it only brings to 
consciousness the structures of art which, to be sure, required a certain historical 
development before that metaphor was possible.’57 This is aligned with Danto’s approach 
towards art as philosophy, wherein the gesture of placing ordinary objects into an art 
context is a ‘philosophical act.’58 Thus it seems it is as philosophy that artworks may be most 
convincingly defined here: in his concluding statement, Danto states that as a work of art, 
Brillo Boxes, ‘does what works of art have always done – externalizing a way of viewing the 
world, expressing the interior of a cultural period, offering itself as a mirror to catch the 
conscience of our kings.’59 
 
The connection between art and philosophy is strong for Danto, who claims that while 
philosophical thought cannot be applied to just any discipline it can be applied to art. Danto 
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views the definition of art as having become part of art’s nature, forming its intersection 
with philosophy. He states that the idea of reality is intrinsic to the discipline of philosophy 
in that philosophy only arises within a society when that society attains a sense of reality as 
a concept, as distinct from things such as illusion, appearance, or art. Philosophy therefore 
occupies the space between language and the world, and Danto likens language (or words) 
to art as both language and art represent the world to us while also residing in it, in their 
existence both inside and outside the world simultaneously. While it does not follow that 
art is language, Danto believes they share a similar ontology in their relationship to and 
contrast with reality.  
 
In the early 1980s Danto was invited to contribute a statement to a symposium on the state 
of the artworld; this statement was published alongside statements by John Berger, 
Clement Greenberg and Rosalind Krauss in the Soho News, and subsequently developed into 
an essay forming the target contribution to a collection of essays called The Death of Art60 
published in 198461. In this original essay on the end of art Danto references Hegel’s 
Aesthetics and describes art’s transference to the realm of philosophy as forming the end of 
its historical development as art. Here he identifies the invention of moving pictures (over 
still photographs) as having usurped traditional art forms’ mimetic role, with the 
relinquishing of this role resulting in early modern art movements such as post-
impressionism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He describes the art 
preceding this moment as having been concerned with the technical development of 
mimesis: a progressive history that ends with the simultaneous advent of mechanical 
reproduction and modern art movements, which, in the absence of a progressive technical 
history, formed a new structure for art based on self-expression over representation.  
 
Hegel, having died eight years before photography attained commercial or widespread 
viability, did not base his idea of art’s having ended on the progressive history of technical 
representation but on his analysis of the shift he perceived between the Classical and 
Romantic periods in art. Whether or not Hegel foresaw art’s future post the advent of 
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mechanical reproduction is difficult to ascertain, but from his own position well beyond the 
advent of mechanical reproduction, Danto’s reading identifies the shift from pre- to post-
photographic art as having formed the end of art’s historical progress in relation to the 
technical attainment of mimesis, with the resulting requirement for a new theory or 
ontology of art resulting in the ‘expression theory’ of art following the lead of the styles 
adopted by artists in this new state. If a theory of modern art is based solely on artists’ self-
expression, Danto claims each artist’s work could be viewed as existing in isolation from the 
next: 
 
…each artist could express himself in his own way, so that one 
vocabulary, as it were, would be incommensurable with another, which 
makes possible a radically discontinuous view of the history of art62. 
 
Danto however is concerned with locating a theory or definition that can account for all 
forms of art historically, turning to Hegel’s notion of art as a cognitive process to achieve 
this. This idea relates to the notion of the end of history as the advent of self-knowledge:  
 
The End of History coincides, and is indeed identical with what Hegel 
speaks of as the advent of Absolute Knowledge. Knowledge is absolute 
when there is no gap between knowledge and its object, or knowledge 
is its own object, hence subject and object at once.63 
 
Despite early modern art’s having been based on a theory of self-expression, it and the art 
that followed did not exist as a series of separate individual instances of expression. The 
developments that did in fact occur within the various modernist movements rule out a 
notion of art as based solely on this sense, in that a sequential development is detectable in 
relation to the changing forms of art that modern movements allowed. Where pre-modern 
art may be viewed in terms of technical progression, modern art can almost be seen as its 
opposite: as a search for the essence of art in the absence of such a progressive 
technological history via an unravelling of perceived technical requirements. The pre-
modern attempt to depict reality via verisimilitude is replaced by the modern attempt to 
create a real or pure concept of art, initially by questioning the necessity that art must 
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mirror reality in the manner of a photograph, and then that it depict anything recognisable 
at all, via abstraction. The necessity that art exist as a framed painting or a sculpture on a 
plinth is then challenged, and the further question subsequently raised that art must inhabit 
painted or sculpted objects at all, exemplified via the readymade or Pop Art. Finally within 
conceptual art, the sense that art as a concept must even inhabit an object is tested. The 
development of modern art involves less a search for realism in relation to representing the 
world and more a search for and liberation of the real sense of art, wherein that which may 
be extraneous to the concept in its pure form – the frame, the image, the object – is deleted 
in order to liberate it from that which may restrict a pure view of the concept. It may be 
here that Hegel’s notion around the achievement of self-knowledge, where ‘knowledge is 
absolute when there is no gap between knowledge and its object, or knowledge is its own 
object, hence subject and object at once’ as interpreted by Danto, is striven for in modern 
art. This knowledge may have been attained within the pure objectives of the conceptual 
moment wherein art is located within any object or situation, rather than solely in those 
constrained by exterior or institutional demands on its nature. As Danto states, ‘freedom 
ends in its own fulfilment’64: when the illusions of art are stripped back to free art as a real 
or pure concept inhabiting all objects and situations, art may be seen to end when 
knowledge (an attempt to represent reality) and its object (reality) become one, forming 
both subject and object.  
 
PART 3 - Critique of Danto 
 
Eight responses were published alongside Danto’s essay ‘The End of Art’ within The Death of 
Art in 1984. In 1993, sixteen responses were published in Danto and His Critics65, and 
critique continued in other publications and symposia until 199966. The critique was for the 
most part made by philosophers, historians and aestheticians: since the end of art involves 
the end of the self-critical development of the art object through the object and thus 
through practice itself, post this end, the anchoring of this debate within discourse rather 
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than practice seems commensurate. Viewed objectively however, the tendency for post-
conceptual practice to continue unabated and almost in ignorance of this parallel and not 
insignificant discourse concerning art’s end lends a sense of discord, the realms of art theory 
and practice seeming to retain concerns with quite separate projects. 
 
This paper is unable to fully explore the extensive range of responses to Danto’s ideas, 
therefore the following discussion and analysis is concerned initially with the main themes 
and approaches of the essays in 1984’s The Death of Art, followed by those from Danto and 
His Critics nine years later. 
 
The early responses to Danto’s original idea concerning art’s end in The Death of Art tend to 
approach the issue with a concern for defining the nature of art, what art is or does. Here, 
some critics question Danto’s emphasis on the notion of pre-modern art as having 
necessarily aimed at mimesis and as therefore based on the notion of technical mastery, on 
which his idea of art’s early progressive history depends.  Norman Miller67 and Joyce 
Brodsky68 emphasise art’s other functions, such as self-expression or decoration, over that 
of representation or mimesis. Richard Kuhns69 argues that since it is only as a history that art 
may come to an end, the fact that art in the sense of affect – for example in its psychological 
effect on the viewer – does not have a history, it cannot end. These essays’ reflection on the 
purpose or function of art tend to argue against the idea of art as autonomous or 
conceptual and situate it within the practical life of a society, the ongoing needs of which 
means art is itself ongoing rather than culminating as philosophy.  
 
Other critique of this early essay reflects some of the responses to Foster’s 2009 
Questionnaire on the Contemporary in expressing relief or celebration of the absence of a 
single discourse or theory for contemporary art, and an accompanying suspicion of Danto’s 
attempt to create one. Joyce Brodsky70 views art’s having escaped theorisation as resulting 
potentially in a less power-centric model of art, while Norman Miller71 claims art’s structure 
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simply reflects the structure of the society in which it exists: in this sense for example, a 
pluralistic society logically results in a pluralistic style of art. In these views, the plurality and 
freedom of form exemplified by contemporary art does not represent the end of art so 
much as reflect the demands society may place on art in its various functions. Joyce Brodsky 
speculates that art in the absence of theory or discourse may come to serve more practical 
functions and exist at the service of the people, a process identified by David Konstan72 as 
the outcome of the modernist dissembling of the hierarchical nature of the academy.  
 
In 1984 – the year of the original publication of his essay ‘The End of Art’ – Danto 
commenced work as the art critic for the magazine The Nation, a position he maintained for 
the next 25 years. Thus while he produced philosophical texts regarding the definition or 
ontology of art until his death in 2013, Danto was simultaneously involved in a working art 
life both reviewing exhibitions and analysing the nature of this activity. Within the more 
philosophical nature of the critique represented by the later Danto and His Critics in 1993 – 
which  includes responses by Danto – Danto’s methodology is frequently scrutinised, 
particularly regarding the perceived contradiction inherent to his maintaining a working life 
as a critic alongside his more philosophical approach in declaring art to have ended. David 
Carrier73, Richard Shusterman74 and Carlin Romano75  find Danto’s pragmatic approach as a 
critic contradicts his more traditional philosophical approach in seeking a definition for art. 
Shusterman believes that by remaining faithful to philosophy’s ‘hegemonic impulse’ Danto 
cannot re-enfranchise art philosophically since attempts to define art tend to 
compartmentalise it, hindering its ability to impact the realm of ordinary life. Carlin Romano 
also claims Danto separates art from life by maintaining a non-pragmatic theory, declaring it 
contradictory that Danto work as a critic while adhering to a declining view of the validity of 
art institutions. 
 
In response, Danto likens his attempt to define art while maintaining a looser approach as 
an art critic to the seeming contradiction inherent to a description of prime numbers: while 
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individual prime numbers are unique and contain singular properties, they can comply 
simultaneously with the overriding definition of prime numbers in general. In this sense, 
Danto’s activity as a critic is a unique property that does not disqualify a definition of his 
overall activity as a philosopher. Where Romano speculates that two Arthur Dantos may 
exist – one that adheres to a system and one that doesn’t – Danto counters that pragmatist 
philosophy is not anti-system as such, and that the perceived existence of two Dantos is less 
a matter of ‘system versus non-system’ than ‘system versus system’. He describes the two 
Dantos as the same Danto trying to live in the world while putting that world in a box, thus 
attempting to work with system and substance together: while he believes theories and 
philosophies must work with the reality they are about, Danto concedes this can result in a 
schizophrenic state.  
 
David Carrier76 finds Danto’s Cartesian approach, wherein philosophical problems are 
treated as historically consistent, contradicts his more Hegelian tendency to theorise art as 
historically contingent. In response Danto claims that while he believes concepts such as 
philosophy or art are not historically contingent, history does impact these concepts in 
relation to the various ways the human mind has thought about them at different moments 
in time. In this view, the essential nature of philosophy (or art) is exposed at specific 
moments through human work and ideas, allowing an historical view of philosophy (or art) 
to exist alongside an ahistorical one. Danto illustrates this idea with the fact that where 
science doesn’t treat the human body as something that changes over time, the science 
through which we examine or learn about that body is impacted by time, in relation to 
changes in the way we understand or represent that body historically. Similarly, Danto 
believes that where concepts such as philosophy or art may be essential or timeless in 
nature, they must be addressed historically regarding the expression of their nature.  
 
Noel Carroll77 and Gary Shapiro78 offer examples of alternative philosophical positions that 
employ methodologies which may not result in the idea that art has ended. Carroll suggests 
that post-structuralist theory may not find the question ‘what is art?’ satisfactorily answered 
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by the use of indiscernibles, and postulates that positions based on more socio-ideological 
understandings of art may not find it to be at an end. Shapiro contrasts Danto’s Hegelian 
approach with Foucault’s sense of history as archaeological rather than teleological, 
wherein events, cultures and materials of the past are characterised less in the sense of 
continuous evolutionary development and more as individual units interrupted by breaks. 
Shapiro believes an application of this concept to the field of art, where the discovery of 
sharp breaks and changes are expected, would allow the conception of a ‘living art’ enabled 
by repetition and simulation rather than foreclose on art’s possibilities. Danto however 
claims post-structuralist theories (for example those of Derrida) tend to apply only to the 
works their theories generate, and that they have no application to, for example, ancient 
Chinese art: for Danto this means they are not universal theories, and while they probably 
don’t aim to be universal, this is something Danto is attempting to locate. He disagrees that 
Foucault’s conception of history is one of archaeology, claiming instead that where he 
himself is interested in the history of art, Foucault is interested in the philosophy of 
historical discontinuity. Danto likens Foucault’s view of history to Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the 
history of science as a series of independent revolutions rather than something continuous 
and developmental, stating that where Shapiro brings the concept of commensurability 
from science into art, art may be no more able to deal with the idea than science was.  
 
Danto based his theory of the end of art around the final indiscernibility between art objects 
and real, everyday ones in contemporary art, or the end of art as a specifically visual 
concern, and several critics scrutinise his reliance on this idea. Richard Wollheim79 wonders 
if Danto’s indiscernible pairs are temporarily indiscernible or if they remain so for all time, 
since once a viewer is made aware of that which is a work of art and that which isn’t, they 
may no longer find the objects indiscernible. If information, belief or a background of theory 
can impact one’s perceiving an object as art, Wollheim claims the status of a pair of objects 
as indiscernible applies only to the first stage of perception, in the initial encounter with the 
pair. Danto finds this concern irrelevant, countering that the differences between real Brillo 
boxes and Warhol’s Brillo Boxes would not become more evident through protracted 
looking, and disputing the fact that prior knowledge as to an object’s status as art would 
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encourage ‘deeper’ looking, allowing the discovery of the previously indiscernible 
difference. For Danto the difference between indiscernible objects lies outside the objects 
themselves – in this case, within their being defined as art or not. When art cannot be 
defined in terms of what meets the eye he believes it falls to theory to make the definition, 
therefore for Danto it is within the realm of theory or philosophy that the difference 
between indiscernible pairs exists rather than that of connoisseurship. 
 
Danto ends his response to the critique in Danto and His Critics with an emphasis on the fact 
that the end of art is less a vexing question of what to do for art than one which reveals the 
‘true’ question – that of the philosophical nature of art – and that the discovery of this 
question liberates art from the requirement to fulfil this nature further. However Danto 
goes on to point out that a philosophical task for art will remain as long as the categories of 
‘art’ or ‘artist’ remain, since the existence of such categories raises questions regarding who 
is an artist and who isn’t.  From this it seems that what could be referred to as the ‘project’ 
of the end of art remains incomplete, since thirty years post Danto’s declaring art to have 
finally ended, the categories ‘art’ and ‘artist’ defiantly remain. The wedge that frequently 
separates the realm of art theory from practice within contemporary art, where questions 
around what art is no longer seem to hold vital application to its practice, is perhaps related 
to a gap between the realms of philosophy and art. Where the gap between these related 
disciplines appeared to close somewhat with conceptual art’s attempt to escape the object 
and return of art to a concern with concepts and ideas, within contemporary art such 
practice no longer seems essential or even possible, as indicated by the generally 
ambivalent response to Foster’s question regarding the need for a definition or theory of 
contemporary art in 2009. 
 
In Danto and his Critics, Noel Carroll claims Danto’s reliance on Hegel’s thought in declaring 
the end of art’s history prevents the possibility of any future counter-examples to his theory 
of art:  in this sense, if Danto shows that modernism has run its course and the 
developmental history of art is over, this in itself makes an essential theory of art possible80. 
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This relates to a point made by Richard Kuhns in the earlier The Death of Art that a 
declaration of art’s ending in philosophy is just a way for philosophy to ‘eat up art’: 
 
One way to understand this claim would be to say this: the dialectic of 
artistic development is essential to what art is and how it functions for 
us in our cultural lives; but that claim in itself might be put forward by 
the fat philosopher preparing the stages of art in the past as dishes for 
his gormandizing in the present.81 
 
Similarly, in 2003 Hal Foster explained that according to Danto, when Warhol perfected the, 
‘Duchampian question of “what is art?”’, he: 
 
…intentionally or not, brought art into philosophical self-awareness. 
But by the same token art no longer had any philosophical work to 
do: its essential rationale fell away, and henceforth it could do 
whatever – to be evaluated, if at all, by the philosopher-critic 
according to its degree of philosophical interest.82 
 
With bracketed suspicion, Foster adds, ‘(we see, then, who is privileged in this account)’.  
 
A sense that the idea of the end of art is an invention on the part of philosophy, constructed 
in relation to an age-old contestation for supremacy between the disciplines of philosophy 
and art, is evident here. Kuhns continues, ‘There is, it seems to me, a mistake that underlies 
Hegel’s particular argument that art is at an end. The mistake is embedded in the 
assumption that art is subservient to the theories that make it meaningful’83. A sense that it 
is only theory – in particular Hegel’s theory – that makes the idea of the end of art possible 
is echoed by Geulen’s treating the idea as a ‘rumour’ instigated by Hegel, in his tendency to 
claim not a totalitarian end to artistic production but, ‘the end of a possibility of a reflection 
on art or aesthetics that does not involve the end of art’84. Similarly Berel Lang, editor of The 
Death of Art, claims it is strictly within Hegel’s philosophy that history is linked to 
consciousness and culture, making them contingent. Describing the idea of the end of art as 
possible only within such a view, Lang refers to a statement by Nietzsche that, ‘even to 
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entertain the thought of the possibility of something can transform us’85. Here, it would 
seem the mere mention by ‘philosophy’ that art had ended has repercussions for art, and 
that by simply entertaining the thought, tangible results for its subject are produced.   
 
A view that theory, philosophy or aesthetics impact art’s direction, or that Hegel’s end of art 
is simply an idea applied over art’s otherwise vital existence, is a view that I believe weakens 
art. A stronger position would be to focus on those moments when an artist (for example 
Rauschenberg or Warhol) makes a work that raises questions around the currently accepted 
conditions of art’s production and existence that compels a philosopher (for example Danto) 
to respond to it philosophically. In this approach, theory does not set out the conditions for 
art’s direction or a claim for art’s having ended: rather, the questions that artists themselves 
raise through their work provide problems that exact philosophical engagement. Rather 
than impose ideas on artworks, philosophers such as Hegel and Danto respond to the 
challenges artworks raise: this view of art enfranchises it, positing it within an equal, 
participatory and reflective relationship with philosophy over a supplementary or contested 
one. In this view, it was artists themselves who questioned art’s essentialism via the 
modernist, self-reflective project within their practice, and while the notion of art’s ending 
may hold negative connotations, the notion of this end requires contextualisation within the 
realm of practice if due respect to and empowerment of ‘art’, as a realm, is to be achieved.  
 
While much critique of Danto or Hegel’s end of art centres on the contestation of art as 
necessarily developmental or historical – for example Joyce Brodsky or Normal Miller’s 
suggestion that art holds a more practical role in society over that of its philosophical 
development, or Richard Kuhn’s suggestion that art as affect does not have a history – Hegel 
had already accounted for the disparity of these views in the introduction to his Aesthetics. 
Preceding Joseph Kosuth, Arthur Danto and Peter Osborne, Hegel denounces ‘aesthetics’ as 
inadequate to account for a discussion of ‘fine art’:  
 
The name ‘aesthetics’ in its natural sense is not quite appropriate to this 
subject. ‘Aesthetics’ means more precisely the science of sensation or 
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feeling…the proper expression, however, for our science is the 
‘Philosophy of Art’ or, more definitely, the ‘Philosophy of Fine Art’.86  
 
Hegel goes on to question whether art can in fact be treated scientifically: ‘the first thing 
that may suggest itself to us is the question of whether fine art shows itself to deserve a 
scientific treatment.’87 When art is influenced by subjective notions of taste, and art as 
beauty forms, ‘the bright adornment of all our surroundings, both mental and material, 
soothing the sadness of our condition and the embarrassments of real life, killing time in 
entertaining fashion’88: when it employs deceptive modes and relies on appearances, Hegel 
claims that, ‘…in all these aspects – in origin, in effect, and in range – fine art, instead of 
showing itself fitted for scientific study, seems rather in its own right to resist the regulating 
activity of thought and to be unsuitable for strict scientific discussion’89. This line of 
reasoning has much in common with more recent arguments around art as pragmatic, 
expressive or affective90 rather than historical, developmental or philosophical, the context 
within which claims around the end of art are made. 
 
While admitting that, ‘it is no doubt the case that art can be employed as a fleeting pastime, 
to serve the ends of pleasure and entertainment, to decorate our surroundings, to impart 
pleasantness to the external conditions of our life, and to emphasize other objects by means 
of ornament’91, Hegel makes the further claim that, ‘in this mode of employment art is 
indeed not independent, not free, but servile. But what we mean to consider, is the art 
which is free in its end as in its means.’92 This is a view of art as autonomous, wherein it 
does not serve pragmatic ends, does not exist in the sense of affect or self-expression, but 
exists much like philosophy in considerations of reality and ideals. Hegel continues this line 
of thought, elaborating on how a consideration of art as independent relates it to the 
‘higher’ realms of philosophy or religion, however it is sufficient to note at this point that 
where arguments around a theory or philosophy of contemporary art are divided in relation 
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to varied opinions regarding the use or value of art today – whether it has political value, 
value as communication, as affect or expression or other pragmatic functions versus a view 
of its uselessness, it’s concern with itself and its likeness to philosophy within the modernist 
project wherein it ends – that these concerns were outlined at the outset of modernism 
itself. In this sense, a theory of contemporary art in its relation to the modern ideals of 
freedom or liberation should be positioned within the sense of Hegel’s view of art as a 
‘higher realm’ or autonomous over that of holding more pragmatic or socio political roles.93 
 
It is important to note here Hegel’s emphasis on the notion of art as ‘free in its end as in its 
means’: contemporary art may ultimately be profiled as post-conceptual or theorised in its 
relation to the modern via the notion of freedom. Where Lucy Lippard spoke of the 
conceptual movement’s attempt to ‘free’ art from its white cell, Hal Foster (disparagingly) 
described the ‘pluralistic’ art that followed as an institution ‘posed as a freedom to choose’ 
which played ‘right into the ideology of the “free market”’. Equally, Baudrillard’s description 
of the availability of all forms as constituting the worst enemy to form may be viewed in the 
sense of freedom: when contemporary art can take any form, it can be said that 
contemporary artists work within a state of absolute freedom. However the attainment of 
this freedom culminates in the end of art as the modernist self-critical investigation of its 
own form and results in a lack of sovereignty for artists, as described by Vidokle and Kuan 
Wood in chapter one.  
 
As an artist, it is within this idea of art’s having ended that I situate my practice, having felt 
keenly this stifling sense of freedom in relation to practicing art. I contextualise my work 
within the notion of art as a ‘higher’ realm, akin to philosophy, not from a compulsion 
toward superiority but from a genuine interest in this tradition over that of art as pragmatic, 
functional or expressive: it is here that I find a convincing definition of contemporary art, as 
the outcome of the progression of modernist movements culminating in absolute freedom 
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of form and the ultimate end of art. My interest in art’s developmental, historical and 
progressive tradition lies within its reflecting and objectifying similar processes of thought 
regarding the human subject within the history of western philosophy, and is not directed 
toward any particularly significant aim or purpose. It is within the idea of art’s having ended 
that contemporary art seems most alive, due to its ability to engage with a sense of 
radicality and the movement towards freedom of thought as instigated within the modern. 
It could be said that art is vital only in the sense that it does raise such questions, and the 
idea of the end of art – while questioning art’s vitality – is ironically perhaps the only true 
manner in which art may remain vital today. 
 
The tendency for critique of Danto’s end of art to remain mired within philosophical 
concerns regarding the perceived incompatibilities inherent to his philosophical style may 
render such debate irrelevant to artists, to whom consistency of philosophical approach is of 
little interest: this may be one factor to account for contemporary artists’ lack of 
engagement with this discourse. The implications of Danto’s end of art in relation to 
practice connects more strongly to the earlier critique of Danto regarding definitions or the 
application of art, questions around what art is or does. Where the base of this concern is 
divided between that of art as pragmatic versus free, contemporary artists may perhaps 
choose to base their practice within the idea of art as autonomous or conversely situate it 
more pragmatically, with concrete aims and outcomes for the society in which it is situated. 
My own interest in art as autonomous and in relation to philosophy results in the necessity 
that I accept and involve the idea of the end of art within my practice. 
 
Having in this sense attained the sensibility of art’s having ended, the question remains as to 
how to maintain a practice within this context, or what strategy to adopt when the demand 
that art be aesthetic or object-bound is beyond its ability to respond to such a demand as 
form. For artists who wish to engage in the seemingly impossible movement toward 
radicalism or the avant garde in the contemporary moment, or for artists who feel keenly 
the end of art in relation to such ideas, the issue of a continuing art practice is a vexed one.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE END OF ART AS CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 
 
(Warhol) either expanded what art could be for future generations, or 
heralded the end of art altogether. Andy himself took both views.1 
 
PART 1 - End of art strategies 
 
As an artist Danto’s response to the end of art was to give up making it, and his practice as a 
philosopher equipped him to make the seemingly logical shift from a studio based practice 
to one based on theory, mirroring his sense that modern art’s project had shifted to the 
realm of philosophy. Much of Danto’s early discussion around the end of art concerned the 
Pop art movement, the objects of which tended to embody the sense that art had entered 
the realm of ordinary life by attaining the perceived banality, popularity and superficiality of 
this realm, rendering art as a distinct visual concern over. The fact such objects were able to 
embody this sense meant Pop artists themselves were not obliged to engage with art theory 
or discourse, contrasting with the later (but almost concurrent2) conceptual art movement 
in which an engagement with theory became as relevant as that of practice. Where 
conceptual artists such as Joseph Kosuth attempted to practice art as philosophy, Danto’s 
abandonment of a studio practice can read as a conceptual artwork in itself.  
 
The act of giving up art seems logical in the context of Danto’s theory, and he made a 
valuable contribution to a philosophy of contemporary art as a result of this choice. 
However his abandonment of practice tends instead to have reinforced the situating of the 
idea of the end of art more strictly within the realm of philosophy, establishing a view of 
Danto as complicit with this discipline. While Danto’s assessment of the development of 
modern art as a search for art’s essence through the object is relevant, his attempt to 
continue this project within the realm of philosophy by developing an essential theory of art 
via his (perhaps necessarily) complicated writing practice renders the project less urgent, 
                                                          
1
 Bob Colacello, Holy Terror – Andy Warhol Close Up (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 28. 
2
 Terry Smith discusses Ian Burn’s charging Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs (1965) with being more properly an 
example of Pop Art, hinging on a two-year difference in the proposed date of its conception: Terry Smith, ‘One 
and Three Ideas: Conceptualism Before, During and After Conceptual Art,’ e-flux journal 29 (November 2011) 
accessed September 20, 2015, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/one-and-three-ideas-conceptualism-before-
during-and-after-conceptual-art/. 
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compromising the profundity and radicality of his end of art statement. In addition, I find 
Danto’s optimistic view of the freedom inherent to art’s pluralistic state at the culmination 
of the modernist project unsatisfying, since an inability to contribute further to the (perhaps 
idealistic) modernist project of self-critique constitutes a somewhat bleak outlook as a 
practicing artist. While Danto’s optimism may be an outcome of his attempt to practice as 
an art critic while commenting on the realm of art as a philosopher, an end of art practice as 
an artist should perhaps maintain some of the nihilism of the end rather than attempt to 
cloak it with an air of positivity.  
 
The difficulty of maintaining an art practice while simultaneously questioning (or attempting 
to escape) such practice in its representing an institution of art has resulted in other artists 
giving up art historically. Marcel Duchamp gave up art as painting, or art as a ‘retinal’ 
concern, in 1912 while still in his early 20s, and more famously declared he was giving up art 
altogether in 1923 in order to play chess: ‘I don't believe in art. Science is the important 
thing today. There are rockets to the moon, so naturally you go to the moon. You don't sit 
home and dream about it. Art was a dream that became unnecessary.’3 Duchamp seemed 
to feel the impossibility of practicing within the realm of art while remaining free of it: in 
1913 he wrote a note wondering, ‘can one make works of art which are not works of art?’4 
It seems Duchamp desired an escape from art while continuing an engagement with it: 
despite having ‘officially’ given up art in 1923 he nonetheless maintained a secret studio 
practice wherein he produced his final major work, Étant donnés, from 1946 until 1966. 
 
Warhol also gave up art, in a manner that may initially appear as the relinquishment of 
painting as a medium, as indicated by this quote concerning his work Silver Clouds (1966):  
 
Since I didn’t want to paint any more, I thought…that I could give that up 
and do the movies. And then I thought that there must be a way that I have 
to finish it off, and I thought the only way is to make a painting that 
floats…the idea is to fill them with helium and let them out of your window 
and they’ll float away and that’s one less object…to move around. And, it’s 
the…well, it’s the way of finishing up painting.5 
                                                          
3
 Marcel Duchamp in Calvin Tomkins, Duchamp, a Biography, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), 408. 
4
 Ibid., 116. 
5
 Andy Warhol in Rainer Crone, Andy Warhol (New York and Washington DC: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 30. 
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Within the contemporary moment, the openness of the field and the tendency for 
contemporary artists to embrace multiple mediums would render the act of relinquishing 
painting and moving to film a simple shift in medium. For Warhol however, to give up 
‘painting’ was to give up ‘art’, as evidenced by his later statement that, ‘(the silver pillows) 
meant something special to me: it was while I was making them that I felt my art career 
floating away out the window’6. As friend, biographer and long-time Factory employee Bob 
Colacello recalls, ‘since he had announced his “retirement” from painting at a show in Paris 
in 1965, Andy saw his art as little more than the means to make money for his movie 
business.’7 In Warhol’s move to his second Factory around this time,  
 
…no place was set aside to paint and no Warhol paintings hung on 
Warhol’s walls. The man who had wanted to be Matisse now wanted to 
be Louis B. Mayer. Indeed, the second Factory was a little studio hoping 
to happen. The letterhead said “Andy Warhol Film, Inc.”8  
 
Similarly to Duchamp, Warhol appeared to have been trying to escape his profile as an artist 
in a move towards that of film maker, as evidenced by his statement that, ‘I felt my art 
career floating away’. Both Duchamp and Warhol appeared to require a new way to 
contextualise their practice post the official abandonment of such practice, Duchamp hiding 
the production of his final work within a second, ‘invisible’ studio to which nobody was 
invited, and Warhol switching from a studio for art to one for film.  
 
A more convincing attempt to give up art was made by Lee Lozano in 1970 with Drop Out 
Piece. Where her earlier work had been rendered within the traditional media of painting or 
drawing, during the 1960s Lozano’s practice became more conceptual. Art theorist Helen 
Molesworth describes Lozano’s tendency to fill notebooks with instructions she was to 
follow, ‘ranging from how much pot to smoke (as much as possible), to what to do with all 
the printed announcements she received from galleries (throw them in a pile on the studio 
floor, or throw them out the window)’9:  
 
                                                          
6
 Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, POPism: the Warhol ‘60s (London: Hutchison, 1981), 149. 
7
 Colacello, Holy Terror, 59. 
8
 Ibid., 60. 
9
 Helen Molesworth, ‘Tune in, Turn on, Drop out: The Rejection of Lee Lozano,’ Art Journal 16 no. 4 (2002): 65. 
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By the time Lee Lozano died in 1999, her last high-profile artwork could 
fairly be judged a success. “Drop Out Piece,” begun in 1970, had 
consisted of removing herself from the New York art world, of which she 
was a highly visible member, and eventually disappearing altogether 
from the public eye. Her choice of burial, in an unmarked grave outside 
Dallas, was arguably the work’s final flourish.10 
 
Thus where Duchamp and Warhol seemed unable to forgo an involvement with art beyond 
their giving up, the stringency of Lozano’s practice allowed her to maintain this action as a 
conceptual work in itself wherein she withdrew from any involvement with the art world, 
constituting her physical removal from New York (as the centre of this world) and a final 
move to her parents’ house in Dallas, Texas in 1982. 
 
The relinquishment of an art practice in favour of a real-life one was a feature of many 
conceptual practices: one example is that of Raivo Puusemp, who in 1975 approached his 
role as mayor of Rosendale, New York as an artist and the problems of the village as an 
artwork, in the hope that, ‘politics, influence and concept could come together 
compatibly’11. In Australia, Ian Milliss became increasingly less concerned with the 
production of artworks within his early practice and more interested in situating art within 
everyday situations, to the point where he ceased producing artworks for gallery contexts 
altogether in the early 1970s in favour of working more politically, via an involvement with 
the Green Bans movement12 and union activity (with artist Ian Burn13) in an effort to 
reconceive art as something that exists within the everyday work and inventions of  people 
not normally considered ‘artists’. Here, giving up art is less a concern with escaping ‘art’ as a 
concept than with creating a new version of this concept, attempting to shift the notion of 
art (as creativity) from traditionally accepted and perhaps capitalist art institutions into the 
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 Dorothy Spears, ‘Lee Lozano, Surely Defiant, Drops In,’ The New York Times, January 5, 2011, accessed 
September 21, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/arts/design/09lozano.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.  
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 E-flux announcement for Raivo Puusemp – Dissolution exhibition at Project Arts Centre Dublin 2013, 
accessed September 22, 2015, http://www.e-flux.com/announcements/raivo-
puusemp%E2%80%93dissolution/. 
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 Wendy Carlson, ‘The Invisible Artist,’ Ian Milliss website, accessed September 22, 2015, 
http://www.ianmilliss.com/text/textindex.htm.  
13
 Ian Milliss and Ian Burn, ‘Art and Working Life: Cultural activities in the Australian trade union movement,’ 
Ian Milliss website, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.ianmilliss.com/documents/AWL.htm.  
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realm of ordinary life and activism. Milliss describes (when writing of Burn) that such actions 
aimed towards: 
 
…the need for a new type of art history that looks beyond the trivial 
pursuits in art galleries and describes the far greater cultural impact of 
artists who work in media that the art world simply does not recognise 
as legitimate, for audiences that the art world does not regard as 
worthwhile.14 
 
While conceptual artists’ impetus was the establishment of a new, more egalitarian and 
freer version of the concept ‘art’ than an escape from the concept altogether, their giving up 
of traditional art practices may nonetheless be viewed within the context of the earlier 
attempts by Duchamp and Warhol to escape the concept and its institutions. 
 
The act of giving up art did not cease with the conceptual movement but has occurred more 
recently with contemporary artist Maurizio Cattelan, who announced his retirement from 
artmaking at a retrospective of his work at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York 
in 2011. While exhibitions of his existing work have continued via the arrangements of 
collectors or institutions, Cattelan himself has ceased making new work in order to ‘let his 
archive take over’: ‘There will be shows without my involvement. It will be as if I were dead. 
Technically, that is—instead of being dead and not seeing what people will do with your 
work, you will be alive and you will suffer a lot.’15 Nonetheless Cattelan – like Duchamp and 
Warhol – remains active within the art world despite his ‘retirement’, curating exhibitions, 
creating fashion spreads, editing Toilet Paper magazine and selling objects through its online 
store16.  
 
Despite the number of high-profile artists who have given up making art in the spirit of 
escape or an attempt to establish the concept ‘art’ within the actual life of society, the 
practice and reception of art via its traditional institutions continues unabated. As 
Baudrillard writes, ‘renunciation is the symmetrical and opposite movement to faith – as 
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 Ian Milliss, ‘A Tribute to Ian Burn,’ Ian Milliss website, accessed September 24, 2015, 
http://www.ianmilliss.com/documents/OnBurn.htm. 
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 Maurizio Cattelan in Carl Swanson, ‘Mister Wrong,’ New York Magazine, October 23, 2011, accessed 
September 21, 2015, http://nymag.com/arts/art/features/maurizio-cattelan-2011-10/. 
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 Toilet Paper Magazine website, http://www.toiletpapermagazine.org/, accessed 21/9/15. 
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absurd and useless. If things exist, there is no use believing in them. If they do not exist, 
there is no use renouncing them.’17 In this sense, an attempt to give up art may seem 
‘absurd and useless’ in that its renunciation may tend instead to entrench it further, as ‘the 
symmetrical and opposite movement to faith’. It is in light of this idea that the sense of 
withdrawal and escape inherent to the conceptual art movement may have resulted rather 
in the colonisation of the world by art, via the re-entrenchment of art as both object and as 
everyday situation, as Baudrillard describes: 
 
Some say that art is dematerializing. The exact opposite is true: art 
today has thoroughly entered reality. It is in museums and galleries, but 
also in trash on walls, in the street, in the banality of everything that has 
been made sacred today without any further debate. The aesthetization 
of the world is complete. Just as we now have a bureaucratic 
materialization of the social, a technological materialization of sexuality, 
a media and advertising materialization of politics, we have a semiotic 
materialization of art.18 
 
It is in this sense that the giving up of art may be both impossible and ineffective, the 
concept ‘art’ itself having survived all attempts at its dematerialisation or renunciation via 
its colonization of reality. An additional problem with the renunciation of practice is that it 
tends to renders one’s ‘voice’ invisible: while one may choose, like Danto, to shift one’s 
efforts towards a discursive or philosophical practice in order to affect art as a concept, it is 
ultimately perhaps only within the sense of art as practice that one may have the most 
impact, the withdrawal of one’s voice resulting in the loss of this chance.19 
 
Another strategy that may seem to allow the continuation of practice while simultaneously 
acknowledging art’s end (or the impossibility of practice) is within the production of 
artworks themselves, wherein references to art’s having ended may be made more or less 
overtly. Particular works by artists Mladen Stilinović, Damien Hirst, Ragnar Kjartansson or 
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 Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Strategy of Dissolution’ in The Illusion of the End, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1994), 53. 
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Fabio Mauri refer to ‘the end’ or ‘the death of art’, however no evidence exists to suggest 
that such work is intended to engage with a genuine belief in the idea of the end of art. An 
early work by Stilinović, I Hear Them Talk about the Death of Art… (1977) has been 
contextualised as a play on ‘myths and clichés’ over that of a serious engagement with or 
belief in the end of art20, and Stilinović’s later work, Three Days until the End of Art (2002) fig7 
appears to maintain a similar, somewhat ironic distance from the idea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7 Mladen Stilinović 
Drei Tage bis zum Ende der Kunst/ Three Days until the End of Art, 2002 
(materials & dimensions unknown) 
http://mladenstilinovic.com/works/6-2/  
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 Marko Golub, ‘Pain, Money, and Zeros,’ Oris Magazine, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.oris.hr/en/oris-
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Where works by Fabio Mauri frequently depict the words ‘The End’, no evidence exists to 
suggest that they refer to the end of art. Similarly, in speaking of his work The End at the 
2009 Venice Biennale, Ragnar Kjartansson refers to recent crashes in the economy and the 
‘poetic decline of manhood’21 alongside more ecological notions of ‘the end’ rather than the 
end of art itself. Damien Hirst’s work frequently refers to death, for example Death 
Explained (2007), The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991), I 
Am Become Death, Shatterer of Worlds (2006) and Monument to the Living and the Dead 
(2006), yet Hirst himself refers to this within the context of his personal obsession with 
death in general, which he identifies as, ‘a celebration of life rather than something 
morbid’22. Some objects for sale in Cattelan’s store – for example pendants shaped like 
tombstones – are inscribed with the words ‘the end’, yet there is equally no evidence 
suggesting that they refer to the end of art in light of Cattelan’s retirement. While it is 
possible to speculate on a connection between the prevalence of the theme of death or ‘the 
end’ in contemporary art and the idea of the end of art, it is difficult to find evidence of any 
artist consciously referring to this end in their utilisation of the motif.  
 
Since the end of art refers to the end of the possibility for the art object to embody its 
ontology as part of its form, an attempt to refer to this end poetically – for example via text 
or the imagery within an artwork – tends to reinforce the status of art as allegorical. While 
Craig Owens’ investigation of the ‘the allegorical impulse’ within postmodern art was made 
in an effort to provide a ‘theory of postmodernism’23 via an emphasis on such arts’ 
operating allegorically in contrast with the suppression of allegory within modern art, I view 
this theory as more effective in relation to the way artworks are read or received by an 
audience. Thus where Owens situates art as allegory within the sense of postmodernism’s 
‘deconstructive thrust’ fighting the more ‘totalizing’ impulse of modernism24, I believe a 
more convincing view may be situated within the response to artworks, whether modern or 
postmodern. This idea is illustrated by the aforementioned25 contrast between the 
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 Ragnar Kjartansson interviewed in ‘The End, by Ragnar Kjartansson,’ New Art TV produced by Gillian Sneed, 
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 Chapter 2, 71-2. 
109 
 
Hyperallergic reviewers’ questioning of Gavin Brown about the ‘meaning’ of Jannis 
Kounellis’ work Untitled (12 Horses) and Brown’s reply that the work ‘wasn’t about 
anything’: in the realms of either contemporary art or modern art, an artwork that 
challenges art’s traditional forms or modes of presentation may tend to be justified as art 
via an attempt to locate a meaning or message within it, establishing the value of the work 
within its usefulness as allegory. This relates to Owens’ statement that: 
 
Throughout its history allegory has demonstrated a capacity for 
widespread popular appeal, suggesting that its function is social as well 
as aesthetic; this would account for its frequent appropriation for 
didactic and/or exhortative purposes...26  
 
Rather than allegory contributing primarily to a definition of postmodern art, I believe its 
application as the tendency to ‘read’ (or resolve) otherwise confounding artworks holds 
more value regarding a theory of contemporary art in terms of its reception.  
 
An attempt to escape the hegemony of ‘the contemporary’ also requires an attempt to 
escape the accompanying sense of art as allegorical. Therefore a practice that refers to ‘the 
end’ or ‘the death of art’ via the inscription of such statements onto its objects (or by 
symbolising or otherwise referencing the end of art in an allegorical manner) would tend to 
maintain this hegemony rather than question or highlight it. Responding to the end of art as 
a contemporary (or post-conceptual) artist requires a different approach to the art object: 
the embodiment of the notion of the end of art within the entirety of an artist’s practice 
rather than individual works.  
 
PART 2 - My end of art practice: escaping the freedom of the contemporary 
 
If the conditions for contemporary art practice are determined by the ideals and outcome of 
the conceptual period, I position my own practice at the intersection of the ideal of art’s 
dematerialisation – a view of art as a concept – and the perceived failure of this ideal.  
Danto’s optimism around the sense of freedom allowed contemporary practice is based on 
contemporary art having been relieved of the requirement to situate itself in relation to, or 
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 Owens, ‘The Allegorical Impulse’ (part 2), 72. 
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deal with the legacy of, art history. But this freedom has resulted not only in ‘the end of art’; 
it has also lessened the philosophical significance of such practice. Moreover, if the 
modernist, self-referential project for art will remain as long as the categories ‘art’ or ‘artist’ 
remain (as Danto argues), the challenge for a philosophical post-conceptual practice is to 
confront these categories (via practice) rather than accept the freedom or pluralism of the 
postmodern state as multiple instances of individual self-expression. 
 
The impossibility of making art that questions its physical boundaries when the concept has 
none, or of escaping the freedom of the contemporary, provides an interesting challenge to 
the post-conceptual practitioner. Within my practice, it is essential I acknowledge the idea 
of the end of art as a determining factor of contemporary art production and theorisation 
due to my desire to attempt a philosophical, historical art practice within the contemporary, 
post historical moment. This desire is born of frustration with the degree of silence or lack 
of debate that seems to exist around contemporary art’s conditions, wherein the question, 
‘what is art?’ is frequently regarded as outdated or irrelevant, by artists and theorists alike. 
My own interest in art hinges solely around such questions, and contemporary art practice 
or reception in the non-historical sense of art’s materiality or affect is of little interest to me. 
To practice at the difficult nexus represented by the idea of the end of art is essential to my 
own will to engage with art at all, and also seems to me a necessary consideration regarding 
the practice and reception of the concept ‘art’ in its entirety if it is to maintain historical 
significance. 
 
The lack of efficacy I sense around either renouncing my art practice or referencing the end 
of art allegorically has led to my formulating a different end of art strategy: an experiment 
wherein I continue to produce art while making the accompanying statement that art has 
ended27. The contradictory nature of this practice embodies the contradictory sense of the 
growth of art practice and reception in the face of its diminished historic or philosophical 
value in the contemporary moment, as well as the divide that tends to exist between the 
idealistic, philosophical project of modernism and the open, pluralistic and frequently 
material nature of the contemporary art that arises from this project. The impossibility of 
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Gianni Vattimo, Weak Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012). 
111 
 
saying ‘the end of art’ and simultaneously maintaining an art practice embodies the seeming 
impossibility of relinquishing the concept ‘art’ within post-conceptual practice. This 
embodiment however is based on a sense of the concept in relation to a practice in its 
entirety, rather than as existing within the objects that result from such practice. 
 
The tendency to set parameters or projects for one’s output as an artist is associated with 
the conceptual movement, described by Osborne in relation to Sol LeWitt’s Sentences on 
Conceptual Art (1969)28:  
 
In his three-dimensional projects, the use of formal numerical rules 
(rather than poetic intuition) to establish the relations between the 
elements of a series means that the determination of a work by an idea 
involves a withdrawal of artistic subjectivity from the production of the 
actuality of the work, which becomes a combination of formal necessity 
and chance.29 
 
Osborne picks out three of LeWitt’s sentences as pertaining particularly to this idea:  
 
7. The will is secondary to the process (the artist) initiates from idea to 
completion. His wilfulness may only be ego. 
28. Once the idea is established in the artist’s mind and the final form is 
decided, the process is carried out blindly. There are many side effects 
that the artist cannot imagine. These may be used as ideas for new 
works. 
29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It 
should run its course.30 
 
Working via series or projects allows me to practice art while providing a sense of distance 
between the artworks and myself, in line with Osborne’s sense of the withdrawal of the 
artist as subject from their work. Where the concept ‘artist’ may be seen to form an 
institution of contemporary art, the withdrawal of this concept allows for critique of this 
institution via practice, which I hope to achieve by bracketing my practice in its entirety as a 
single project.  
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Baudrillard identifies the modernist impulse toward the liberation of art and the real world 
as resulting in the indexing of one on the other, ‘a deadly chiasmus for both art and the real 
world.’31 In this sense, where ‘integral reality’ can ‘only be exchanged with itself, repeating 
itself to infinity’32 and where, ‘art is simply what is discussed in the art world, in the artistic 
community that frantically stares at itself’33:  
 
Even the “creative” act replicates itself to become nothing more than 
the sign of its own operation – the true subject of a painter is no longer 
what he or she paints but the very fact that he or she paints. The painter 
paints the fact the he or she paints. In that way, at least, the idea of art 
is saved.34 
 
If an artist ‘paints the fact that they paint’ their practice is conducted less in the service of 
some independent reality and more as a quotation of practice itself (and for Baudrillard, this 
somehow saves the ‘idea’ of art). This provides a clue as to a method of escaping ‘the 
contemporary’: a conscious attempt to frame (or quote) one’s practice may relieve its 
objects of the expectation that they serve the ‘higher’ aim of representation. By framing the 
entirety of my practice as one single end of art project, I hope to ‘paint the fact that I paint’, 
bracketing the objects that result from my practice as quotes that simply refer to the 
concept ‘art’. Where ‘art’ exists within the whole of an artist’s practice – within the fact that 
they are an artist, making art and conducting themselves as such – rather than within the 
objects of that practice, contemporary art is perhaps most convincingly defined as post-
conceptual, and a practice that attempts to embrace ‘the end of art’ must be viewed in the 
light of its whole over its parts.  
 
As with my decorative painting project, the works in my end of art project are titled 
numerically and consecutively, starting (again) with number one. My end of art project 
officially began with #1 (Ealdwif) (2012) fig 8: where I intend that it form my second ‘lifelong’ 
project as an artist35, my thesis research represents the initial stages of this project. 
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     Fig 8 Elizabeth Pulie  
           #1(Ealdwif) 2012 
     acrylic and oil stick on linen, 120 x 100cm 
     photo courtesy Sarah Cottier gallery   
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Bracketing my practice as a lifelong ‘end of art’ project constitutes my primary creative act: 
since this act renders its objects of secondary concern, I am reticent to lend them 
significance by discussing them. In contrast with most conceptual art projects (and my 
previous decorative painting project) wherein strictly defined parameters tend to determine 
the form of their resulting objects, the main parameters I set for the objects of my end of art 
project are that of freedom and experimentation: while overall my end of art project 
reflects a modernist tendency toward critique and self-questioning, I intend that the objects 
in which it results reflect the freedom and multiplicity of the contemporary moment. The 
fact the project’s boundaries mandate freedom means my holding any particular objectives 
regarding the aesthetic or forms of its objects represents a compromise, since my main aim 
is that they represent an attitude suggestive of ‘anything-goes’. However in the event that 
one is compelled to create artworks in order to register the fact of one’s being an artist, 
decisions regarding what to make inevitably result in concerns around aesthetics and 
medium, rendering the existence of aims regarding artworks’ appearances inevitable.  
 
The objectives of multiplicity and experimentation resulted in my intention to include 
everything I made within my thesis research – experiments, drawings, or failed works – as 
part of my ‘official’, numbered output, and I wanted my work in its entirety to appear to 
have been produced by a series of altogether different artists. I hoped these characteristics 
would assist in a view of the artworks as props – objects which by their existence showed I 
was an artist, but which (in combination with an end of art statement) pointed toward their 
lack of value as ‘art’. I felt that multiplicity and a lack of recognisable style would remove a 
sense of my personal self as the producer of my output, raising further questions around the 
institutions of the artist and the art object.  
 
The progress of my work throughout my thesis research divides into two stages: the first 
(2012 – 2013) represents a period of experimentation remaining within the confines of 
painting, and the second (2013 – 2015) an attempted expansion of medium. The works in 
stage one point toward experimentation with form and style and an endeavour to break 
with my previously decorative concerns by adopting a painterly sensibility figs 8-10, and 
introducing a sense of representation fig 11.  
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      Fig 9 Elizabeth Pulie  
            #3 (Inhale) & #4 (Exhale) 2012 
            acrylic & ink on linen on board, each 47 x 36cm 
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Fig 10 Elizabeth Pulie  
             #7 (Inhale) & #8 (Exhale) 2012 
             acrylic and oil stick on board, each 20 x 15cm 
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         Fig 11 Elizabeth Pulie  
                      #16 (Nipple Suit) 2013 
                      acrylic and oil stick on canvas, 120 x 40cm 
   photo: Docqment 
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Including sketches and work on paper within the official output of this stage fig 12 and re-
using old paintings to make new ones fig 13 represent further breaks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 12 Elizabeth Pulie  
             #5 (Figure and Ground: Guru Show) and #2 (Nipple Suit Drawing) 2012 
             gouache and pencil on paper,#5: 17 x 17cm, #2: 23 x 13cm 
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     Fig 13 Elizabeth Pulie 
                #6 (Reuse Landscape Triptych) 2012 
                 acrylic and oil stick on linen on board, 2 panels 40 x 35cm, 1 panel 30 x 20cm 
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I held an overriding objective towards an outdated, modernist aesthetic within these early 
works, and aimed towards a sense of ‘ugliness’ in contrast with my previously decorative 
project. I wanted to emulate both the type of paintings that frequently occupy the 
neglected corners and foyers of public buildings, as well as work I had seen at local art and 
craft shows in the 1970s and 80s – slightly amateur paintings, stylistically a few decades 
behind the times. It is in relation to these aims that I judge the success or failure of this first 
stage of works: the fact the paintings are of varying standard points conversely to their 
overall success in relation to my projected aim to include all work within my numbered 
output. 
 
My employment of painting and emphasis on a modernist aesthetic represent an attempt to 
escape what may be described as contemporary tropes: while all mediums, formats and 
styles are technically allowed within the pluralism of the contemporary, it may be said that 
some are more popularly considered representative of ‘contemporary art’. These would 
include mediums such as installation, photography, video, performance or sound – mediums 
made possible in the wake of conceptual art’s escape of traditional formats and which tend 
to form a canon of contemporary art. Both in my decorative and end of art project, my 
utilising painting represents an effort to break with ‘the contemporary’ by exploiting the 
final remnants of a view of painting as outdated: here, recurring analyses of the ‘death of 
painting’36, speculation around its resurrection or extension37, and the exclusion of painting 
in ‘new media’ categorisations tend to reinforce a view of painting as a medium that was at 
some point surpassed and which may therefore require validation as a ‘contemporary’ art 
form. While all formats are possible within the contemporary moment, it is those that are 
most allowed, or that are typical of the ‘most successful’ contemporary art that I wished in 
general to avoid38.   
 
                                                          
36
 See Yve-Alain Bois, ‘Painting: The Task of Mourning’ in Endgame: Reference and Simulation in Recent 
Painting and Sculpture, (Boston: The MIT Press, 1986), 29-49, and Douglas Crimp, ‘The End of Painting,’ 
October 16 (1981): 69-86.  
37
 See Robert Nelson, The Visual Language of Painting: an aesthetic analysis of representational technique, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne 2011, accessed November 16, 2015,  
http://www.artinfo.com.au/pdf/VLP.pdf. 
38
 As a strategy, this resonates with points made by Thomas Lawson in ‘Last Exit: Painting,’ in Theories of 
Contemporary Art, ed. Richard Hertz (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 143-55.  
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In addition to my use of the painted medium, my avoidance of the contemporary within the 
first stage of my thesis research resulted in an aim to make work which was as un-
interpretable, opaque or dense as possible, despite the impossibility of this aim. Within my 
decorative painting project, my inability to make paintings that were adequately received as 
decoration may be read in light of the popular and overwhelming impulse to treat works of 
modern or contemporary art allegorically, and while I cannot ultimately control the way my 
work is received, the overriding aim for these painted works is to resist any indication that 
they explore, deconstruct, question or interrogate any particular theme, problem or idea.  
 
The second stage of works constituting my thesis research aim equally to avoid a 
contemporary aesthetic, while representing a broadening of medium to include 
experimentation with craft and textiles – however, similarly to the medium of painting, a 
craft-like sensibility can only approximate an anti-art stance in the contemporary moment. 
My experimentation with textiles was initiated by my participation in the Sydney College of 
the Arts Graduate School Conference Exhibition (2013), one of the themes of which was 
feminism. The work I produced was based on one I had made ten years earlier, Banner – 
Female Form (2003) fig 14: a stylised, decorative view of a woman’s groin and legs assuming 
an assertive stance, printed on a number of banners and installed in the streets of Sydney’s 
central business district for the exhibition Art and About (2003). 
 
This work represents my closest previous attempt to consciously embody a feminist 
sensibility: the groin-and-legs format fit the restrictively narrow pictorial space dictated by 
the banners’ dimensions, and I had liked the idea of bombarding inner city streets with a 
stylised view of a woman’s lower anatomy disguised within a decorative x-ray view. #35 - 
#37 (The Female Form II) fig 15 represents an expansion of this idea into three larger, more 
domineering banners, the super-hero poses adopted by the figures recalling the strength 
and significance represented by the fight for women’s rights historically, contrasting with 
the stylised, decorative treatment of their physical sexuality. 
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Fig 14 Elizabeth Pulie 
             The Female Form I (banner) 2003 
             printed synthetic fabric, 200 x 80cm 
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Fig 15 Elizabeth Pulie 
#35 - #37 (The Female Form II) 2013 
acrylic on hessian, wooden poles, each 400 x 180cm 
installed at Sydney College of the Arts Galleries 
photo: Jamie North 
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Where in my decorative project I had aimed to avoid themes – especially political themes – 
in an attempt to create art that was empty and lacked significance, my aim that the objects 
of my end of art project more freely reflect the nature of contemporary art means I can rely 
on, if not embrace, themes as a starting point for the creation of artworks. My use of 
themes here is in quotation marks: bracketing my practice as an overall, ‘end of art’ project 
means my treatment or employment of any particular issue lacks sincerity due to my 
questioning the significance of art objects at all as representation. Utilising themes forms 
both an attempt to quote the common expectation that contemporary art demonstrate a 
concern with politics or activism, and acts as a starting point for making work in light of the 
perceived lack of necessity I feel to do so. 
 
A sense of contradiction is embedded within the aims and outcomes of my thesis research: 
my stated desire to avoid contemporary tropes within my early painted work is contradicted 
by my later embrace of political themes, and my aim to create distance between myself and 
my work is contradicted by my allowing a sense of the personal within the objects of my 
studio research. In one sense, my considering the physical artworks incidental to my project 
and my desire that as a whole they embody a sense of ‘anything-goes’ renders these 
contradictions of diminished importance. The fact I am attempting to embody ideologies 
frequently conceived as competing – that of the modern versus the contemporary – may go 
some way to accounting for these contradictions; however they may also be explained in 
relation to Danto’s defence against critique concerning his working within the field of 
contemporary art as a critic while writing theory about that world. The reality of the life of a 
working artist is that one is frequently called upon to respond to situations or requests for  
work or ideas that may fall outside the strict parameters of one’s project, and rather than 
have these challenges represent a compromise (as tended to be the case within my 
decorative painting project), I now hope to more realistically embody contemporary 
practice via a readiness to respond to such requests. In addition, where ideally the objects 
of my end of art practice would appear to be the work of several different artists, long 
established perceptions regarding my project until this point may render a shift from a 
decorative painting practice to one encompassing forms as diverse as found photography, 
metal sculpture and sound art overly radical and compromise serious consideration of my 
project. 
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While formally satisfying, the final outcome of #35 - #37 (The Female Form II) did not match 
my intentions for it. I had aimed with this work to recall the radicalism and sense of protest 
inherent to the second-wave feminist movement by utilising materials and methods 
frequently employed by both activists and artists of that time, and while my use of hessian 
fulfilled the work’s ambitious size requirements and gestured toward the craft-like, do-it-
yourself nature of late 20th-century protest and counter-culture, the flat, painted outcome 
did not finally match this vision. Much of the work I have subsequently produced for my 
thesis research is an attempt to correct this and achieve something closer to my desired 
outcome, representing overall an experiment with textiles and other craft-like mediums.  
 
In a series of work produced for the Curating Feminism Conference at Sydney College of the 
Arts in 201439, I employed a consciously material-based approach: while I held the overall 
aim that these works form a series of large foreboding heads as vague self-portraits, rather 
than work according to a detailed plan or drawing (as I had when making #35 - #37), I 
allowed the materials themselves to dictate the evolution of the final works’ form fig 16.  
 
I found that a short period of intense focus on a sheet of hessian would reveal a pre-existing 
face within its faults and folds, forming a ready-made plan upon which I could carry out the 
work. In my consideration of this series as an overall experiment, #43 fig 17 most successfully 
approximates the combination of materials and styles I had in mind.  
                                                          
39
 Curated by Jacqueline Millner. 
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      Fig 16 Elizabeth Pulie 
      #43 - #48 2014 
      acrylic on hessian, mixed fibre, metal and wooden fastenings 
  installed at Sydney College of the Arts Galleries 
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Fig 17 Elizabeth Pulie 
      #43 2014 
      acrylic on hessian, mixed fibre, metal fastenings 
  200 x 180cm 
  photo: Docqment 
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The comical, cartoon-like features in this work counter-balance a perhaps more serious, art-
historical reference to geometric, hard-edged abstraction, and framing the work with a base 
of black fabric corrects, to a degree, the hessian’s tendency to sag and pucker, its contrast 
with the tidy black seam lending the work an overall formality. For this reason I intend to re-
work another of this series, #44, for my thesis exhibition: where it seems unfinished in its 
initial iteration fig 18, I plan to add detail to its surface or frame it with fabric in the hope of 
correcting its sack-like formlessness.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 18 Elizabeth Pulie 
     #44 2014 
     acrylic on hessian, fabric, wooden fastenings 
 200 x 150cm 
 photo: Docqment 
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The combination of aims I held for #35 - #37 (The Female Form II) – those of approximating 
a craft-like aesthetic in order to allude to the power of second wave feminism, addressing 
my personal relation and sense of indebtedness to that movement – are most successfully 
achieved with #43 and #44 from this series.  
 
To make #57 (Bedspread) I employed a similarly material-based approach: having initially 
attempted to plan this work on paper and failing, I decided to keep my overall vision for the 
work in mind while allowing the hessian itself to dictate the final outcome fig 18.   
 
The works’ subject matter retains a concern with feminism, referencing the third-wave’s 
complex relationship with issues of pornography, sexual identity and power: as a form of 
self-portraiture, this work indicates my own situation within this wave and personal 
experience with its issues. The subject of #57 (Bedspread) equally references the conditions 
of its own making, eventuating as it did from an invitation to create a work for an art fair 
held in a hotel40: here, the work references both the anonymous sexual acts conducted 
within hotel beds, alongside the sense of submission to commercial demands that both 
artists and artworks are subject to by the phenomenon of the art fair.  
 
I aim that the other works in my thesis exhibition (in production at time of writing) develop 
my use of a craft-like aesthetic via experimentation with materials and technique, based on 
themes of self-portraiture and the conditions of production of the works themselves. An 
anticipated work (potentially titled Thesis) will reference the fact of the exhibition’s existing 
within the bounds of my thesis research; a large wall-hanging forming a self-portrait will 
refer to my project’s encompassing both theory and practice as well as my personal 
relationship to the idea of the end of art; a planned hessian painting will re-work an earlier 
painting, Josie (2005) fig 19, a portrait of my maternal grandmother, as a ‘genetic’ self-
portrait.  
                                                          
40
 This work was exhibited on the bed in Sarah Cottier Gallery’s room at the Spring 1883 art fair at the 
Establishment Hotel, Sydney 2015. 
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Fig 19 Elizabeth Pulie 
     #57 (Bedspread) 2015 
     acrylic, wool, diamantes, jute on hessian 
 180 x 200cm 
  photo courtesy Sarah Cottier gallery 
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    Fig 20 Elizabeth Pulie 
         Josie 2005 
         gouache and pencil on polyester 
     40 x 30cm 
      photo: Docqment 
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While the work in my thesis exhibition arises materially and formally in the context of an 
experiment to break with the flatness of painting and embrace of a craft-like, feminist 
aesthetic, it also represents an attempt to conceptually combine the formality of a research-
based, academic approach to art-making with a sense of personal self-expression. Here, in 
combination with my end of art thesis, I aim that the work resulting from my research 
broaches to an extent the divide commonly perceived to exist between theory and practice.  
 
Despite my focus on fibre-based works, I have maintained (and will continue to maintain) a 
concurrent involvement with two-dimensional work in the form of collage and painting figs 20, 
21 in line with my objective to emphasise an openness of medium: a recent experiment with 
performance art via my re-performing of Lee Lozano’s work Decide to Boycott Women 
(1971), represents a further opening of my end of art project to new media41.  
 
The material-based approach I have utilised when working with fibre has come to inform my 
painting and collage work, frequently resulting in more interesting outcomes than that 
allowed by the more constrained approach of my previous project. Where a sense of the 
personal may enter my end of art work regarding theme, it also tends to enter the work in 
relation to process: for example over-weaving smaller areas when I become bored with 
completing a large one can result in a satisfyingly haphazard result. While such methods 
may seem obvious regarding most artists’ processes, it is only within the constraints of the 
freedom of my end of art project that I have come to realise the potential of this way of 
working. 
 
 
  
                                                          
41
 Performed at Marrickville Garage as part of Second Comings, March 2015, curated by Jane Polkinghorne and 
Sarah Newall. 
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          Fig 21 Elizabeth Pulie 
                #59 (Potential Reaction to the Idea of  
          the End of Art) 2015 
                acrylic and collage on board 
            42 x 30cm 
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Fig 22 Elizabeth Pulie 
      #56 (Self Portrait) 2015 
      acrylic, oil, ink on board 
  61 x 46cm 
   photo: Docqment 
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Fig 23 Elizabeth Pulie 
      #50 (Fucksake) 2014 
      acrylic on hessian, fibre, cloth, fimo 
  100 x 100cm 
photo courtesy Sarah Cottier gallery 
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Fig 24 Elizabeth Pulie 
     #41b (Weaving) 2014 
     bamboo, mixed fibres 
 340 x 150cm 
photo: Jamie North 
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    Fig 25 Elizabeth Pulie 
    #58 (Thesis) 2015 
    ink on card 
     60 x 40cm 
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PART 3 - Saying ‘the end of art’ 
 
Making a statement that art has ended forms an equally important part of my project and 
thesis research, counter-balancing the more typical contemporary tropes of my studio 
practice. The blunt, unequivocal nature of the statement contradicts the sense of freedom 
and openness inherent to contemporary art, echoing the contradiction implied by the 
modernist demand for a theory or philosophy of contemporary art alongside the post-
modern celebration of the lack of such theory. Just as respondents to Foster’s Questionnaire 
on the Contemporary equally defended and denied the value of a philosophy or definition 
for contemporary art, the two halves of my research thesis, viewed as theory and practice, 
may seem at odds with each other. However the various contradictions and impossibilities 
inherent to my end of art studio project – maintaining an open project while avoiding the 
openness of contemporary art, attempting to work within an anti-art medium when all 
mediums are acceptable, or employing an allegorical approach while disavowing it – render 
the axiomatic nature of an end of art statement essential.  
 
My attempt to make an end of art statement is as experimental as my studio practice since I 
am unsure how extensively, overtly or subtly it should be made: for example while I could 
include a reference to the end of art within the titles of all future works and exhibitions, I 
believe my consecutive titling of the works adequately emphasises their existing within its 
bounds. My end of art statement has for the most part been made within this thesis, as well 
as in papers I’ve presented at various conferences and symposia since commencing my 
research42. Mentioning ‘the end of art’ in response to casual queries regarding the subject 
of my research has had considerable impact, tending to lead to discussion regarding 
contemporary art with individuals of varied levels of experience with its theorisation. I make 
an end of art statement primarily to maintain a convincing contemporary practice rather 
                                                          
42
 The papers I have contributed to the following all included references to, or analyses of, the idea of the end 
of art: Conquest of Space/Science Fictional symposium: ‘Baudrillard’s Science Fiction and Contemporary Art’ 
UNSW Art and Design (2014); New Materialism graduate school conference: ‘Materialism and Contemporary 
Art’s Parole’ Sydney College of the Arts, the University of Sydney (2014); Aesthetics After Finitude conference: 
‘Human and Aesthetic Finitude’ UNSW Art and Design (2015); Reason Plus Enjoyment conference: ‘Seduction 
of the End of the End’ University of New South Wales (2015); AAANZ Annual Conference: ‘Lee Lozano’s Decide 
to Boycott Women (Re-performed): from the Conceptual to the Post-Conceptual moment’ GOMA, Brisbane 
(2015). 
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than to raise awareness or alter the conditions of contemporary art’s theorisation, and to 
this end tend to refer to it more incidentally outside theoretical contexts.43  
 
While the greatest volume of critical activity concerning Danto’s end of art originates from 
within the final decades of the last century, the idea is still referenced and critiqued within 
current discourse. In 2002, preceding his Questionnaire on the Contemporary, Hal Foster 
concedes that, ‘our condition is largely one of aftermath…we live in the wake not only of 
modernist painting and sculpture but of the post-modernist deconstructions of these forms 
as well’44. While admitting to a certain end of art history within the contemporary, Foster 
aligns Danto’s acceptance of its plurality with neo-liberal values, ‘in the sense that its 
relativism is what the rule of the market requires.’45 Writing in 2013, Peter Osborne 
describes Danto’s thesis as, ‘an inverted (and disavowed) acknowledgement of the 
inadequacy of the prevailing philosophical discourse on art’46 – in the absence of a 
philosophy for contemporary art, Osborne claims Danto turns against contemporary art 
itself, characterising it as the cause of this condition, as an art form that merely makes a 
claim to ‘the hallowed signifier “art”’47. For Osborne, Danto’s theory is simply a negative 
judgement on contemporary art’s validity as art, which he describes as a judgement ‘against 
contemporaneity itself.’48 Speculating that the apparent legitimation crisis of contemporary 
art may be ‘oversold’, Osborne declares that, ‘the market provides sufficient legitimation of 
its own: “creative industry”’49. Thus where Foster negatively assesses Danto’s view of 
contemporary art as an alignment with neoliberalism and the market, Osborne claims 
contemporary art’s legitimation by the market renders its ‘legitimation crisis’ oversold, a 
fact which he believes undermines Danto’s apparent need to critique it. 
 
Osborne’s claim that contemporary art does not require legitimation when Danto attempts 
to provide a philosophy for it is at odds with both his own statement that ‘contemporary art 
                                                          
43
 Simultaneously however, treating the end of art as a simple fact that underlies my practice seems to lend it 
greater power than expounding upon or defending it. In my brief email correspondence with Arthur Danto 
before he died, he advised me to, ‘just go ahead with the end of art, as a commonplace’. 
44
 Foster, ‘This Funeral is for the Wrong Corpse,’ 125. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 6. 
47
 Ibid., 7. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid. 
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is badly known’50 and the considerable effort he makes to develop his own philosophy. 
While an end of art statement does connote negativity, Osborne’s accusing Danto of an 
attack against ‘the contemporary’ is contradicted by the extent of Danto’s increasing 
involvement with contemporary art and artists until his death in 201351. Danto remained 
open to and critically considered all contemporary projects despite his end of art 
declaration, and while he admits that a sense of negativity did inform the initial instance of 
his theorisation, a familiarity with his work in its entirety makes apparent the degree of care 
and respect he holds for art’s significance historically.  
 
A case can be made against Osborne here: where he concludes that aesthetics is essential (if 
‘insufficient’) to a philosophy of contemporary art and characterises conceptual art’s 
fundamental drive toward dematerialisation as, ‘a misunderstanding of art’s conceptual 
character’, Osborne’s denial of conceptual artists’ aim of escape and his return of 
contemporary art to a (partial) concern with aesthetics tends to preclude the engagement 
of contemporary practice with theory. Where conceptual art’s questioning of the conditions 
of its production gave artists a degree of sovereignty over their activity (if only fleetingly), to 
return art to a concern with aesthetics or the visual tends to render artists once again mute. 
In this instance, art as discourse remains firmly within the realm of philosophy, as a place 
where theorists (such as Osborne himself) may ‘construct the contemporary’ via their ideas, 
or Foster may carry out surveys regarding contemporary art without consulting artists. 
While admittedly Danto’s own theorising of the conditions of the contemporary remained 
within his practice as a philosopher, where a potential exists for art practitioners to consider 
contemporary art as the end of art, it enables an engagement with discourse via practice. 
Rather than Danto attacking ‘contemporary art’ via his end of art statement, contemporary 
art practice is instead significantly weakened by Osborne’s precluding of any potential for 
artists to engage with a self-critical, philosophical practice by relegating art to a concern 
with aesthetics or allegory. Rather than an end of art statement privileging the realm of 
                                                          
50
 Ibid., 1. 
51
 For example, in 2010 Danto participated in Marina Abramovic’s performance event The Artist is Present at 
MOMA, New York and wrote the exhibition catalogue’s main essay; in 2012 he contributed a paper to the 
seven-hour event The Last Word at the culmination of Maurizio Cattelan’s final exhibition at the Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Museum, New York. 
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philosophy, its potential to endow an art practice with a sense of philosophy tends in fact to 
result in the opposite outcome. 
 
The significance of the concept ‘art’ within the contemporary moment may in fact be 
prolonged and nurtured by the critical nature of the idea of its ending. This relates to 
Sylvere Lotringer’s comments regarding Baudrillard’s critique of contemporary art:   
 
…the less pertinent art has become as art, the louder it keeps claiming 
its “exceptionalism.” Instead of bravely acknowledging its own 
obsolescence and questioning its own status, it is basking in its own self-
importance…it has been doing everything it could to prove that it still is 
art. In that sense Baudrillard may well be one of the last people who 
really cares about art.52 
 
This relates to Baudrillard’s claim that, ‘it is all the more necessary to talk about art now that 
there is nothing to say about it’53. Critique of contemporary art tends to result in discourse 
concerning its nature, thus the critical overtones of an end of art statement hold greater 
potential in furthering discourse than does a more collusive tendency to avoid critique. An 
end of art statement returns my art practice to a concern with art as concept, situating it 
within the bearings engendered by the legacy of conceptual art. Where questions regarding 
the nature of art are typically viewed as characteristic of ‘the modern’, the tendency for 
theorists to attempt a philosophy or definition for contemporary art reveals nostalgia for 
such characteristics, which may be satisfied by an end of art statement. 
 
The sense of historical stasis frequently attributed to the contemporary may symbolise a 
lack of futurity and therefore hope, explaining current efforts to establish a sense of the 
contemporary’s ongoing historical significance over its theorisation as the end. To ask the 
question, ‘what’s next?’ or speculate on the nature of the next art movement, form or style 
is common today. In 1961 Marcel Duchamp displayed a prescient awareness of the stasis 
inherent to the post-conceptual condition in his attempt to answer the question, ‘where do 
                                                          
52 Sylvere Lotringer, ‘Introduction: The Piracy of Art,’ The Conspiracy of Art, 9-21.  
53
 Baudrillard, ‘Art…Contemporary of Itself,’ 91. 
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we go from here?’54 – a sense echoed within the 2013 publication, What’s Next? Art after 
Crisis55. Liam Gillick identifies the inclusiveness typical of contemporary art as having, 
‘helped suppress a critique of what art is and more importantly what comes next. We know 
what comes next as things stand: more contemporary art.’56 In disparaging the idea that art 
has ended, Foster asks, ‘what comes after these ends, or perhaps (if they did not quite 
occur) in lieu of them?’57, and suggests, ‘rather than deny this aftermath, then, why not 
admit it and ask “what now, what else?”’58 Similarly, Smith’s third ‘current’ of contemporary 
art asks, ‘what kind of art may be made now?’59 
 
Osborne claims that the, ‘inability to think the concept of art at once philosophically and 
historically with any kind of futurity’60 itself precludes a philosophical grasp of contemporary 
art in its difference to that of the past: his thesis concludes that, ‘at its best, contemporary 
art models experimental practices of negation that puncture horizons of expectation’61. 
Hypotheses regarding a sense of art’s futurity suggest the ideal of progress over that of 
stasis, yet the modernist nature of this sense of futurity tends to preclude a theorisation of 
contemporary art as distinct from the modern in any significant or meaningful sense. The 
idea of the end of art challenges such futurity, and may hold potential to more radically shift 
the conditions or character of ‘the contemporary’ by embracing nihilism over the optimism 
of futurity62. An experiment in embracing the stasis embodied by the end of art may 
represent a more realistic experience of ‘the contemporary’ than its refusal; where the 
                                                          
54
 Marcel Duchamp, ‘Where do we go from Here?’ address to a symposium at the Philadelphia Museum 
College of Art, March 1961, trans. Helen Meakins, first published in Studio International 189 (1975): 128. 
55
 What's next? Art after Crisis: A Reader, eds. John M. Hedinger & Torsten Meyer (Berlin: Kadmos, 2013). The 
177 responses collected in this reader tend to mirror the pluralistic tendencies of previously cited attempts to 
theorise the contemporary and encompasses the usual breadth of themes, including (but not limited to) re-
performance or the recycling of art, the trend to the curatorial, collaboration and participation, digitalisation, 
networking and new media, the reception of art, art as business, the ‘creative industries’, post-autonomous 
art, globalisation, etc. 
56
 Gillick, ‘Contemporary art does not account for that which is taking place.’ 
57 Foster, ‘This Funeral is for the Wrong Corpse,’ 125. 
58
 Ibid., 129. 
59
 Smith, What is Contemporary Art? 270. 
60
 Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 8. 
61
 Ibid., 211. 
62
 This idea resonates with Gianni Vattimo’s reading of Nietzsche’s ‘accomplished nihilism’; see, ‘An Apology 
for Nihilism’ in The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern Culture, trans. Jon R. Snyder, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 19. 
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question ‘what’s next?’ tends to reinforce the abyss of the end, a more wholehearted ‘end 
of art’ statement, while admittedly risky and of unknown consequence, may come to fill it.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
One might ask why so many precautions must be taken instead of 
merely putting one’s work out in the normal fashion, leaving comment 
to the critics and other professional gossip columnists. The answer is 
very simple: complete rupture with art—such as it is envisaged, such as 
it is known, such as it is practiced—has become the only possible means 
of proceeding along the path of no return upon which thought must 
embark.1 
 
A concern with realism may be seen to have informed the progression of modern Western 
art movements, arising from a compulsion to free the concept ‘art’ from the perceived 
institutional distortions of its form that precluded its effective representation of reality. 
Where original 19th century Realists strove to depict the real life of ordinary people over the 
romantic, institutionalised version, Impressionists painted light in order to capture that 
which the eye registered in reality, Post-Impressionists reinforced the sense of reality as 
subjective via their individual views of the world. Conceptual artists attempted to position 
their activity outside the sanctioned space of the institution and its objects in order to bring 
the concept ‘art’ closer to the real. Where ‘art’ may be more broadly defined as ‘culture’ in 
the way it represents our subjectivity and world view, distortions resulting from the 
exclusion of particular subjects or groups by cultural institutions render the concept 
contested. Thus, a sense of the liberation of the concept ‘art’ is inherent to a view of 
modern western art as historically linear. In instances where particular cultures (world views 
or realities) are excluded by mainstream definitions of art, the (modernist) move to de-
institutionalise or liberate the concept may be viewed as a fight against or attack on the 
institution and its objects with the intention of rendering the concept closer to a 
representation of the reality of one’s cultural worldview, or a move toward the ‘real’.2 
 
Where Hegel determined that art ended at the outset of modernism on account of its 
reduced representational significance, the tendency to progressively liberate the concept 
from its role as representation by the movements that followed culminate in conceptual or 
                                                          
1
 Daniel Buren, excerpts from ‘Beware!’ in Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of 
Artists’ Writings, eds. Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz (California: University of California Press, 1996), 140-8. 
2
 Ironically perhaps, this tendency toward realism reflects the mimetic impulse of pre-modern art, despite the 
fact that modern art forms grew from a challenge to the necessity of this impulse. 
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pop art’s signalling the end of art as a visual concern altogether, in the ultimate 
indiscernibility between art objects and real ones as theorised by Danto. It is in this way that 
contemporary art marks the end of art, where, ‘art today has thoroughly entered reality’3 – 
this idea is illustrated by the common story of the cleaner who inadvertently discards a work 
of art by mistaking it for garbage on the museum floor4 or the tendency for museum 
audiences to perceive recording hygrothermographs (or other functional equipment within 
the museum) as art due to their resembling readymades or conceptual artworks. When art 
is indiscernible from real life it is finally liberated as a concept, a fact which paradoxically 
tends to reinforce the authority of the institution, since if art truly did exist everywhere and 
in everything it would – finally and irrevocably – end. In the face of the loss of this concept 
within the ‘real’, institutions are obliged to protect it ever more fiercely, a fact that reflects 
the failure of conceptual art’s ultimate attempt at liberation. In the instance that the 
institution validates all attempts at art’s escape, the hegemony of ‘the contemporary’ tends 
to occlude an outsider position, rendering a sense of radicalism or self-critique impossible 
and resulting in a loss of sovereignty in the role of the artist.  
 
The historical stasis that appears to accompany the end of the modernist project of self-
critique results in attempts to reinstate a sense of radicality or historical significance to the 
realm of contemporary art via a search for its definition, philosophy or discourse. Hence, the 
current desire to define contemporary art in itself forms a feature of the contemporary 
moment. Nostalgia for criticality and radicalism – traits of the modern – informs these 
attempts, a fact made apparent when their discourse pits the contemporary against the 
modern as a new or improved moment or historical position. However, ambivalence 
toward, avoidance, or outright rejection of the ideological, utopian thinking perceived as 
marking the failure of ‘the modern’ thwarts this nostalgia: whether critical or radical 
thought is possible in the absence of utopian ideals is a philosophical question beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it is a question that contextualises my thesis research and practice 
as a contemporary artist working with an awareness of the end of art.  
                                                          
3
 Baudrillard, ‘Towards the Vanishing Point of Art’, 105. 
4
 See for example Colin Blackstock, ‘Cleaner Clears up Hirst’s Ashtray Art,’ The Guardian Online, October 19, 
2001, accessed November 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/oct/19/arts.highereducation1. 
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Despite official characterisations of ‘the contemporary’ as marking the end of ideology, 
narratives or historical progression, it can be said that, at the very least, the concept ‘art’ 
continues to represent a space for potentially critical or radical thought. Even in the face of 
the current impossibility for the art object, or art as form, to embody radicality or critique 
within the all-encompassing embrace of ‘the contemporary’, the potential for the concept 
‘art’ as a space for radical thought – even if only as a dream – means a space for art itself 
may be left open. This potential is illustrated by the openness of art institutions toward the 
idea of the end of art, made evident by the considerable number of symposia and 
publications that gave serious consideration to Danto’s idea in its initial iteration5. While in 
2010 Cuauhtémoc Medina made unforgiving critique of contemporary art in e-flux6, he 
nonetheless concludes his critique with an analysis of the field’s potential for radicality, 
claiming that, ‘despite the way art is entwined with the social structures of capitalism, 
contemporary art circuits are some of the only remaining spaces in which leftist thought still 
circulates as public discourse.’7 According to Medina, ‘if we should question the ethical 
significance of participating in contemporary art circuits, this sole fact ought to vindicate 
us’8: in this sense, when institutions of contemporary art allow for self-critique they form a 
final space for radical thought, at a time when, according to Medina, ‘academic circuits have 
ossified and become increasingly isolated, and where the classical modern role of the public 
intellectual dwindles before the cataclysmic power of media networks and the balkanization 
of political opinion.’9  
 
Medina describes the project for contemporary art as an ‘uncomfortable inheritance’: 
 
…we would need to consider the possibility that our task may consist, in 
large part, of protecting utopia—seen as the necessary collusion of the 
past with what lies ahead—from its demise at the hands of the ideology 
of present time.10 
 
                                                          
5
 It is also displayed by the openness of the academy (in this instance, Sydney College of the Arts, the 
University of Sydney) to supporting my own research regarding the end of art as a contemporary artist. 
6
 See chapter one, page 23. 
7
 Medina, ‘Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses.’ 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
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In describing the ‘genealogy’ of this inheritance, Medina quotes Dada artist and historian 
Hans Richter’s description of Dada as having been, ‘the vacuum created by the sudden 
arrival of freedom and the possibilities it seemed to offer’11. Depicting this influential 
modern movement in terms of liberation echoes both the conceptual artists’ project of the 
liberation of art as a concept, as well as Baudrillard’s argument concerning the ultimate 
liberation of art and the real within the modern. To Medina, this inheritance obliges 
contemporary art to, ‘deal with the ambivalence of the experience of emancipation’12: I 
believe that what Medina refers to as the ‘ideology of the present time’ (that from which he 
claims ‘utopia’ must be saved) can be seen to exist within the denial of such ambivalence, as 
demonstrated by attempts to provide a paradigm for contemporary art. 
 
My thesis research is situated within the vacuum of this ambivalence as a reality for 
contemporary artists: a reality wherein a self-critical, ontological art practice is no longer 
possible due to the ultimate liberation of art as a visual form and the subsequent co-
optation of all form by the institution. My thesis’ emphasis on a studio project (‘art’ in a 
positive sense) and accompanying end of art statement (‘art’ in a negative sense) embodies 
this ambivalence, potentially representing a space within the hegemony of the 
contemporary for self-critique and a philosophical engagement with art. While this research 
may risk irrelevance due to the sense of impotence surrounding attempts to escape ‘the 
contemporary’, a certain necessity equally informs it: the very possibility of my practice is 
facilitated by its contextualisation within the idea of the end of art due to my interest in art 
as it intersects with philosophy, or art as concept over experience or affect. 
 
While my thesis research facilitates my studio practice I believe it also holds potential for a 
larger theorisation of contemporary art, satisfying equally the current search for a narrative 
or philosophy of contemporary art alongside the desire to avoid metanarratives or 
ideology13. Baudrillard describes radical thought as, ‘intelligence without hope but with a 
                                                          
11
 Hans Richter in Medina, ‘Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses.’ 
12
 Medina, ‘Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses.’ 
13
 While again, the constraints of this research do not allow for a full investigation of such theorisation, the 
making of an end of art statement alongside the continuation of art practice may relate to several recent 
philosophical positions due to its raising of issues such as representation, the subject, the ‘real’ and ideology, 
and the extrapolation of such theory may form the basis for potential future research. 
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happy form’14 and claims that, ‘true depressive thought’ lies with, ‘those who only speak of 
moving forward and transforming the world while they are incapable of transforming their 
own language’15. While theorists such as Osborne desire a sense of futurity for a philosophy 
of contemporary art, I believe the denial of such futurity represents an opportunity for 
radical thought via the return of a sense of realism to contemporary art practice. Where 
Medina states we must protect utopia, ‘from its demise at the hands of the ideology of 
present time’16, the optimism that surrounds an ideology of contemporary art in regards to 
a sense of its futurity is resisted by an end of art statement, providing an opportunity for 
radical thought and, potentially, a subsequent protection of utopia.  
 
Medina’s demand that we resist the ‘ideology of the present time’ may thus require more 
serious consideration of the end of art; here, the ‘many ends of art’, speculation as to what 
may follow ‘them’17 or categorisations of the end of art in terms of a game18 are replaced by 
a view of the development of modern and contemporary art as formed by one single end. 
My role as an artist provides me with a privileged position from which to make a serious 
claim that art has ended via my thesis research, and my ability to maintain and expand my 
practice in light of this claim may allow me to, as Medina describes it, ‘find an advantage to 
the constant collision of perfume and theory that we experience in contemporary art’.19 At 
its most radical, an end of art statement reflects Baudrillard’s speculation that, as an 
extension of the logic of the conceptual moment, ‘art could do no better than to disappear 
without any further discussion’20. In the absence of this particular possibility, this thesis 
research points to a potentially convincing theorisation for contemporary art, provides a 
conjunction of art theory with practice that enables the very possibility of practice, and 
returns a sense of sovereignty to artists.  
 
  
                                                          
14
 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Radical Thought (1996),’ The Conspiracy of Art, 174. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Medina, ‘Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses.’ 
17
 Foster, ‘This Funeral is for the Wrong Corpse,’ 125. 
18
 See David Joselit and Elisabeth Sussman, eds: Endgame: Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting and 
Sculpture (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986). 
19
 Medina, ‘Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses.’ 
20
 Baudrillard, ‘Art…Contemporary of Itself,’ 91. 
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APPENDIX A 
CODED RESULTS OF HAL FOSTER’S QUESTIONNAIRE ON ‘THE CONTEMPORARY’ 
 
CODE 
No. 
responses 
Percentage 
of total 
Contemporary art is postcolonial/global/involves the peripheries and can't be defined 
from a centre 
14 44 
Contemporary art must be defined in relation to contemporary issues, it shows us our 
world as it is now 
12 37 
The nature of contemporary art reflects the structure of neoliberalism/capitalism 12 37 
We need to define/interrogate contemporary art, it’s good to have the discussion 11 34 
Contemporary art has a strange temporality/is both in and out of time/is not linear/is a 
multeity of times 
11 34 
Rather than one broad definition, we need to define contemporary art via specific 
artist's works, histories and locations 
11 34 
There is value in contemporary art's lack of a definition, its uncertainty is a good thing 11 34 
Contemporary art resists paradigms/we don’t need a paradigm/grand narrative for it 10 31 
Contemporary art exists as a multitude of times/histories/modernities/we need a 
comparative history of contemporary art  
9 28 
Contemporary art is globalising/homogenising/the extension of western culture to 
dominate other cultures 
9 28 
Contemporary art must be defined in its relation to the past/the future/as a way of 
understanding other temporalities 
8 25 
Much contemporary art is the latest iteration of the modern/is modern art in a 
globalised/diverse world 
8 25 
Contemporary art is a contradictory field, it is defined by antinomies 8 25 
The category 'contemporary art' was invented by the art market/can be defined in its 
relation to the art market 
8 25 
‘Contemporary art’ as a category/definition of art has been around a long time/is 
outdated 
7 22 
It is difficult to historicise the present/ contemporary art is too present/in a state of 
becoming to be historicised 
7 22 
Embracing the multeities and specific instances of contemporary art may lead to it 
becoming a nominal term/obscure its meaning 
7 22 
Traditional art history can't account for contemporary art 7 22 
Contemporary art can be defined by the rise of the biennale/international temporary 
exhibitions 
7 22 
Art criticism is threatened by the heterogeneity of contemporary art, and needs to 
reinvent itself 
7 22 
165 
 
APPENDIX A continued 
 
 
  
CODE 
No. 
responses 
Percentage 
of total 
The pluralism of contemporary art is not a negative feature/holds possibility 7 22 
Contemporary art's multitude of forms and practices is considered a crisis, thus the 
search for a paradigm 
6 19 
The fact that many contemporary artists are alive and available as a resource has 
implications for historizing contemporary art 
6 19 
The homogeneity of contemporary art is a positive thing as it gives a voice to the 
periphery/challenges the mainstream 
6 19 
Contemporary art is directly related to/the result of the conditions of post 
modernism/we can use the arguments/paradigms of post-modernist discourse to 
address contemporary art 
6 19 
The study of contemporary art has increased enormously in the recent past, so it needs 
a rigorous definition 
5 16 
Contemporary art does not lack form, means of defining it do exist 5 16 
Contemporary art can be defined by its shift towards the image/visuality/involves 
visual studies 
4 12 
All art was once contemporary, contemporary art must be defined in relation to 
contemporary art of the past 
4 12 
Pluralism in art is not a new thing/art has lacked unity since the early 80s 4 12 
The reception of contemporary art is important in defining/historicising it/artwork as 
'affect'/role of the viewer/participatory 
4 12 
Contemporary art's provenance is yet to be proven/contemporary art is too subject to 
the whims of fashion/the market to be confidently theorised 
2 6 
We need to define/interrogate contemporary art otherwise it may become 
meaningless/vacuous/must take it seriously 
2 6 
Artists/other art practitioners don't identify what they're doing with 'the 
contemporary'/don't historicise their practice  
2 6 
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#3 (Inhale)   
2012  
acrylic & ink on  
linen on board 
36 x 47cm 
#1 (Ealdwif)   
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on linen  
120 x 100cm 
#2 (Nipple Suit  
Drawing) 
2012  
gouache & pencil 
on paper 
23x13cm 
#4 (Exhale)  
2012  
acrylic & ink on 
linen on board 
36 x 47cm 
#5 (Figure & Ground  
Guru Show)  
2012  
gouache & pencil on  
paper  
17 x 17cm 
#6 (Reuse Landscape  
Triptych) 2012 
acrylic, ink & oil stick  
on linen on board  
2 panels 40 x 35cm  
1 panel 30 x 20cm 
#9a (Inhale)  
2012  
acrylic & medium 
on board 
61 x 45cm 
#7 (Inhale) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board 
15 x 20cm  
#8 (Exhale) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board 
15 x 20cm  
#9b (Exhale) 2012  
acrylic & medium on  
canvas 
3 panels  
each 15 x 15cm 
#11 (Exhale ) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas  
90 x 77cm 
#12 (Inhale Smoke 
I) 2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas 
100 x 80cm  
#13 (Exhale Smoke 
II) 2012  
acrylic & oil stick on 
canvas 
100 x 80cm  
#14 Inhale (Lines I) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas 
100 x 80cm  
#15 Inhale (Lines 
II) 2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas 
100 x 80cm  
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#17 (Stone Villa) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
21 x 15cm 
#16 (Nipple Suit) 
2012  
acrylic, oil stick, 
ink on linen 
107 x 51cm 
#18 (Stone Villa) 
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
21 x 15cm 
#19 Seaweed  
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
21 x 15cm 
#20 Burn  
2012  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
21x15cm 
#21 (Jan 13 Study I: 
Mishka Fundraiser)  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick on 
canvas board  
30 x 25cm 
#22 (Jan 13 Study 
II) 2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas board  
30 x 25cm 
#23 (Jan 13 Study 
III)  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas board  
30 x 25cm 
#24 End of Art 
(Toilet Door)  
2013  
acrylic on wooden 
door 
180 x 70cm 
#25 (EP 25 
study)2013 
acrylic on canvas 
board   
41 x 30cm  
#26 (Vector)  
2013  
acrylic & pencil 
on linen  
160 x 120cm  
#27  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas board  
40 x 30cm 
#28  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas board  
40 x 30cm  
#29  
2013 
acrylic & oil stick 
on canvas board   
40 x 30cm  
#30  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
50 x 40cm 
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#33 
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
50 x 40cm 
#34 
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
50 x 40cm 
#31  
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
50 x 40cm 
#32 
2013  
acrylic & oil stick 
on board  
50 x 40cm 
#35 (The Female 
Form II) 
2013  
acrylic on hessian, 
wooden pole 
400 x 180cm  
#37 (The Female 
Form II) 
2013  
acrylic on hessian, 
wooden pole 
400 x 180cm  
#36 (The Female 
Form II) 
2013  
acrylic on hessian, 
wooden pole 
400 x 180cm  
#38  
2013   
acrylic on hessian 
fimo, metal rods 
180 x 300cm 
#39  
2013   
acrylic on hessian 
fimo, metal rods 
180 x 80cm 
#40 
2013   
acrylic on hessian 
fimo, metal rods 
180 x 300cm 
#41a (sanded 
board Stonevilla) 
2013 
acrylic on board 
21 x 15cm  
#41b (weaving) 
2014  
bamboo, mixed 
fibres 
340 x150cm 
#43  
2014  
paint & mixed 
fibre on hessian, 
metal rings 
186 x 94cm 
#44 
2014  
paint, mixed fibre 
on hessian, cane 
rings 
200 x 118cm 
#45 
2014  
mixed fibres, 
fabric, acrylic on 
hessian, wooden 
rings  
260 x 200cm 
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#48 
2014  
acrylic and mixed 
fibre on hessian, 
metal rings 
100 x 150cm 
#47 
2014  
acrylic and mixed 
fibre on hessian, 
metal rings 
200 x 150cm 
#46  
2014  
acrylic, mixed 
fibre on hessian, 
wooden rings 
200 x 180cm 
#49 (ICAN 
fundraiser)  
2014  
paper, hessian, 
fibre, calico, board  
42 x 30cm  
#50 (Fucksake)  
2014  
acrylic on hessian,  
fibre, cloth, fimo  
100 x 100cm 
#51 (for Jack)  
2014  
collage & fabric  
on board  
21 x 14cm 
#52 (Stonevilla)  
2014  
collage on 
boxboard, fabric, 
wood 
21 x 15cm  
#53 (for Soo)  
2014  
collage on 
boxboard, mixed 
fibres  
44 x 32cm 
#54 (floor work) 
2014  
paint & applique 
on hessian  
154 x 114cm 
#55 (MEN)  
2015  
paint & diamantes 
on hessian  
88 x 58cm 
#56 (Self Portrait) 
2015  
acrylic, oil, ink on 
board  
61 x 46cm  
#57 (Bedspread)  
2015  
acrylic, wool, 
diamantes and jute 
on hessian   
180 x 200cm  
#58 (Thesis)  
2015 
ink on card 
60 x 40cm 
#59 (potential 
reaction to the idea 
of the end of art)  
2015 
collage & acrylic on 
board 
42 x 30cm 
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